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CEO NETWORK IN FINANCE 
 
This thesis examines how information flow among CEOs with social and professional 
connections affects firms and the market environment. Using biographical information about  
CEOs of U.S. public companies supplied by BoardEx from 2000-2016, the thesis relies on 
CEOs’ educational background, employment history and social activities (e.g., social clubs) to 
estimate the social and professional connections of CEOs as a measure of firms’ network size. 
The thesis then examines how networks among CEOs facilitate commonality in liquidity and 
commonality in asset growth among connected firms.  
 
The essay titled “CEO Connectedness and Commonality in Liquidity”, examines the effects of 
CEOs’ social and professional networks on stock liquidity commonality. We hypothesize that 
the stock liquidity of firms whose CEOs are connected will covary. In this essay, we uniquely 
construct our measure of commonality in stock liquidity among connected firms and provide 
strong evidence supporting the hypothesis. Outcomes reveal that the more connections firms 
share with each other, the more their stock liquidity comove. The essay further tests channels 
through which CEOs social and professional networks drive commonality in stock liquidity 
across connected firms. Results indicate that similarity in corporate finance policies and trading 
activities across connected firms are two channels through which CEOs’ personal connections 
drive liquidity covariation. We address endogeneity concerns and provide results that 
demonstrate that the magnitude of stock liquidity covariation among connected firms reduces 




The essay titled “CEO Peer Effects and Commonality in Asset Growth”, sought to investigate 
whether educational, social and professional networks among CEOs affect managerial asset 
growth decisions. We hypothesize that the asset growth rate of firms whose CEOs are 
connected will comove because of group thinking and peer influence. Using biographical 
information regarding CEOs of U.S. public firms from 2000 – 2016, the results suggest that 
CEO connectedness facilitates asset growth covariation. We conclude that a CEO is more likely 
to increase assets if peers in the network have recently done so leading to asset growth 
covariation across connected firms. Next, we test for channels through which CEOs’ 
connections may drive asset growth commonality across connected firms. The results reveal 
that commonality in asset growth decisions among connected firms stems from two possible 
channels: the adoption of related acquisition and research and development investment 
strategies. On the economic benefits of commonality in asset growth to shareholders, results 
show that commonality in asset growth across connected firms affects shareholders negatively. 
On endogeneity, tests indicate that the death of a CEO significantly reduces the extent of asset 
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CHAPTER 1  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Introduction and Research Objective  
Recent empirical finance research suggests that CEOs’ social and professional networks affect 
managerial decisions. These studies indicate that corporate decisions such as firms’ financial 
policies, investment styles, corporate governance practices, acquisitions, and compensation 
decisions are influenced significantly by the CEOs’ network ties through information diffusion 
across top executives social networks (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Schonlau and Singh, 2009; 
El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2015; Kaustia and Rantala, 2015; Fracassi, 2016). This thesis 
adds to the literature by investigating how a CEO’s network of social and professional contacts, 
a potentially valuable source of external information, impacts stock liquidity and asset growth 
decisions across connected firms.  
 
The thesis specifically investigates the role of CEO networks as a determinant of commonality 
in liquidity and commonality in asset growth among connected firms for several reasons. First, 
CEO networks represent a pivotal channel through which firms disseminate information to 
make informed decisions. This channel is critical because CEOs’ contributions are crucial in 
firm decisions coupled with the fact that CEOs possess specialized expertise that the board of 
directors may lack. In addition, social and professional connections of top executives provide 
better access to valuable information on product characteristics, regulatory change, industry 
trends and market dynamics (Granovetter, 1974; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995a; Tsai, 2001; 
Inkpen and Tsang, 2005). This information advantage, according to Burt (1997) and Faleye, 
Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014), makes individuals more innovative in taking quality 
strategic decisions. Secondly, Asch and Guetzkow (1951) observe that the tendency of an 
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individual to fall victim to group thinking increases among individuals with social and 
professional connections. This indicates that CEOs with connections are prone to group 
thinking because of constant pressure from peer CEOs. Arguably, peer practices and decisions 
driven by group thinking can convey information or effect changes in the market environment 
that can motivate firms and individuals to undertake similar actions. Fracassi (2016) confirms 
this view in indicating that top management with social and professional connections adopt 
similar corporate finance policies.  
 
Though firms benefit enormously from social and professional networks of top executives, 
CEOs in a network are more susceptible to group thinking bias (Mizruchi, 1996). For instance, 
when wrong information permeates through CEOs’ social and professional networks, it is more 
likely that the information would be reinforced and accepted without much consideration 
because of the trust among individuals within the network. Thus, analyzing the effects of group 
thinking among CEOs with social and professional networks, which may cause market 
conditions to change and cause individuals to adopt similar corporate policies and practices, is 
essential. This thesis contributes to the stream of research that examines the effects of CEOs’ 
social and professional networks in finance (Kirchmaier and Stathopoulos, 2008; Engelberg, 
Goa, and Parsons, 2013; Liu, 2014; El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik, 2015; Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 
2015).  
 
This thesis addresses two key questions. The first question is whether stock liquidity across 
connected firms covaries. This question is distinguished from previous research on social 
networks in finance in that: it examines how CEOs’ social and professional networks may 
facilitate commonality in stock liquidity. In the market microstructure literature, extensive 
research shows that commonality in stock liquidity is prevalent among stocks (Chordia, Roll, 
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and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001); however, 
we know relatively little about the factors that fuel commonality in liquidity among stocks. 
Some key prior studies attribute liquidity commonality among stocks to 1supply-side sources 
and 2demand-side sources (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Huberman and Halka, 
2001; Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Koch, Ruenzi, and 
Starks, 2016).  
 
As explained above, the first question investigates whether CEOs’ networks, which create firm 
connectedness, are a potential source of liquidity covariation among stocks. Thus, we propose 
that the stock liquidity of firms that are connected strongly covary. Specifically, we argue that 
the adoption of similar corporate policies among firm CEOs with network ties facilitates the 
transfer of similar information into security markets by connected firms. The release of similar 
information into security markets may cause changes in the market environment and influence 
the trading strategies of market participants and investors holding stocks that are connected to 
be related. This essay is the first to determine whether connectedness among firms influences 
liquidity commonality among stocks. We next test for possible channels through which CEOs’ 
connectedness may drive commonality in liquidity. First, we investigate whether CEOs’ 
networks impact commonality in liquidity through the adoption of similar corporate finance 
policies across connected firms. Second, we examine whether the trading activities of 
connected firms are related leading to stock liquidity covariation across connected stocks.   
                                                          
1 Supply-side explanation for liquidity commonality argues that when there is uncertainty about the market or 
when there is a market drop, liquidity providers are forced to liquidate their positions across many assets to recover 
from losses, which leads to a decline in market liquidity creating an illiquidity spiral. This decrease in liquidity or 
increase in volatility fuels commonality in liquidity. The supply side-sources argue that commonality in liquidity 
is higher during high market volatility, higher interest rates in the economy and poor financial market conditions, 
which affect the availability of capital to financial intermediaries. 
 
2 Demand-side explanation for sources of liquidity commonality mainly lies in the intense trading by institutional 
investors, mutual fund institutions, banking firms and insurance companies 
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Our second question is whether asset growth decisions among connected firms are related. 
Specifically, we conjecture that through peer effects, CEOs are likely to mimic asset growth 
decisions of peers. Previous psychology studies demonstrate that social interactions lead to 
group thinking because of peer effects (Cowan and Todorovic, 2000). Peer effects are a subject 
of increasing attention in many areas of economics and finance. Empirical evidence comes 
from individual’s investment choices (Duflo and Saez, 2002; Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004), 
labour markets (Topa, Bayer, and Ross, 2008), consumption decisions (Cai, Chen, and Fang, 
2009) and the use of welfare benefits (Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000). Peer 
influence is interesting since it can generate social multiplier effects through which a small 
initial shock can lead to more substantial changes as the actions of peers directly influence 
individuals. Clearly, corporate activities are a potential domain for such peer effects since 
corporate managers pay close attention to the actions of their peers. For example, Bizjak, 
Lemmon, and Naveen (2008) note that 96% of firms report utilizing peer groups to set 
executive pay. Recently, Kaustia and Rantala (2015), examining social learning and corporate 
peer effects, discover that firms are more likely to split their stock if peer firms have recently 
done so. In line with the above intuition, we probe further to ascertain whether a CEO is more 
likely to grow assets after peer CEOs belonging to the same network have done so. We 
hypothesize that through peer influence, commonality in asset growth will exist across 
connected firms. The essay further tests for the economic benefits of peer firms imitating each 
other when it comes to asset growth decisions.  
 
2. A Summary of the Major Findings 
In this thesis, we test the hypotheses on a sample of U.S. firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges 
(NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) from 2000 to 2016. The first essay examines CEO networks as a 
potential determining factor of liquidity commonality among stocks in U.S. stock exchanges. 
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In line with Anton and Polk (2014) and Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016), we construct our 
measure of stock liquidity commonality across connected firms. The results suggest that stock 
liquidity commonality exists among connected stocks. Additional tests demonstrate that the 
magnitude of stock liquidity commonality increases with firm network size. This implies that 
the larger the network of a firm, the greater the extent of comovement between the firm’s stock 
liquidity and the stock liquidity of firms connected to the firm. To explain our findings, we 
argue that firms with a large network adopt or mimic the actions of a large number of firms; 
hence, their trading activities end up having related components with other firms. In effect, 
their stock liquidity covaries with the stock liquidity of several firms, hence the greater their 
liquidity commonality. From the work of Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we control for time 
and firm effects and find that the main results are not driven by time-invariant unobservable 
heterogeneity. Overall, our results show that the more connections firms share with each other, 
the more comovement their stock liquidity has.  
 
Next, we conduct tests to examine the potential channels through which CEOs’ networks may 
influence commonality in liquidity across connected firms. First, we test whether similarity in 
corporate finance policies among connected firms facilitates liquidity commonality across the 
firms. We conjecture that similarity in corporate finance policy decisions among connected 
firms facilitates the transfer of related information from these firms to the security markets, 
which affects market conditions. Hence, traders holding stocks of firms that are connected and, 
as a result, adopt similar actions may employ similar trading strategies when trading these 
stocks leading to a correlated trading pattern across the stocks. We provide evidence that 
similarity in corporate finance policy decisions, such as capital investment, as well as R&D, 
drive liquidity commonality across connected firms. As a second channel, we analyze the 
trading activities of connected firms to ascertain whether they have shared components. Using 
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the number of trades as the measure of trading activity, the results indicate that the trading 
activities of connected firms have a common component that drives liquidity commonality in 
the stocks. The essay attributes the commonality in trading activities among connected stocks 
to activities of a group of investors trading in the stocks. We argue that if a group of investors 
trades in such stocks around the same time, then there will be a common component in their 
‘buy’ and ‘sell’ orders leading to commonality in liquidity across connected stocks.   
 
In the next set of analyses, we investigate whether CEOs’ networks influence asset growth rates 
of firms with CEOs having social and professional connections. We conjecture that, because of 
peer effects, asset growth rates across connected firms will covary. We test this claim using 
U.S. firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. We discover that CEO connectedness 
significantly affects asset growth rate decisions. The results show that connected firms grow 
assets similarly leading to commonality in asset growth across the firms. We attribute the results 
to group thinking across the CEOs’ networks that influences individuals in the network to adopt 
similar actions. We conclude that a CEO is more likely to increase a firm’s assets if a colleague 
CEO in the network has done so. Thus, the asset growth rates of firms are influenced 
significantly by peer performance and peer effects.  
 
With the above discoveries, we test the net economic significance of asset growth commonality 
on shareholder value. Cooper, Gulen, and Schil (2008) and Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2103) 
suggest that asset growth negatively affects stock returns. Those studies demonstrate that firms 
with higher asset growth rates record lower stock returns. In a recent study, Hvide and Östberg 
(2015) find that stock market investment decisions of individuals are positively correlated with 
those of coworkers. As per the findings above, we hypothesize that asset growth commonality 
can negatively affect firms. This is because, through peer influence, a CEO may imitate a peer 
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CEO to increase assets even if the asset addition may not add value to the firm. With our earlier 
findings confirming that asset growth decisions of connected CEOs are related, it is essential 
we test for the relationship between commonality in asset growth and firm performance. It is 
likely that commonality in asset growth may not yield significant economic benefits to firms 
since a firm may increase assets at a specific time as a result of CEO peer effects that may not 
be strategic for the firm.  
 
The results indicate a significant negative relationship between commonality in asset growth 
and firm performance. Thus, the similarity in asset growth across connected firms does not 
enhance shareholder value. Focusing on the channels that information flow through, CEOs’ 
networks may drive asset growth commonality across connected firms; we find that similarity 
in M&A decisions among CEOs with personal connections significantly influences 
commonality in asset growth among these firms. Additional tests reveal that similarity in R&D 
investment decisions among connected firms drives commonality in asset growth. These 
outcomes confirm that CEOs’ networks significantly influence several aspects of corporate 
decisions through peer effects (Grennan, 2019; Bouwan, 2011).  
 
3. Contribution  
This thesis contributes to several lines of research. First, the thesis contributes to studies on the 
determinants of commonality in liquidity across stocks in various stock markets by establishing 
that CEOs’ networks drive commonality in stock liquidity across connected stocks (Chordia, 
Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Coughenour and Saad, 2004; 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). From the results, 
asset growth decisions of connected CEOs are closely related because of peer influence. The 
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thesis also contributes to work on peer effects in corporate finance (Bouwan, 2011; Shue, 2013; 
Fracassi, 2016; Grennan, 2019).  
 
This thesis complements studies examining the determinants of asset growth (Simon and 
Bonini, 1958; Eatwell, 1971; Lucas Jr, 1978; Sawyer, 1985; Evans, 1987b, Audretsch, Klomp, 
and Santarelli, 2004) and how asset growth affects firm performance (Cooper, Gulen, and Schil, 
2008; Lipson, Morta, and Schill, 2011; Lam and Wei, 2012). In addition, this thesis contributes 
significantly to studies on social learning among individuals with personal connections and the 
effects on individuals within the network (Kaustia and Rantala, 2015) 
 
The discoveries reported in this thesis is close to studies that analyze the influence of peer 
actions of firm executives in security markets. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) infer that 
through social networks, information is transferred to security markets, which influences the 
decisions of mutual fund managers. Kaustia and Knupfer (2012) find that social influence 
affects an individual’s stock market entry especially when better opportunities exist for the 
individual to gain knowledge through social learning. We provide evidence to suggest that 
convergence in corporate behavior among connected firms facilitates the transfer of similar 
information to stock markets which causes changes in the market environment that influence 
investors’ trading strategies leading to commonality in liquidity.  
 
4. Thesis Structure  
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the role of CEOs’ 
networks on stock liquidity commonality. Chapter 3 explores the effects of CEOs’ personal 
connections on a firm’s asset growth decisions. Chapter 4 concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
CEO CONNECTEDNESS AND COMMONALITY IN LIQUIDITY 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Several studies report the significant role of stock liquidity in asset pricing, market efficiency, 
and corporate finance. Lam and Tam (2011), for example, indicate that liquidity is an essential 
factor for pricing returns after taking well-documented asset pricing factors into consideration. 
Similarly, Amihud (2002) demonstrates that there exists a significant relationship between 
liquidity and expected returns. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) suggest that liquidity 
stimulates arbitrage activity, which, in turn, enhances market efficiency. In the context of stock 
liquidity and corporate investment decisions, Beeker-Blease and Paul (2006) find a positive 
relationship between changes in capital expenditure and changes in stock liquidity, indicating 
that stock liquidity influences corporate investment decisions. On the other hand, substantial 
literature provides evidence that stock liquidity covary across stocks using single and multiple 
market datasets, i.e., there is commonality in liquidity among stocks (Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Coughenour 
and Saad, 2004; Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Hameed Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; 
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2011; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012; Koch, Ruenzi, and 
Starks, 2016).  
 
These studies on the determinants of liquidity covariation across stocks offer several 
hypotheses on why stock liquidity covary. Some of these studies hypothesize that stock 
liquidity covariation is influenced by noise trading effects (Huberman and Halka, 2001), 
liquidity demand heterogeneity (Fernando, 2003), macroeconomic announcements (Brockman, 
Chung, and Pérignon, 2009), market volatility (Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010), 
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institutional stock ownership (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016), 
and country level supply-side and demand-side factors (Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012). All 
these studies primarily focus on financial market-level determinants but ignore firm-specific 
determinants such as the personal traits and characteristics of corporate decision makers. 
Although extensive research suggests commonality in liquidity is prevalent among stocks, , the 
current literature  on factors causing commonality in liquidity is limited to the asset pricing and 
market microstructure literature, hence, this current study aims to be the first to establish a link 
between the corporate finance literature and liquidity commonality.  
 
Interestingly, although available research suggests that CEO networks impact corporate 
policies, earlier studies on the sources of commonality in liquidity do not consider the crucial 
role of social and professional networks of top executives (e.g. CEOs) who direct corporate 
behavior and implement policies that can cause changes in stock markets to influence 
individual stock liquidity and stock liquidity covariation among stocks. To the extent that a 
growing number of studies in empirical finance infer that CEOs’ social and professional 
networks significantly influence firms’ corporate policies such as capital investment (Fracassi, 
2016), earnings management (Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013), acquisition activities (El-Khatib, 
Fogel, and Jandik, 2015; Shue, 2013), and board monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 2012), this 
factor is crucial and noteworthy for consideration as a potential source of stock liquidity 
covariation. In addition, a number of studies have long acknowledged the existence of social 
interaction effects among individual investors (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Shiller, 1984; 
Shiller and Pound, 1989), which further indicates the need for an investigation into the 
relationship between CEOs’ networks and commonality in stock liquidity.     
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This essay investigates whether the presence of social, educational and professional 
connections among CEOs of U.S. public companies drives liquidity commonality among 
connected firms. The essay focuses on social networks because, in the sociology literature, 
Coleman (1988), for instance, finds that social interactions greatly influence economic 
behavior. In another study, Ellison and Fudenberg (1995a) indicate that economic agents often 
rely on whatever information they have obtained via casual word-of-mouth communication in 
making decisions leading to similarity in corporate behavior. In effect, we hypothesize that the 
stock liquidity of connected firms will comove. Specifically, the essay seeks to address the 
following research questions: Does stock liquidity of firms that are connected through CEOs’ 
social and professional networks covary? If so, through which channel(s) does liquidity 
covariation manifest itself through CEOs’ networks?  
 
The intuition for our hypothesis is as follows: From the social network literature, Banerjee 
(1992), Park and Sabourian (2011), and Welch (1992), using information based models, explain 
that social network and information structures, which play significant roles in information 
diffusion, often fuel similarity in behavior among individuals with personal connections 
because of peer effects. In finance, Fracassi (2016) shows that information flow through the 
social and professional networks of directors and top executives influence corporate decisions 
across firms leading to convergence in corporate policies. Fracassi (2016) reveals that 
connected firms have similar corporate finance policies such as capital investment. Similarly, 
Bouwman (2011) finds that networks among firm executives cause corporate governance 
practices to converge. These studies demonstrate the effects of social interaction that creates 
peer effects among firm top executives and directions in corporations.  
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In this essay, we argue that the convergence of corporate policies and practices among 
connected firms can convey information to market participants or cause changes in the stock 
market that can motivate individual investors to trade in the same direction or adopt similar 
trading strategies to cause commonality in liquidity. In line with the intuition outlined in this 
stream of research, this essay argues that, if connected public companies take similar corporate 
finance policies and corporate governance practices around the same time, then similar signals 
will be transmitted to the broader market because of the similarity in corporate behaviour. We, 
therefore, conjecture that this can influence and induce decisions by economic agents’ trading 
strategies in connected stocks. If stocks of connected firms are held by a large group of investors 
who tend to trade in the same direction and at the same time, then these connected stocks would 
be characterized by strong comovements in their liquidity. We argue that similarity in corporate 
behavior among connected firms could influence investors’ decisions to trade in the same 
direction causing their stock liquidity to comove.   
 
To answer the baseline question, we construct a measure of liquidity commonality across 
connected stocks and then estimate its relationship with the stock’s network size measured by 
the CEO’s connectedness degree. Specifically, we use Amihud (2002) and CRSP Bid-Ask 
Spread as proxies for daily stock liquidity. In line with the approach of Koch, Ruenzi, and 
Starks (2016), we construct our measure of liquidity covariation among connected firms by 
first estimating the relationship between the stock’s own liquidity and the liquidity of a portfolio 
of stocks connected to the individual stock (excluding the individual stock from the portfolio). 
We label the regression coefficient of an individual stock’s liquidity on the liquidity of a 
portfolio of stocks connected to the individual stock, the Social Network Liquidity Beta.  
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As anticipated in our hypotheses, our results reveal a significant positive relationship between 
individual stock liquidity and the liquidity of a portfolio of stocks connected to the individual 
stock. Our results thus establish that the stock liquidity of firms that are connected comoves. 
We further extend our investigation in two directions. First, we carry out an additional test to 
determine whether indeed liquidity commonality is prevalent across connected stocks. 
Focusing on the extent of a firm’s total network size, we study the relationship between the 
social network liquidity beta coefficient for each stock and the network size of each firm 
measured by the firm’s CEO’s network size. Consistent with our baseline hypotheses, we find 
a significant positive relationship between the social network liquidity beta and a CEO’s 
network size.  
 
Following the results above, we investigate the channels through which information flows 
across CEOs’ social network ties could drive liquidity commonality across connected stocks. 
First, we examine whether commonality in stock liquidity across connected stocks could be 
driven by commonality in corporate outcomes that can affect stock liquidity. To address that, 
we examine the relationship between social network liquidity beta and our measure of corporate 
policy similarity for each stock. Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe a significant 
relationship between social network liquidity beta and the similarity of corporate finance 
policies. 
 
To explain our results, let us assume that different mutual fund managers hold different 
portfolios of stocks with stocks in each portfolio that are socially connected. If these socially 
connected firms end up taking similar corporate finance policy decisions, we argue that 
voluntary trading is likely to correlate across funds because similar information is transmitted 
to the market through similar corporate finance policy decisions. The reason is that fund 
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managers react to the same kind of public information, rely on many of the same information 
sources and follow similar investment styles with similar catalysts because of the similarity in 
corporate finance policies across connected firms that induces liquidity comovement. If 
voluntary trading is correlated across funds, we anticipate that firms with large network size 
will have a particularly high commonality in liquidity. We provide evidence to support this 
argument. We further argue that, through similarity in corporate behavior, spontaneous trading 
will be observed when stocks experience liquidity shocks leading to buying and selling pressure 
(Coval and Stafford, 2007; Khan, Kogan, and Serafeim, 2012). If this buying and selling 
pressure is correlated across connected stocks, it will result in liquidity commonality.  
 
Secondly, we investigate whether commonality in trading activities of connected firms induces 
liquidity comovement. Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) note that there exist time series 
patterns in commonality in stock returns, liquidity and trading activity across individual stocks 
in developed and emerging economies. The time-series tests show that commonality in liquidity 
is high during periods of high market volatility and high market-wide trading activity. This 
essay argues that the trading activity of connected firms’ will have common components, which 
can give rise to liquidity commonality among connected stocks. This essay proposes that the 
more connected two firms are, the more similar their trading activities are because of the 
similarity in trading strategies of market participants. Using the number of trades as our 
measure of trading activity, we examine the relationship between social network liquidity beta 
and commonality in trading activities across connected firms. We find strong evidence that 
commonality in trading activity across connected stocks is an essential driver of the relationship 
between liquidity commonality and CEOs’ social networks. This evidence aligns with our 
hypothesis that liquidity comovement across connected stocks could be induced by similarity 
in trading activity among connected stocks.  
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The essay contributes to various threads of research. First, the investigation contributes to the 
literature on the impact of social networks in finance. Several studies have shown that social 
and professional interaction across firms affects corporate behaviour (Renneboog and Zhao, 
2011; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2014; Khanna, Kim, and Lu, 
2015) and corporate financial policies (Davis, 1991; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; 
Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009; Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010; Larcker, So, and 
Wang, 2013; Shue, 2013; Fracassi, 2016). We add to the literature on CEOs’ social networks 
with evidence that CEOs’ social and professional network ties drive liquidity commonality 
across connected stocks through two channels. Precisely, we establish the role of CEOs’ social 
network’s in explaining commonality in liquidity.  
 
Secondly, we contribute to research on information sources of traders and market participants. 
Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki (2016) observe that, through director connectedness, 
information spreads either directly or inadvertently to sophisticated traders such as short sellers, 
options traders and institutional investors. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) infer that sell-
side equity analysts and mutual fund managers, through their educational networks, obtain 
superior information. Generally, we contribute immensely to the emerging literature regarding 
how the corporate policies of firms affect the information environment. We demonstrate that 
the imitation of corporate policies gives information to traders through a signal effect that 
influences their trading behavior leading to liquidity comovement across connected firms.  
 
The essay proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the literature review and hypothesis development. 
Section 3 describes the data and sample selection. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and 
Section 5 documents the conclusion and recommendation.  
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2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development   
2.1 CEO Networks and Corporate Policies  
In developing the hypotheses for this essay, we combine two strands of literature. We first rely 
on the social science literature to define a CEO’s social and professional network as the number 
of ties the CEO has with other CEOs through shared educational, work experience and social 
activities. From the literature, CEOs who are well connected have two essential qualities: (i) 
they have better access to relevant information both internal and external to the firm and (ii) 
they have higher status and greater economic and political power (Brass and Burkhardt, 1992; 
Haunschild, 1993a; Mizruchi, 1996; Mizruchi and Potts, 1998; Granovetter, 2005). Through 
strategic alignment, CEOs and firms both benefit from these traits through advantages in the 
product, labor, and corporate control markets. For example, Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and 
Shleifer, (1992) and Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) find that members in a network 
rely on shared information obtained from other members in the network to improve, advocate 
and institute acceptable and beneficial practices. The essay argues that CEOs rely on the 
accomplishments of other CEOs in the networks to implement policies and develop strategies 
for actions that tend to influence firms’ stock liquidity levels.  
 
The application of the networks of top executives to business matters is well established in the 
management literature (Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Tsai, 2001); however, recently 
studies in the finance literature examine the effect of social and professional networks of CEOs 
in corporate decisions. Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2010), for example, examine whether 
strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists in local markets help restrict entry by 
outside venture capitalists, thus improving the incumbent’s bargaining power over 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015) investigate whether CEOs’ 
networks influence mergers and acquisitions and Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) examine 
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whether CEO connectedness enhances corporate fraud. Likewise, Ahern and Harford (2014) 
examine whether industry connectedness leads to a higher incidence of cross-industry mergers. 
These studies focus on CEOs because of the significant “soft” influence CEOs have aside from 
the legal authority to direct corporate behavior and dictate board decisions. In this essay, we 
build on this line of research to study the impacts of CEOs’ networks on commonality in stock 
liquidity. We argue that CEOs, through their social and professional interactions, obtain vital, 
sensitive information shared across the networks that they rely on to influence decisions in the 
firm that can cause changes to the firm’s stock liquidity. Through information diffusion, 
managers belonging to the same network end up having similar preferences regarding corporate 
financial decisions because of the actions of their social peers. Consistent with Coughenour and 
Saad (2004), we argue that commonality in corporate decisions across connected firms could 
generate commonality in stock liquidity. Arguably, this essay is the first in the empirical finance 
literature to consider establishing a relationship between commonality in liquidity and 
similarity in corporate policies.  
 
We focus on social and professional networks as a potential source of commonality in stock 
liquidity because activities across social ties by individuals within the networks can 
significantly influence firm level decision-making that can affect the decisions of market 
participants and investors. For instance, top executives’ networks facilitate information 
diffusion and transmission within the group (Holzer, 1987; Granovetter, 1995; Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson, 2004), which causes managers to often rely on their social and 
professional networks to obtain valuable experience, gather vital market information, exchange 
resources, and identify business opportunities (Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013). Ellision 
and Fundenberg (1995) and Watts (2003) reveal that, in situations where individuals do not 
23 | P a g e  
 
have all the required information, they often depend on whatever information they receive from 
an individual within their network due to peer effect.  
 
There is now a growing literature on the effects of CEOs’ social and professional networks in 
finance. Key studies have explored the role and the effects of CEO networks in corporate 
finance policy decisions of firms: compensation (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Hwang and 
Kim, 2009; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013), executive employment options in the labour 
market (Liu, 2014), stock options backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009), corporate 
innovation (Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran , 2014), board monitoring (Fracassi and Tate, 
2012), acquisition activity (Haunschild, 1993b; Cai and Sevilir, 2011; Ishii and Xuan 2014; 
Renneboog and Zhao, 2014;), tax rates (Brown and Drake, 2013), private equity transactions 
(Stuart and Yim, 2010), IPOs (Cooney, Madureira, and Singh, 2015), earnings management 
(Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013), and future performance (Horton, Millo, and Serafeim, 2012; 
Larcker, So, and Wayng, 2013). However, none of these studies examined the relationship 
between CEOs network size and stock liquidity commonality. Primarily, these studies do not 
consider whether the strength and the size of top management’s social and professional 
networks can affect stock liquidity covariation among connected firms.  
 
2.2 Overview of Commonality in Liquidity 
  
The second strand of literature centres on stock liquidity and sources of liquidity commonality. 
Liquidity, defined as the ease with which investors trade assets in a timely manner at a low 
cost, plays a significant role in the price formation process of individual stocks. Hence, a stock’s 
liquidity and how it changes over time are important to market participants. Earlier studies 
document that liquidity goes beyond individual securities (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and 
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Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Amihud, 2002; Brockman and Chung 2002; 
Domowitz, Hansch, and Wang, 2005; Brockman, Chung, and Pérignon, 2009). These studies 
specify that stock liquidity comove with other securities, which makes liquidity more than just 
a feature of individual securities. In the past two decades, a number of studies confirmed this 
phenomenon (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Brockman and Chung, 2002; 
Brockman and Chung, 2008; Brockman, Chung, and, Pérignon, 2009; Karolyi, Lee, and van 
Dijk, 2012; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). Understanding liquidity comovement across 
stocks and its determinants are relevant to market participants for several reasons. For example, 
some studies discovered liquidity covariation across stocks can influence expected returns 
(Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2000, 2011) note the determinants and pricing of stock liquidity commonality 
have vital implications for international asset pricing. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) show that a stock’s exposure to systematic liquidity is 
most likely a price source of risk.  
 
Most studies on liquidity commonality attribute the fundamental sources of liquidity 
comovement in stock markets to two sources: asymmetric information and market conditions. 
Asymmetric information can occur at the market and/or industry level. For instance, during 
transactions, market participants who have no private information about firms are likely to lose 
by transacting business with an informed trader whose knowledge regarding the stock may be 
superior. Similarly, when new information that affects all stocks in the market hits the market, 
liquidity covariation across stocks tends to occur. Huberman and Halka (2001) specify that for 
quote driven markets, the trading frequency of individual stocks positively affects liquidity 
proxies. Brockman and Chung (2002) suggest that since trading volume contains relevant 
information regarding informed trading, traders end up splitting their orders into small and 
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medium size trades to hide their existence; this process of tactfully breaking up orders results 
in having market-wide and industry-wide trading frequencies with related components that 
contribute to liquidity commonality.  
 
Market conditions sources of liquidity commonality are classified into supply-side and 
demand-side sources. Prior studies suggest that supply-side sources of comovement in liquidity 
include funding constraints of financial intermediaries (Coughenour and Saad, 2004; 
Brunnermeier, 2009; Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 
2012). A cross-section of prior studies provides evidence that demand-side sources of 
commonality in liquidity include investor sentiment (Huberman and Halka, 2001), ownership 
level of institutions (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016) and 
correlated trading patterns among investors (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; 
Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). Brockman, Chung, and Pérignon, (2009) show that, in addition 
to the demand-side and supply-side sources of liquidity commonality, both country-specific 
(domestic) and U.S. macroeconomic announcements drive stock liquidity comovement.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
An important factor motivating this essay is that the actions of people in a network can 
influence individual preferences and decisions as a result of shared information through 
interactions; this influences corporate outcomes. This is highlighted by Nguyen, Hagendorff, 
and Eshraghi (2016) and Hvide and Östberg (2015) who show that personal connections 
facilitate the exchange of vital, sensitive information, ideas and knowledge that significantly 
influences the decision making of individuals. Ellison and Fudenberg (1995b) and DeMarzo, 
Kaniel, and Kremer (2008) comprehensively evaluate the impact of word-of-mouth effects 
among connected individuals. In the financial context, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008) use 
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social networks to identify the transfer of information in security markets. They find social 
networks to be an essential mechanism for information flow into asset prices since portfolio 
managers perform significantly better by holding stocks that are connected than holding stocks 
that are not connected. This essay conjectures that liquidity commonality across stocks may 
arise from the transfer of similar information from connected firms to security markets, which 
can influence the trading strategies of market participants leading to liquidity commonality.  
 
As outlined above, network ties provide better access to information and enhance decision 
making at the firm level. As prior studies point out (Chiu, Teoh, and Tian, 2013; Shue, 2013; 
Leary and Roberts, 2014; Kaustia and Rantala, 2015), directors use information obtained 
through their networks to direct corporate behavior. This essay extends the impact of director 
network ties to market microstructure by focusing on how similarity in corporate decisions 
across connected firms taken at the firm level drive liquidity commonality. We argue that the 
transfer of information into the security market by connected stocks might influence the 
decisions of liquidity demanders trading strategies across these connected stocks to be 
correlated. The novelty of this essay rests on the application of social network measures to 
ascertain how they influence stock liquidity comovement across stocks.  
 
The essay hypothesizes that social and professional network ties among corporate executives 
influence the trading pattern of investors. This assertion is driven by the fact that the more two 
companies are connected with each other, the more similar their corporate decisions are. Thus, 
similar decisions will send similar signals from the two companies to the stock market, which 
will affect the trading choices and strategies of analysts and investors. We argue that similar 
signals sent to markets by the two connected companies causes investors to trade in a correlated 
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pattern contributing to commonality in liquidity. Accordingly, we predict that the liquidity of 
firms that are connected would comove. The first hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Stock liquidity of connected firms will strongly comove. 
 
Next, we examine whether the relationship in hypothesis 1 vary for differences in network size. 
The connection to an executive director facilitates information sharing since executive directors 
have better, excellent, direct knowledge regarding their company and have the power to 
influence corporate decisions. Since information sharing in the network benefits both the CEO 
and the firms, we expect that the relationship in hypothesis 1 will strengthen for firms with a 
larger network. We employ the CEO’s number of connections to other CEOs as the proxy for 
a firm’s network size. Following the above, we expect the extent and magnitude of liquidity 
comovement for firms with a larger network to be greater. Consequently, we predict a positive 
relationship between liquidity commonality and CEOs’ networks size. The second hypothesis 
is: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Liquidity commonality increases with the CEO’s network size. 
 
Conceptually, empirical evidence implies that liquidity covariation can arise from supply-side 
and demand-side sources (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Kamara, 
Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes, 2010; 
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). However, for factors influencing commonality in liquidity 
among stocks, some studies suggest that different investor types drive liquidity commonality 
(Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012). Other studies attribute liquidity comovements to market 
design with evidence of the existence of commonality in liquidity in quote driven (Chordia, 
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Roll, and Subrahmayam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001) and 
order driven markets (Brockman and Chung, 2002). However, Coughenour and Saad (2004) 
find that liquidity commonality arises from the fact that each NYSE specialist firm provides 
liquidity to many stocks because of shared capital and information among specialist firms. 
Thus, stock liquidity comoves with the liquidity of other stocks handled by the same specialist 
firm. We argue that firm interconnections that lead to similarity in corporate behavior could 
give rise to liquidity comovement across connected firms since similarity in corporate behavior 
could cause changes in stock markets and influence market participants’ decisions.  
 
Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013) specify that directors who serve on different boards are 
information carriers who ‘infect’ other susceptible firms on whose board they sit with 
information. Hence, firms with shared directors are likely to make similar corporate decisions 
such as earnings management, around the same time. Likewise, Fracassi (2016) uses the social 
and professional networks of key executives and directors to explain how social networks affect 
the corporate finance policy decisions of connected firms. He argues that managers are 
influenced by their social peers when making corporate policy decisions because of information 
flow through the social and professional networks. A natural implication of this theory is that 
one firm can transmit its shocks or decisions to another firm through information flow 
irrespective of the industry affiliation of the firm. From Fracassi’s work, the information flow 
enables companies in the network to invest in a less idiosyncratic way and exhibit better 
economic performance. We expand on this argument by applying it to stock liquidity 
commonality. The third hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Similarity in corporate finance policies across firms is a channel through 
which CEO connectedness contributes to liquidity commonality. 
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We conduct tests to examine whether commonality in trading activity across connected firms 
drives liquidity commonality.  We argue that daily movement in liquidity and trading activity 
of firms can be influenced by shared information across CEOs’ social and professional 
networks since market participants rely on information from the security markets to adopt 
trading strategies. Hence, the stock liquidity of connected firms adopting similar corporate 
decisions is likely to experience similar trading activity. We conjecture that the number of daily 
transactions and volume of trade across firms whose CEOs are connected could have common 
components because of similar corporate behavior that can fuel liquidity covariation across the 
firms. The fourth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Correlated trading activity across connected firms is a channel through which 
CEO connectedness contributes to liquidity commonality.  
 
3. Data and Sample Selection  
We begin with the BoardEx database, which provides biographical information on firms’ senior 
executives and board members. For each director or executive, BoardEx compiles a full 
historical profile containing employment history, current employment, board memberships, 
educational background, and social activities such as memberships in social and charitable 
organizations. For this essay, we focus only on U.S. firms in BoardEx with a sample period 
from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2016.BoardEx reports generated in December 2016 
provide a summary of board composition and/or senior executives by year for 18,314 firms in 
North America including 13,688 U.S. firms.  
 
We proceed to extract firm-level financial and accounting information from Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat North American Database and merge the BoardEx data with Compustat by linking 
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the BoardEx firm identifier (Company ID) to the Compustat Identifier (GVKEY). BoardEx 
provides the ISIN for firms with stock quotes. We extract CUSIP from ISIN and match it to 
Compustat header CUSIP. Of the 13,688 U.S. firms in BoardEx, we are able to find the 
GVKEY for 7,527. For BoardEx firms without an ISIN, we use a Levenshtein algorithm to aid 
approximate name matching and verify the matched pairs manually. We are able to find the 
GVKEY for an additional 3,563 U.S. firms in BoardEx under this procedure. In total, we found 
11,090 out of 13,688 (81%) U.S. firms covered by BoardEx for 1 January 2000 to 31 December 
2016. 
 
Next, we identify CEOs from the 11,090 U.S. firms obtained from BoardEx. In BoardEx, 
individual’s employment role is recorded regardless of whether the individual’s role continues 
or has ended. Hence, we identify CEOs as individuals with the role name CEO, CEO/President, 
CEO/Chairman, Chairman/President/CEO and CEO/CFO. Next, we select individuals with 
those employment roles and find 13,980 CEOs for 8,736 out of 11,090 U.S. firms. We use the 
biographical information of the CEOs to define four social networks representing different 
social interactions among pairs of individuals in the final data sample.  
 
We obtain stock price information from CRSP. Using the link history table of the 
CRSP/Compustat dataset, we merge BoardEx and Compustat fundamentals data with CRSP 
stock liquidity data. To identify a unique CRSP security identifier (PERMNO) for each firm-
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3.1 Variable Construction  
3.1.1. CEO Network Size Measure 
We start by aggregating all types of CEOs’ social and professional ties (hereafter, CEO network 
size) into a single index and test whether it explains liquidity commonality. A CEO’s network 
size is calculated by counting the number of other CEOs with whom the CEO has connections 
each year. A CEO network connection at year t is defined as one established between a CEO 
and another CEO if they link on one or more of employment, education or other social activities 
(e.g., social club) during or the prior to year t (Fracassi. 2016). 
 
From earlier studies, such as Engelberg, Goa, and Parsons (2013), Liu (2014) and Fracassi 
(2016), this essay defines CEO professional and social networks as follows: two CEOs are 
connected in a professional network through their previous employment if CEO 1 of company 
‘A’ was a board member or top management member of company ‘B’ headed by CEO 2. In 
situations where CEO 1 and CEO 2 sat on the board of directors of a third company, the essay 
classify the two CEOs as professionally connected through their past employment. For this 
essay, we focus on past employment connections in the last 5 years because past employment 
connections that go beyond 5 years are weak connections. Two CEOs are connected in a 
professional network through their current employment if CEO 1 of company ‘A’ is a board 
member or top management member of company ‘B’ headed by CEO 2. Where CEO 1 and 
CEO 2 sit on the board of directors of a third company, the essay classify the two CEOs as 
professionally connected through their employment network.  
 
Two CEOs are connected in a social network through their past education if they graduated 
within one year of each other from the same school and have the same degree type. We identify 
educational overlaps based on BoardEx’s education file. We clean the BoardEx education file 
32 | P a g e  
 
in two ways following Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008). First, for universities that have 
multiple institute IDs, we aggregate them into single institute ID. For instance, BoardEx assigns 
“Stanford University” ID# 743905436, “Stanford University School of Law” ID# 9164011235, 
“Stanford University Graduate School of Business” ID# 8034910975 and “Stanford Medical 
School” ID# 5881139024. We merge all of these into the “Stanford University” ID. BoardEx 
does not list a unique ID for degree type, only a description of the executive’s qualification. 
We map each degree description on one of six types: (1) undergraduate, (2) masters, (3) MBA, 
(4) PhD, (5) law, and (6) other. We ignore professional certificates such as CFA or CPA 
because we focus only on university qualifications as in earlier studies (Engelberg, Gao, and 
Parsons, 2011). Following Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons (2013), two CEOs are connected 
socially if they belong or share membership in a social club or professional/non-professional 
association and are both active.  
 
Our measure of CEO network size for a firm CEO is the sum of the direct professional and 




_ _ _ _ _
_ _ _
i t i t i t
i t
CEO Total Network Size Network Employment Network Education
Network Other Social Activities
   

     1 
 
where network employment sums a CEO’s current and past employment connections, network 
education sums a CEO’s education connections, and network other activities sums a CEO’s 
other social activity connections.  
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3.1.2. Liquidity Measures 
 
a. Amihud Illiquidity Measure 
We calculate the daily change in stock illiquidity for all stocks in our sample. Our sample of 
stocks includes ordinary common shares (share codes 10 and 11) listed on NYSE and AMEX. 
We exclude NASDAQ stock from our main analysis because the NASDAQ trading volume is 
inflated relative to NYSE/AMEX trading volumes because of different trading mechanisms 
(Koch, Ruenzi, and Startks, 2016). We obtain data on stock price, return, trading volume, the 
number of transactions, bid and ask from the CRSP daily file and construct daily Amihud and 
CRSP-Spread measures from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2016. Following Amihud, (2002) 
and Koch, Ruenzi, and Startks (2016), we calculate the daily change in stock illiquidity for all 
common stocks on NYSE and AMEX that trade above $5 per share and have at least 10 trades 
a month. To prevent outliers from affecting our analysis, we eliminate the top and bottom 1% 
of observations of the measure. From the filtering process, we obtain a sample of 8,048 ordinary 
stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX.  
 
Following Amihud (2002), Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012), Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 
(2016) and Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2017), we estimate  stock liquidity using the  Amihud 
(2002) measure of daily stock illiquidity, which equals the absolute value of stock i's return for 
day d divided by the dollar volume of stock i’s trading on day d . The Amihud measure is ideal 
for the purposes of the study because it is based on widely available data and can be calculated 
for a large number of stocks at a daily frequency. Evidence also supports the use of the Amihud 
measure as a reliable proxy for a stock’s liquidity with strong correlations between it and 
alternative liquidity measures based on intraday microstructure measures (Hasbrouck and 
Seppi, 2001; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). In addition, Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) show that 
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the Amihud measure is a good proxy for price effect. We then calculate the daily change in 
Amihud Illiquidity for all stocks in our sample by taking the difference of the logs of Amihud’s 
Illiqudity measure (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). This is 



















































illiq            2 
Where r i,d is the return on stock I for day d  and , 1i ddvol   is the dollar volume for stock i on 
day d . 
 
b. The CRSP Bid-Ask Spread 
Following Chung and Zhang (2014) we calculate the CRSP bid-ask spread for stock i for 
day d using the following formula. 
 
,/)(_ ,,,, titititi MBidAskSpreadCRSP 
       3 
 
where tiAsk ,  is the ask price of stock i on day t from the CRSP daily data, tiBid ,  is the bid price 
of stock i on day t from the CRSP daily data, and tiM ,  is the mean of tiAsk ,  and tiBid , . To 
reduce the effect of data errors and outliers, we exclude all tiSpreadCRSP ,_  that are greater 
than 50% of the quote midpoint. We delete CRSP observations if both ask and bid are zero 
(Chung and Zhang, 2014) for each stock. The daily values of tiSpreadCRSP ,_  are calculated 
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from 2000 to 2016. From the filtering process, we obtain a sample of 7,431 ordinary stocks 
listed on NYSE/AMEX.  
 
3.1.3 Corporate Finance Variables 
Based on Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Fracassi (2016), we obtain corporate variables of 
interest from Compustat for 2000-2016. We focus on three different sets of corporate decisions, 
investment policy, financial policy and organisational strategy. For investment policy, we 
consider capital investment whereas for financing policy decisions we consider: financial 
leverage, cash reserve ratio/cash holdings, interest coverage and dividend payout. Finally, for 
organizational strategy, we focus on research and development expenditure.  
 
3.2 Summary Statistics  
Panel A, Table 1, summarises the statistics for the two main liquidity variables used in the essay 
with a mean value of 0.307 for Amihud Illiquidity and 0.006 for the CRSP-Spread, which is 
consistent with prior studies such as Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) and Chung and Zhang (2014). 
For the liquidity measures, it can be observed that the median for Amihud Illiquidity is not 
close to the mean. Amihud illiquidity recorded a mean of 0.307 with a median of 0.003. Thus, 
Amihud Illiquidity shows right skewness since the sample mean is larger than the median. This 
is consistent with previous studies such as by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam (2000) and 
Fabre and Frino (2004). Panel B, Table 2, reports the statistics of the daily changes in stock 
liquidity for the two liquidity measures. The results indicate that variability in daily changes in 
Amihud Illiquidity is more than the CRSP-Spread. 
 
Table 1 also reports the statistics for aggregate liquidity across connected firms. Panels C and 
D, Table 1 show the statistics of daily liquidity changes for the portfolio of stocks constructed 
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to investigate the study objectives. In Panel C, summary statistics of the daily changes in 
liquidity for the portfolio of stocks that are connected to individual stock irrespective of the 
industry of connection are presented. Since each stock in the sample is connected to a number 
of stocks, we estimate the statistics of the portfolio of stocks connected to each firm first without 
taking into consideration the industry of connection. However, in Panel D, we estimate the 
statistics for the portfolio of connected stocks that share the same industry with the individual 
stock to which they are connected. Using the standard deviation to measure variability, from 
Panels C and D, we discover that the Amihud Illiquidity is more variable for all cases than the 
CRSP-spread.  
 
Panel E, Table 1, summarises the statistics of CEOs Network Size measured as the sum of 
Network-Employment, Network-Education and Network-Other Social Activities. The panel 
presents the mean value of CEO Network Size with aggregate statistics for the full sample 
where we ignore the industry of the firms connected to the individual stock. The table further 
details descriptive statistics of CEO Network Size where we consider the industry of firms with 
which the individual stock is connected. Thus, we tally the number of CEOs on a CEO network 
with reference to the industry of interconnections. For the full sample, we find the median 
number of total network contacts is 10. However, we recorded a median of the total contacts to 
be 9 and 2 for CEO total connections in a different industry and same industry, respectively. 
From the above, we find CEO network total to be positively skewed for all categories. For 
instance, the results show that the mean number of total contacts for a CEO in the sample 
irrespective of industry affiliation of the other CEOs is 23.526. For CEOs who are connected 
but belong to different industries, we find the mean number of contacts to be 17.242 whereas 
the mean number contacts for CEOs who are connected and belong to the same industry is 4.19. 
This shows that CEOs tend to have more connections with other CEOs working in all industries. 
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Comparing the means with the full sample, on average, there is 73.2% chance that two firms 
that are connected will belong to different industries and there is 17.8% chance that two 
connected firms will belong to the same industry. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Estimating Liquidity Commonality across Connected Stocks  
Prior research on commonality in liquidity estimates liquidity comovement using different 
approaches. For example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam (2000), Coughenour and Saad 
(2004) and Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) applied a market model that measures the 
sensitivity of stocks own liquidity to variation in broader market liquidity to estimate liquidity 
commonality. Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010), Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) 
define commonality in liquidity as the R2 (Roll, 1988) of a regression of the stock’s daily 
liquidity measured by the price impact proxy of Amihud (2002) on daily market liquidity. 
 
For this essay, we adopt the approach of Anton and Polk (2014) and Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks 
(2016) to estimate the measure of liquidity commonality across connected firms. For each firm, 
we estimate the covariance between the daily changes in individual stock liquidity and changes 
in the liquidity of portfolio of stocks having connections with the individual stock. We control 
for value-weighted market liquidity documented by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam, (2000). 
For each firm, we estimate regressions of daily changes in individual stock liquidity
,i tliq
, on 
changes in the liquidity of portfolio of stocks connected to individual stock
,j tliq
, and on 
changes in the market-wide stock liquidity
,mkt tliq . Our focus is on the extent of liquidity 
covariation across connected firms; however, to proxy for market effects, we include market 
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liquidity in the model. The market liquidity was computed as changes in the value-weighted 
liquidity of two portfolios; a market portfolio containing all stocks and a portfolio comprising 
only stocks connected to the individual stock of interest. To cater for industry effects, we add 
changes in the liquidity of a portfolio of stocks connected to the individual stock and in the 
same industry
,k tliq  to the model. We add ,k tliq  to the regression as industry factors that 
influence stock liquidity levels. Specifically, we separately estimate the following regression 
for each stock across trading days. 
 
, , , ,i t CI j t mkt mkt t i tliq liq liq controls           
                            4 
, , , , ,i t CI j t mkt mkt t ind k t i tliq liq liq liq controls                    
                                                                                                                                      5 
The regression coefficient of a stock’s own liquidity on the liquidity of the portfolio of stocks 
connected to the individual stock is labelled the Social Network Liquidity Beta, CI . In this 
essay, we use changes in logs for the liquidity measure. The use of log-differences helps solve 
potential econometric problems that may arise as a result of potential non-stationarity of the 
liquidity measures (Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008). For each regression, we remove the 
individual stock that is the firm of interest from the market portfolio. In the regression model, 
the following controls are included: contemporaneous market returns and contemporaneous 
firm return squared to control for possible correlations between returns and the liquidity 
measure; and lead and lag changes in the illiquidity measures to cater for lagged adjustments 
in liquidity (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam, 2000; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). The 
squared returns is included to cater for any volatility effect that may be linked to liquidity. 
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If there is commonality in liquidity, then changes in daily individual stock’s liquidity will be 
significantly related to changes in the liquidity of the portfolio of stocks connected to the 
individual stock. Based on Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016), we are interested in the 
significance of the mean coefficient of liquidity betas to look for evidence of liquidity in 
commonality. As the hypothesis predicts, we anticipate the coefficient of social network 
liquidity beta in equation (3) and equation (4) above to be 0CI   and statistically significant. 
The positive significance of the estimated social network liquidity beta implies that firm’s 
interconnections bring about convergence of each firm’s liquidity with the variation in the 
liquidity of the portfolio of stocks with which the individual firm has connections. As per 
Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we define CI  as the sensitivity of changes in an individual 
stock‘s own liquidity to changes in aggregate liquidity of the portfolio of firms connected to 
the individual stock.  
 
Table 2 summarizes the time series regression output using equation 4 above and reports strong 
evidence of liquidity commonality across connected stocks irrespective of industry. We find
CI , our measure of liquidity commonality across connected stocks, to be positive and 
statistically significant at 1% for both Amihud Illiquidity and CRSP-Spread. The mean of CI
is 0.222 at 1% significance level for Amihud illiquidity. This magnitude establishes significant 
evidence for the existence of stock liquidity convergence across connected firms. This result 
confirms that firm-level factors such as CEOs’ social and professional networks influence stock 
liquidity comovement and not only market-level determinants as described in prior studies 
(Huberman and Halka, 2001; Fernando, 2003; Kamara, Lou, and Sadka, 2008; Hameed, Kang, 
and Viswnathan, 2010; Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk, 2012; Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016).   
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We replicate the regressions using CRSP-Spread and report the results in Table 2, model 2. 
From Table 2, for a stock’s own social network liquidity beta CI , we obtain results similar to 
those employing the Amihud illiquidity measure. However, comparing the average means of 
social network liquidity beta for both Amihud and CRSP-Spread, indicates that the mean of CI  
for Amihud Illiquidity, 0.222, is greater than the overall mean of CI  for CRSP-Spread, 0.112. 
Thus, liquidity commonality across connected firms using the Amihud Illiquidity measure is 
approximately twice the magnitude using the CRSP-Spread. The variability in the Amihud 
measure recorded in the results agrees with Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Korajczyk and 
Sadka (2008) who find the Amihud measure as a reliable proxy for a stock’s liquidity, and with 
Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) who show that the Amihud measure is a good proxy for price 
effect. The positive statistically significant coefficient of the market liquidity beta, mkt  for 
Amihud and CRSP-Spread measures reveals that individual stock liquidity on average comoves 
positively with market liquidity (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam, 2000; Koch, Ruenzi, and 
Starks, 2016).  
 
From the baseline regression results in Table 2, we provide evidence to support the hypothesis 
that a stock’s liquidity comoves with the liquidity of the portfolio of stocks connected to the 
individual stock irrespective of the industry to which the connected firms belong. It is 
noteworthy to mention that for both Amihud and CRSP Spread, the results show liquidity 
covaries strongly across stocks that are connected than with the market liquidity, i.e., liquidity 
commonality is stronger among connected firms.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
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4.2 Estimating Liquidity Commonality across Connected Stocks in Same Industry 
According to Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam (2000) and Brockman and Chung (2002), it is 
possible that in systematic liquidity, there are both industry and market components. Hence, 
we investigate the possibility that individual stock liquidity comoves with the liquidity of stocks 
that are connected to the individual stock and belong to the same industry. We classify stocks 
into industries using the 2-digit SIC code and extract the number of firms an individual firm is 
connected to that belong to the same industry. We include the industry liquidity variable 
,k tliq  
in equation 5. We estimate this regression because, aside from market level factors such as 
macroeconomic indicators, interest rate, market return, volatility and seasonality, which 
according to Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyan (2001) significantly affects stock liquidity, 
specific industry factors can also affect stock market liquidity. Table 3 reports the results based 
on equation 5. We find evidence of the existence of liquidity commonality across firms that are 
connected and belong to the same industry confirming the view that individual stock liquidity 
is influenced significantly by industry wide common factors consistent with Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmayam (2000). This result indicates that industry wide connectedness is an example of 
industry wide common factors that drive stock liquidity commonality 
 
Following the findings reported in Table 3, we conduct additional analysis to compare the 
magnitude of the social network liquidity beta coefficients using equation 5. We include in 
equation 5, lead and lag variables for the two liquidity measures: portfolio of stocks connected 
to the individual stock irrespective of industry of affiliation and portfolio of stocks connected 
to the individual and belonging to the same industry. In Table 4, we find that for all the liquidity 
measures, the cross-sectional mean of social network liquidity beta ( )CI  irrespective of 
industry of connectedness is generally larger than the industry social network liquidity beta 
( )ind  across U.S. public firms for both Amihud and CRSP-Spread. This result is consistent 
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with Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmayam (2000) and Brockman and Chung (2002). It implies that, 
on the NYSE and AMEX stock exchanges, industry-wide liquidity is relatively less important 
in explaining individual stock liquidity commonality.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3   & INSERT TABLE 4 
4.3 Effect of Network Size (Large vs Small ) on Stock Liquidity Betas 
To examine the potential effect of network size on systematic liquidity, we divide the sample 
into five quintiles based on firms’ network size and estimate the cross-sectional means of social 
network liquidity beta for each quintile. We investigate whether firms with a large network 
have a larger social network liquidity beta ( CI ) than firms with small network as 
hypothesized. From Table 5, we summarize averages of the social network stock liquidity betas 
for both Amihud and CRSP-Spread across the five quintiles using equation 3. We use CEO 
network size since it is regarded as a proxy for the relative importance of connections in the 
social network literature (Fracassi, 2016). The first quintile contains the bottom fifth of the 
firms on network size (i.e., the 20% of the total firms with the lowest network size), the second 
quintile represents the second fifth (from 21% to 40%) and the fifth quintile represents the 20% 
of the firms with the largest networks. For the social network stock liquidity beta,
CI , results 
show that the sorted averages using firm network size is not monotonic. The average 
CI  varies 
with network size as hypothesised. For instance, using Amihud Illiquidity, we find the 
CI  
average for a firm in quintile 1 is 0.065; for quintile 3 and 5 the CI averages 0.022 and 0.264, 
respectively.  
 
Comparing the averages of CI for quintiles 1 and 5, we find the magnitude of liquidity 
covariation is about four times larger than the magnitude of liquidity co-movement for firms in 
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quintile 1. The results confirm the hypothesis that the magnitude of sensitivity of liquidity 
covariation is stronger for firms with large network size than their counterparts with small 
network size for both Amihud and CRSP-Spread. Comparing the magnitude of CI for both 
liquidity measures across the five quintiles, the results shows that the magnitude for Amihud is 
much larger than for CRSP-Spread. We report in Table 5b test of difference between quintile 
1 and quintile 5 using liquidity betas. 
INSERT TABLE 5a & 5b 
4.3.1 Association between CEO Network Size and Liquidity Commonality  
We further estimate a time series regression to test the second hypothesis that liquidity 
commonality increases with CEOs’ network size. We regress the measure of liquidity 
commonality CI  on Network Total Size for each firm and control for firm size and average 
liquidity. The variable of interest, Network Total Size, is the sum of the CEO’s employment, 
education, and other activity connections. We control for scale effects by adding firm size since 
the size of a firm can influence the CEO’s network size. In the main specification, we include 
time-fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm and time-dimensional levels to 
account for cross sectional dependence. The specification is:  
 
, ,, 1 , 3 4 ,
( _ _ ) ( ) ln( ) _
i t i tCI i t i t i t
Network Total Size liq ave size time effects                
                                                                                                                                               6 
The results of this regression model using Amihud and CRSP-Spread are presented in Table 6 
and 7, respectively. Column 1, Table 6 presents results for the full sample. Consistent with 
hypothesis 2, we find that liquidity of stocks that are connected exhibit comovement evidenced 
by the statistically significant positive coefficient of 0.112 for the effect of network size. In 
column 2, we include controls for the stock size and average liquidity. Again, the coefficient 
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of social network index in column 2 is positive and statistically significant as estimated in 
column 1.  
 
Columns 3 – 10, Table 6, include fixed firm effects to subsume the effect of any time-invariant 
firm-level characteristics that CEOs/top management may have stable preferences for and 
might have an effect on commonality. We also include a time-fixed effect and cluster standard 
errors at the firm level. The coefficient estimate of social network liquidity beta CI  is somewhat 
reduced to 0.086 even though it is still positive and statistically significant at 1%. This shows 
that time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity is not driving the main findings, which is 
consistent with the findings of Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008). As CEOs’ Network Size 
increases, the magnitude of liquidity covariation also increases. Of the controls in the 
regressions in columns 3-10, the significant contributor is firm size. Thus, firm size 
significantly influences the extent to which firms’ liquidity comoves with the liquidity of firms 
belonging to the same network. For CRSP-Spread, we find a similar association between 
liquidity commonality and a CEO’s network size as presented in Table 7. Overall, we find that 
stock liquidity covariation across firms is influenced by the extent of a firm’s social and 
professional connectivity.   
INSERT TABLE 6 & TABLE 7 
 
4.4. Liquidity Commonality and Similarity in Corporate Finance Policies  
We next investigate the possible channels through which CEOs social and professional 
networks drive liquidity commonality across connected firms. We test hypothesis 3 that 
examines whether similarity in corporate finance policy decisions across connected firms is a 
channel through which CEO connectedness drive liquidity commonality among connected 
firms. 
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To investigate hypothesis 3, we adopt the approach of Fracassi (2016) to obtain similarity in 
corporate finance policies across connected firms. We consider eight corporate finance policies: 
investment ratio, R&D ratio, SG&A ratio, cash reserve ratio, leverage, interest coverage ratio, 
dividend over earnings, and advertising expense. In a recent study, Moshirian et al. (2017) show 
that liquidity commonality is driven by both market level determinants and firm-level determinant 
factors. On the firm-specific factors, they argue that the sensitivity of an individual’s stock’s liquidity 
to market liquidity can be firm specific. Thus, the transparency and information asymmetry of an 
individual firm can affect its stock liquidity. This is because more firm-specific information can invite 
more individual trading in the stock. We focus on the above policies because the information set of 
investors on firms can be expanded through the policies to influence their trading. Gelos and Wei (2005) 
conclude that a higher level of financial transparency reduces information asymmetry and increase stock 
price informativeness. We further argue that the above corporate policies will increase the stock price 
informativeness of individual firms  which can affect the stock liquidity. First, we test whether firms 
that are connected take similar corporate policy decisions using a pair model. Using the model, 
we account for as much of a firm’s policy as possible by regressing on each policy, specific 
control variables that determine the policy. The residual (or excess) policy of connected firms 
is obtained and used to define a measure of corporate finance similarity across connected firms. 
In the second step, we test whether similarity in corporate policy across connected firms drives 
liquidity commonality among the connected firms.  
 
As explained above, first, we regress each firm’s corporate finance policy decisions on a set of 
control variables that relate to each specific policy using equation 7 after which we obtain the 




represents the set of corporate finance policies and control variables, respectively.  
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For all regressions presented in Table 8, we control for year fixed effects. For the investment 
policy regression in column 1, following Chava and Roberts (2008), we use log (total assets) 
to control for size, Tobin’s Q to control for investment opportunities and cash flow. In the R&D 
regression, we follow Brown, Fazzari, and Peterseen (2009) and use sales (log) and cash flow 
as control variables. In the selling, general and administrative (SG&A) and cash reserves 
regressions, following Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), we control for size (log Total 
Assets), investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q), cash flow, investment and R&D expenditure. 
For the regressions using leverage and interest coverage, we follow Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008) and use sales (log), investment opportunities (Tobin’s Q), asset tangibility, and 
cash flow. For estimate using dividends over earnings and advertising, we follow Fracassi 
(2016) and control for variables that determine each policy. In Appendix B, we present the 
correlation matrix of the corporate finance variables and controls; the results are in Table 8. 
The coefficients of the main control variables are consistent with the ones documented in prior 
literature.  
 
Next, we estimate the similarity in corporate policy across connected firms using the residual 
from equation (7), which represents the excess, or idiosyncratic, component of each policy for 
each firm relative to the expected policy according to the standard model. We define policy 
dissimilarity across connected firms using equation 8 as the absolute value of the difference in 
the residuals of each firm’s corporate finance policy, ,i t  and average of the residuals of 
corporate finance policies of the portfolio of firms (
,i j ) that are connected to the individual 
firm.   
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The variable is a proxy for the difference in the corporate finance policy decisions among the 
connected firms. The smaller the variable, the more similar are the policies of the connected 
firms (Fracassi, 2016).  
 
Finally, we regress social network liquidity beta CI , on our measure of dissimilarity in 
corporate finance policy ( )Policy Dissimilarity  for each firm as shown in equation (9), 
controlling for size, average liquidity, and time effects. In estimating equation (9), we cater for 
serial correlation by allowing clustering of the error term at the firm level for both each firm 
and the portfolio of firms connected to the individual firm (Petersen, 2009). 
 
, 1 , 2 ,
3 , ,
( ) ( )
ln( ) _
CI i t i t i t
i t i t
PolicyDissimilarity liq ave
size time effects




       9 
Using equation (9), we test whether social and professional ties between CEOs influence 
liquidity comovements through similarity in corporate finance policy decisions. We argue that, 
as the deviation of our measure of policy dissimilarity increases, then the corporate finance 
policies of connected firms deviate from each other so there will be no convergence in corporate 
policy decisions across connected firms. A negative coefficient for 1  in equation (9) implies 
that, as corporate policy dissimilarity becomes more negative or as policy dissimilarity 
decreases, the corporate policy decisions among connected firms become more similar leading 
to transfer of related information from connected firms to the broader market. Hence, we predict 
that the stock liquidity of these connected firms adopting similar corporate finance policies will 
strongly comove.  
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Tables 9 and 10 show the results of the regressions using the strength of the aggregate policy 
dissimilarity as the main variable of interest as shown in equation 9. In Table 9, we consider 
the Amihud illiquidity measure and, for capital investment policy, we find a significant 
negative effect of the strength of capital investment dissimilarity among connected firms on 
liquidity comovement across the connected firms, supporting our hypothesis that social ties 
drive liquidity comovement across connected firms via similarity in investment decisions. This 
shows that capital investment is one corporate policy through which connected firms impact 
stock liquidity. Given that the sample mean for capital investment is 0.364 and the coefficient 
of corporate investment dissimilarity is 0.088, we find the economic impact, 24.2%, to be 
significant. From Table 9, we also find that stock liquidity covariation among connected stocks 
is also driven by similarity in R&D, and leverage decisions across connected stocks. We find 
insignificant results for similarity in the cash reserves ratio, SG &A interest coverage ratio, 
advertising expense and dividend policy since these policies do not drive liquidity co-variation 
across connected stocks. We replicate the above results using CRSP Spread social network 
liquidity beta and present results in Table 10 with similar findings. 
 
This result may explain the findings of Coughenour and Saad (2004) who show that because 
of information sharing among specialists within a firm, stock liquidity comoves with the 
liquidity of other stocks handled by the same specialist firm. Thus, when connected firms adopt 
similar corporate finance policy decisions, specialists will obtain similar information 
transferred to security markets after announcements, which eventually induces their trading 
strategies as they transfer such information to their colleagues leading to liquidity covariation 
across connected firms.  
 
INSERT TABLE 8, TABLE 9 & TABLE 10 
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4.5 Liquidity Commonality and Commonality in Trading Activity  
We test hypothesis 4 that states that trading activities of connected firms are a channel through 
which CEO networks drive liquidity commonality across connected firms. To do this, we 
regress a stock’s own social network liquidity beta, 
,i tCI
  for each stock on ,j tTrade  which is 
defined as the daily changes in the number of trades of portfolio of stocks connected to each 
firm controlling for size, average liquidity, price, trade volume, and time effects. We argue that 
trading activities of connected stocks will be related leading to stock liquidity covariation 
through correlated trading. When related information among connected firms is conveyed to 
security markets, the trading activities of investors and market participants are likely to be 
related; they rely on the same public information to develop their trading strategies, which, in 
effect, drives commonality in liquidity across stocks that are connected.  
 
Our argument is based on the premise that if a group of market participants swho hold a 
portfolio of stocks that are connected, then the transfer of related information across connected 
firms to the broader market can influence their decisions to trade in the same direction with 
similar timing since investors rely on information and signals from the market environment to 
decide on their trading strategies. In effect, these stocks are likely to experience large trade, 
buy and sell orders, at the same time to cause liquidity comovement across connected stocks. 
We also argue that this may arise from different investors holding stocks that are connected 
and take similar corporate decisions and face similar liquidity shocks. For instance, market 
participants holding connected stocks will have to adjust to the related liquidity shocks that 
might be affecting the firms with similar trading strategies. That eventually leads to correlated 
trading and commonality in liquidity. Consequently, we test hypothesis 4 using equation 10 
and expect to find a significant positive relationship between our measure of liquidity 
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commonality and changes in the trading activity of portfolio of stocks that are connected to an 
individual stock. The specification model is:  
 
, , 2 , 3 ,
4 , 5 , ,
( ) ln( )
Pr _
CI i t TRD j t i t i t
i t i t i t
B Trade liq ave size
Volume ice time effects
   
  
    
            10 
Table 11 presents the results using the Amihud (2002) measure of stock liquidity commonality 
and measures of stock trading activities using changes in the number of trades. We find a 
statistically significant positive relationship in Table 11 confirming the hypothesis that trading 
activities of connected stocks are correlated and, as a result, drive liquidity covariation across 
these connected stocks. In model 1, Table 11, without controlling for time and firm fixed effect, 
we find the coefficient of TRD  0.025 to be statistically significant at 1%. This suggests that 
trading activities of investors across connected stocks are positively correlated. In model 2, 
Table 11, we control for time fixed effects and find the coefficient of TRD  is positive and 
statistically significant at 1%, even though its magnitude reduces to 0.022. The significant 
relationship is also documented in models 3 to 6 where we control for time and firm fixed 
effects. Using CRSP-Spread, we find similar results (see Table 12). The results imply that 
trading activities in stocks that are connected through CEO connectedness will have a related 
component in their buy and sell orders, which facilitates stock liquidity covariation. As 
explained earlier, this effect could arise from trading activities of institutional investors who 
make a prime example of an investor group that generally holds a large, well-diversified 
portfolio of stocks and are regularly faced with similar information that drives liquidity across 
e stocks.  
 
INSERT TABLE 11 & 12 
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4.6 Controlling for Endogeneity and Reverse Causality  
 
4.6.1 Instrumental Variable Approach 
So far, we have established that the stock liquidity of firms that are connected with each other 
comoves. This could prompt a CEO to build stronger networks to maximize the benefits 
associated with liquidity comovement. Moreover, firms experience shocks in their stock 
liquidity levels and dynamically adjust their policies and strategies over time. El-Khatib, Fogel, 
and Jandik (2015) show that firms in such situations could hire a CEO with specific social and 
professional connections to improve accounting and reporting quality as well as the quality of 
policies and decisions that could influence the firm’s stock liquidity levels and broader market 
outlook in the eyes of market participants. For instance, a firm in financial distress is likely to 
hire a CEO with specific education, skills, or employment to turn things around. Arguably, the 
causality might as well run in the opposite direction since successful companies with high 
investment levels and high return on assets might lead to an expansion of the social networks 
of their CEOs. Interestingly, many factors determine a CEO’s network size, only some of which 
are influenced by the CEO’s choices. For example, a CEO can choose to become a member of 
a social organization or serve as an outside board member of a public company. On the other 
hand, CEOs have little control over whether other graduates from their alma mater become 
executive officers. In the same way, the board may consider the CEO’s network in appointing 
the CEO, but it is unclear whether this is a first-order effect. A CEO’s network is likely to 
change over time for reasons over which the board has no control. 
 
The possibility that the CEO’s network reflects choices creates the potential for endogeneity 
and potential bias from correlated omitted variables. To check for the effects of endogeneity, 
we use a two-stage instrumental variable approach, where, at the first stage, we use equation 
11 to estimate a regression with the CEO’s network size as the dependent variable and use the 
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industry average network size for the other firms in the sample in the same industry of a firm 
in year t  as the instrument. We follow prior studies and use industry average network size as 
the instrumental variable because it relates positively to CEO network size, which is the 
underlying explanatory variable but unrelated to the residuals in the second stage equation, 
which is Social Network Stock Liquidity Beta 
,CI i t  (Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran, 
2014).. In constructing the instrumental variable, we follow the approach of prior studies and 
estimate the average industry network size as the average network size of all firms in a 
particular industry. We classify the industry a firm belongs to using the two-digit SIC code.  In 
addition, the choice of instrument is based on the theory that firms follow an industry norm, 
and interlocking practices between CEOs would give more opportunity to build networks 
within the industry if CEOs, in general , have broader networks.  
 
The first stage regression is: 
 
, 1 ,
3 , 1 4 , 1 ,
( _ _ ) ( _ _ )
( ) ln( ) _
i t i t
i t i t i t
Network Total Size Industry Network Total
liq ave size time effects
 
   
  
  
  11 
The second stage regression is: 
, 1 ,
3 , 4 , ,
( _ _ _ )
( ) ln( ) _
CI i t i t
i t i t i t
Instrumented Network Total Size






Table 13 presents the two-stage regressions using the Amihud Illiquidity measure. Estimates 
of equation 11 indicate that Industry Network Total i, t is positive and statistically significant at 
1% in determining network size. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic is 5641.73, which exceeds 
the 10% (25%) critical values of 16.38 (5.53) suggesting that the instrument, Industry Network 
Total, is unlikely to be a weak instrument (Stock and Yogo 2005; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
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The second stage includes the predicted CEO Network Total Size as the regressor from the 
first-stage equation. Because the test variable is determined solely by the variables identified 
in the first stage, it is less likely to reflect unobservable factors that are correlated with our 
measure of liquidity commonality. The results show a positive significant coefficient (p<0.001) 
for CEO Network Size, like the main result reported in Table 5. Overall, the results suggest that 
the instrument passes the weak instrument test by explaining a significant amount of the CEO’s 
network size. Table 14 shows the results for CRSP Spread liquidity measure that documents 
similar findings.    
INSERT TABLE 13 & 14 
4.6.2 Difference-in-Difference Approach 
The results obtained so far could be biased because of the presence of an omitted variable that 
could drive both social network size and the stock liquidity level of firms. Hence, an exogenous 
shock to the social network ties is needed to test the direction of causality between social 
connections and liquidity co-movement. We thus use individuals’ deaths as an exogenous 
shock to a firm’s social and professional connectivity. We obtain information on CEO death 
from BoardEx for the period of January 2000 to December 2016. In the sample period, there 
are 680 CEO deaths. When an individual dies, his/her social ties with other individuals in the 
network cease, altering exogenously the social connections between companies. 
Simultaneously, the death of a CEO is an event that can deeply influence corporations and can 
lead to large changes in corporate policies and hence liquidity comovement.  
 
The choice of CEO death as an exogenous shock to CEO Network Size is based on prior studies. 
Several studies investigate the effect of CEO and senior executive deaths as exogenous shocks 
to the composition of the board of directors (Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon, 2006; 
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Salas, 2010). Fracassi and Tate (2012) use death as an exogenous shock to social ties to test 
governance implications of firms with CEOs having social ties with directors. In a recent study, 
Fracassi (2016) used the death of a director or top executive to test for its implications on the 
firm’s corporate finance policy. In view of the above, I use the death of a CEO in the group of 
connected firms to test its effect on liquidity commonality across connected firms. The intuition 
is that the death of a CEO will break information flow across the connected firms, which, we 
argue, will weaken liquidity comovement across connected firms. Tables 15 and 16 show the 
difference in difference approach for Amihud and CRSP Spread, respectively. 
 
In this test, we group all companies in the sample into two groups. Panel A is our treatment 
group and covers all firms that recorded the death of a CEO. Panel B report estimates from the 
control group and reports all individual firms that did not record the death of a CEO but rather 
a CEO of firms in the network connected to the individual firm died. We then compare the 
measure of liquidity commonality between firms for both Panels A and B. For each regression, 
the variable of interest is the interaction between Death Dummy and CEO Network Total Size. 
For the Death Dummy, a dummy variable of one is created for a firm if a CEO within the 
number of firms connected to the individual firm died. We argue that the death of a CEO within 
the group will weaken the strength of liquidity comovement. More specifically, we predict that 
stock liquidity commonality for firms in Panel A will be weakened more than firms in Panel B 
because the effect of a breakdown in information flow will decline more for firms in Panel A. 
This is because individual firms in Panel A recorded CEO’s death coupled with the fact that a 
CEO within the network of firms connected to the individual firm also died.  
, 1 , 2 , ,
3 , 4 , ,
( _ ) (( _ ) *( _ ) ))
( ) ln( )
CI i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
Death Dummy Death Dummy Network Total
liq ave size
   
  
   
 
  13 
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The results using equation 13 shows that the coefficient of Death Dummy is negative and 
significant for both Panels A and B using the Amihud illiquidity measure (see Table 15). This 
result suggests the death of a CEO within the group affects the magnitude of stock liquidity 
co-movement across connected firms in all specifications. The interaction coefficient between 
Death Dummy and CEO Network Size is positive and statistically significant in all 
specifications. These results further suggest that a CEO’s death within the group of connected 
CEOs makes the comovement of stock liquidity across the connected firms more dissimilar 
because the magnitude of comovement is weakened. The results of the difference in difference 
regression suggest that a break in the flow of information in social and professional 
connections has a causal effect on changes in comovement of liquidity. Table 16 reports the 
results using CRSP-Spread.   
 
In the difference in difference approach reported above, we argue that the death of a CEO will 
alter the extent of connectivity between two firms, its noteworthy to mention that, our findings 
could be driven by characteristics of an incoming CEO. This is a because an incoming CEO 
with strong network ties will definitely influence the information environment of the firm and 
stock liquidity.    
INSERT TABLE 15 & TABLE 16 
5. Conclusion  
This essay is the first in empirical finance literature to investigate whether CEOs’ social and 
professional network ties, which drive firm-level connectedness, facilitate liquidity 
comovement across the connected firms. The essay theorizes that the transfer of similar 
information to security markets by connected firms because of the similarity in corporate 
decisions across connected firms could play a key role in liquidity covariation across stocks. 
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Using the biographical information of CEOs, we create a social index of network ties for each 
CEO from current employment, past employment, education, and other activities. We show 
that social connections influence stock liquidity covariation across NYSE and AMEX stocks 
that are connected. Specifically, we find evidence that stock liquidity covary strongly across 
connected firms. Next, we examine the link between CEOs’ network size and our measure of 
liquidity commonality across connected firms. We find evidence supporting the link between 
social and professional connectivity between connected firms and commonality in liquidity 
with the results not driven by common time trends in commonality in liquidity (Kamara, Lou, 
and Sadka, 2008).  
 
Subsequently, we test possible channels through which CEOs social and professional network 
ties could drive liquidity commonality across connected stocks. We hypothesize that similarity 
in corporate finance policies across connected firms is a possible channel that drives liquidity 
covariation. Using a multi-stage process, we find evidence supporting our hypothesis that 
similarity in corporate decisions across connected firms drives liquidity commonality. We also 
test whether trading activities of connected firms using the number of trades is a possible 
channel that drives comovement across connected firms. We find a significant positive 
relationship confirming our hypothesis that trading activities of connected firms drive 











Acharya, V.V., Pedersen, L.H., 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics 77, 375-410 
Ahern, K.R., Harford, J., 2014. The importance of industry links in merger waves. The Journal 
of Finance 69, 527-576 
Akbas, F., Meschke, F., Wintoki, M.B., 2016. Director networks and informed traders. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 62, 1-23 
Amihud, Y., 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal 
of Financial Markets 5, 31-56 
Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial 
Economics 17, 223-249 
Anton, M., Polk, C., 2014. Connected stocks. The Journal of Finance 69, 1099-1127 
Banerjee, A.V., 1992. A simple model of herd behavior. The Quarterly Journal Of Economics 
107, 797-817 
Becker‐Blease, J.R., Paul, D.L., 2006. Stock liquidity and investment opportunities: Evidence 
from index additions. Financial Management 35, 35-51 
Bennedsen, M., Perez-Gonzalez, F., Wolfenzon, D., 2006. Do CEOs Matter? Unpublished 
Working Paper. New York University. 
Bertrand, M., Schoar, A., 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 1169-1208 
Bizjak, J., Lemmon, M., Whitby, R., 2009. Option Backdating and Board Interlocks. The 
Review of Financial Studies 22, 4821-4847 
Bouwman, C.H., 2011. Corporate governance propagation through overlapping directors. The 
Review of Financial Studies 24, 2358-2394 
58 | P a g e  
 
Brass, D.J., Burkhardt, M.E., 1992. Centrality and power in organizations. Networks and 
organizations: Structure, Form, and Action 191, 198-213 
Brennan, M.J., Subrahmanyam, A., 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: On the 
compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics 41, 441-
464 
Brockman, P., Chung, D.Y., 2002. Commonality in liquidity: evidence from an order-driven 
market structure. Journal of Financial Research 25, 521-539 
Brockman, P., Chung, D.Y., 2008. Commonality under market stress: Evidence from an order-
driven market. International Review of Economics and Finance 17, 179-196 
Brockman, P., Chung, D.Y., Pérignon, C., 2009. Commonality in Liquidity: A Global 
Perspective. J. Finance. Quant. Anal. 44, 851-882 
Brown, J.L., Drake, K.D., 2013. Network ties among low-tax firms. The Accounting Review 
89, 483-510 
Brown, J.R., Fazzari, S.M., Petersen, B.C., 2009. Financing innovation and growth: Cash flow, 
external equity, and the 1990s R&D boom. The Journal of Finance 64, 151-185 
Brunnermeier, M.K., 2009. Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-2008. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 23, 77-100 
Burt, R.S., 1997. The contingent value of social capital. Administrative Science Quarterly, 339-
365 
Cai, Y., Sevilir, M., 2011. Board connections and M&A transactions. Journal of Financial 
Economics 
Calvo-Armengol, A., Jackson, M.O., 2004. The effects of social networks on employment and 
inequality. American Economic Review 94, 426-454 
Chava, S., Roberts, M.R., 2008. How does financing impact investment? The role of debt 
covenants. The Journal of Finance 63, 2085-2121 
59 | P a g e  
 
Chiu, P.C., Teoh, S.H., Tian, F., 2013. Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. 
Accounting Review 88, 915-944 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2000. Commonality in liquidity. Journal of Financial 
Economics 56, 3-28 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2008. Liquidity and market efficiency. Journal of 
Financial Economics 87, 249-268 
Chordia, T., Roll, R., Subrahmanyam, A., 2011. Recent trends in trading activity and market 
quality. Journal of Financial Economics 101, 243-263 
Chung, K.H., Zhang, H., 2014. A simple approximation of intraday spreads using daily data. 
Journal of Financial Markets 17, 94-120 
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., Malloy, C., 2008. The Small World of Investing: Board Connections 
and Mutual Fund Returns. Journal of Political Economy 116, 951-979 
Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., Malloy, C., 2010. Sell‐Side School Ties. Journal of Finance 65, 1409-
1437 
Coleman, J.S., 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American journal of 
sociology 94, S95-S120 
Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D., Naveen, L., 2008. Boards: Does one size fit all? Journal of financial 
Economics 87, 329-356 
Comerton - Forde, C., Hendershott, T., Jones, C.M., Moulton, P.C., Seasholes, M.S., 2010. 
Time Variation in Liquidity: The Role of Market-Maker Inventories and Revenues. The 
Journal of Finance 65, 295-331. 
Cooney, J.W., Madureira, L., Singh, A.K., Yang, K., 2015. Social ties and IPO outcomes. 
Journal of Corporate Finance 33, 129-146 
Coughenour, J.F., Saad, M.M., 2004. Common market makers and commonality in liquidity. 
Journal of Financial Economics 73, 37-69 
60 | P a g e  
 
Coval, J., Stafford, E., 2007. Asset fire sales (and purchases) in equity markets. Journal of 
Financial Economics 86, 479-512 
Davis, G.F., 1991. Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the 
Intercorporate Network. Administrative Science Quarterly 36, 583-613 
DeMarzo, P.M., Kaniel, R., Kremer, I., 2008. Relative Wealth Concerns and Financial Bubbles. 
The Review of Financial Studies 21, 19-50 
Dodds, P.S., Muhamad, R., Watts, D.J., 2003. An experimental study of search in global social 
networks. Science 301, 827-829 
Domowitz, I., Hansch, O., Wang, X., 2005. Liquidity commonality and return co-movement. 
Journal of Financial Markets 8, 351-376 
El-Khatib, R., Fogel, K., Jandik, T., 2015. CEO network centrality and merger performance. 
Journal of Financial Economics 116, 349-382 
Ellison, G., Fudenberg, D., 1995. Word-of-mouth communication and social learning. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 93-125 
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., Parsons, C.A., 2011. Friends with money. Journal of Financial 
Economics 103,169-188 
Engelberg, J., Gao, P., Parsons, C.A., 2013. The Price of a CEO's Rolodex. The Review of 
Financial Studies 26, 79-114 
Fabre, J., Frino, A., 2004. Commonality in liquidity: Evidence from the Australian Stock 
Exchange. Accounting & Finance 44, 357-368 
Faleye, O., Kovacs, T., Venkateswaran, A., 2014. Do better-connected CEOs innovate more? 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, 1201-1225 
Fama, E.F., French, K.R., 2002. Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about 
dividends and debt. The review of financial studies 15, 1-33 
61 | P a g e  
 
Fernando, C.S., 2003. Commonality in liquidity: transmission of liquidity shocks across 
investors and securities. Journal of Financial Intermediation 12, 233-254 
Fich, E.M., Shivdasani, A., 2006. Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance 
61, 689-724 
Fong, K.Y., Holden, C.W., Trzcinka, C.A., 2017. What are the best liquidity proxies for global 
research? Review of Finance 21, 1355-1401 
Fracassi, C., 2016. Corporate Finance Policies and Social Networks. Management Science 63, 
1-19 
Fracassi, C., Tate, G., 2012. External Networking and Internal Firm Governance. Journal of 
Finance 67, 153-194 
Glaeser, E.L., Kallal, H.D., Scheinkman, J.A., Shleifer, A., 1992. Growth in cities. Journal of 
Political Economy 100, 1126-1152 
Goyenko, R.Y., Ukhov, A.D., 2009. Stock and Bond Market Liquidity: A Long-Run Empirical 
Analysis. J. Finance. Quant. Anal. 44, 189-212 
Granovetter, M., 1974. Getting a Job Cambridge. Mass. Harvard University Press 
Granovetter, M., 1995. Coase revisited: Business groups in the modern economy. Industrial 
and Corporate Change 4, 93-130 
Granovetter, M., 2005. The impact of social structure on economic outcomes. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 19, 33-50 
Hameed, A., Kang, W., Viswanathan, S., 2010. Stock Market Declines and Liquidity. Journal 
of Finance 65, 257-293 
Harford, J., Mansi, S.A., Maxwell, W.F., 2008. Corporate governance and firm cash holdings 
in the US. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 535-555 
Hasbrouck, J., Seppi, D.J., 2001. Common factors in prices, order flows, and liquidity. Journal 
of Financial Economics 59, 383-411 
62 | P a g e  
 
Haunschild, P.R., 1993. Interorganizational imitation: The impact of interlocks on corporate 
acquisition activity. Administrative Science Quarterly, 564-592 
Hochberg, Y.V., Ljungqvist, A., Lu, Y., 2010. Networking as a barrier to entry and the 
competitive supply of venture capital. The Journal of Finance 65, 829-859 
Holzer, H.J., 1987. Hiring procedures in the firm: Their economic determinants and outcomes. 
National Bureau of Economic Research Cambridge, Mass., USA 
Hong, H., Kubik, J.D., Stein, J.C., 2004. Social interaction and stock‐market participation. The 
Journal Of Finance 59, 137-163 
Horton, J., Millo, Y., Serafeim, G., 2012. Resources or power? Implications of social networks 
on compensation and firm performance. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 39, 
399-426 
Huberman, G., Halka, D., 2001. Systematic liquidity. Journal of Financial Research 24, 161-
178 
Hvide, H.K., Östberg, P., 2015. Social interaction at work. Journal of Financial Economics 117, 
628-652 
Hwang, B.-H., Kim, S., 2009. It pays to have friends. Journal of financial economics 93, 138-
158 
Inkpen, A.C., Tsang, E.W., 2005. Social capital, networks, and knowledge transfer. Academy 
of Management Review 30, 146-165 
Ishii, J., Xuan, Y., 2014. Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes. Journal of Financial 
Economics 112, 344-363 
Jaffe, A.B., Trajtenberg, M., Henderson, R., 1993. Geographic localization of knowledge 
spillovers as evidenced by patent citations. the Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 
577-598 
63 | P a g e  
 
Kamara, A., Lou, X., Sadka, R., 2008. The divergence of liquidity commonality in the cross-
section of stocks. Journal of Financial Economics 89, 444-466 
Karolyi, G.A., Lee, K.-H., van Dijk, M.A., 2012. Understanding commonality in liquidity 
around the world. Journal of Financial Economics 105, 82-112 
Kaustia, M., Rantala, V., 2015. Social learning and corporate peer effects. Journal of Financial 
Economics 117, 653-669 
Khan, M., Kogan, L., Serafeim, G., 2012. Mutual fund trading pressure: Firm‐level stock price 
impact and timing of SEOs. The Journal of Finance 67, 1371-1395 
Khanna, V., Kim, E.H., Lu, Y., 2015. CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud. Journal of 
Finance 70, 1203-1252 
Koch, A., Ruenzi, S., Starks, L., 2016. Commonality in Liquidity: A Demand-Side 
Explanation. The Review of Financial Studies 29, 1943-1974 
Korajczyk, R.A., Sadka, R., 2008. Pricing the commonality across alternative measures of 
liquidity. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 45-72 
Larcker, D.F., Rusticus, T.O., 2010. On the use of instrumental variables in accounting 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics 49, 186-205 
Lam, K.S., Tam, L.H., 2011. Liquidity and asset pricing: Evidence from the Hong Kong stock 
market. Journal of Banking & Finance 35, 2217-2230 
Larcker, D.F., So, E.C., Wang, C.C.Y., 2013. Boardroom centrality and firm performance. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 55, 225-250 
Leary, M.T., Roberts, M.R., 2014. Do Peer Firms Affect Corporate Financial Policy? Journal 
of Finance 69, 139-178 
Lemmon, M.L., Roberts, M.R., Zender, J.F., 2008. Back to the beginning: persistence and the 
cross‐section of corporate capital structure. The Journal of Finance 63, 1575-1608 
64 | P a g e  
 
Liu, Y., 2014. Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect. Journal of Corporate 
Finance 28, 201-217 
Mizruchi, M.S., 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research 
on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology 22, 271-298 
Mizruchi, M.S., Potts, B.B., 1998. Centrality and power revisited: actor success in group 
decision making. Social Networks 20, 353-387 
Nguyen, D.D., Hagendorff, J., Eshraghi, A., 2016. Can Bank Boards Prevent Misconduct? 
Review of Finance 20, 1-36 
Park, A., Sabourian, H., 2011. Herding and contrarian behavior in financial markets. 
Econometrica 79, 973-1026 
Pástor, Ľ., Stambaugh, R.F., 2003. Liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Journal of 
Political economy 111, 642-685 
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing 
approaches. The Review of Financial Studies 22, 435-480 
Powell, W.W., Koput, K.W., Smith-Doerr, L., 1996. Interorganizational collaboration and the 
locus of innovation: Networks of learning in biotechnology. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 116-145 
Renneboog, L., Zhao, Y., 2011. Us knows us in the UK: On director networks and CEO 
compensation. Journal of Corporate Finance 17, 1132-1157 
Renneboog, L., Zhao, Y., 2014. Director networks and takeovers. Journal of Corporate Finance 
28, 218-234 
Roll, R., 1988. R-S1-2. Journal of Finance 43, 541-566 
Salas, J.M., 2010. Entrenchment, governance, and the stock price reaction to sudden executive 
deaths. Journal of Banking & Finance 34, 656-666 
65 | P a g e  
 
Schonlau, R., Singh, P.V., 2009. Board networks and merger performance. Unpublished 
Working Paper. University of Washington. 
Shiller, R.J., Pound, J., 1989. Survey evidence on diffusion of interest and information among 
investors. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 12, 47-66 
Shiller, R.J., Fischer, S., Friedman, B.M., 1984. Stock prices and social dynamics. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1984, 457-510 
Shue, K., 2013. Executive Networks and Firm Policies: Evidence from the Random 
Assignment of MBA Peers. The Review of Financial Studies 26, 1401-1442 
Stathopoulos, K., 2008. From Fiction to Fact: The Impact of CEO Social Networks. 
Unpublished working paper. Manchester Business School. 
Stock, J., Yogo, M., 2005. Asymptotic distributions of instrumental variables statistics with 
many instruments, in D.W.K. Andrews and J.H. Stock, eds.: Identification and 
Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). 
Stuart, T.E., Yim, S., 2010. Board interlocks and the propensity to be targeted in private equity 
transactions. Journal of Financial Economics 97, 174-189 
Tsai, W., 2001. Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network 
position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance. 
Academy of Management Journal 44, 996-1004 





66 | P a g e  
 
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Key Variable Name   Definition  Source 
Amihud-Illiquidity 
Measure 
= The absolute value of stock i’s return on day d divided by the dollar volume of stock 
i’s trading on day d  
CRSP 
CRSP Spread = Difference between the ask price and the bid price of stock i on day t from the CRSP 
daily data divided by the mean of the ask price and bid price. 
CRSP 
Network Education  = Sum of the CEO’s educational ties. An educational tie occurs if the CEO went to the 
same university at the same time as another CEO 
BoardEx 
Network Employment = Sum of the CEO's employment ties. An employment tie occurs if the CEO currently 
or historically overlapped with another CEO 
BoardEx 
Network Other Social 
Activity  
= Sum of the CEO’s other activity ties. Another activity tie occurs if the CEO 
participated in the same organization (e.g., a charity or recreational club) at the same 
time as another CEO. 
BoardEx 
CEO Network Total = Log(Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social 
Activity) for connected CEO irrespective of Industry  
BoardEx 
CEO Network Total 
(Same Industry) 
= Log (Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social 
Activity) for CEOs who are connected and in the same industry.  
BoardEx 
CEO Network Total 
(Different Industry) 
= Log (Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social 
Activity) for CEOs who are connected but in a different industry.  
BoardEx 
Corporate Finance Variables   
Dividend Over Earnings  = Dividends over earnings are the ratio of the sum of common dividends (COMPUSTAT 
item 21) and preferred dividends (COMPUSTAT item 19) over earnings before 
depreciation, interest, and tax (COMPUSTAT item 13) 
Compustat 
Cash Reserves Ratio = Cash Reserves Ratio is the ratio cash and short-term investments (che)/total assets, 
winsorized at the [1,99] quantile.  
Compustat 
Interest Coverage = Interest Coverage is the ratio between operating income before depreciation and 
amortization (oibdp) and the interest expenses (xint), winsorized at the [1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Investment Ratio = Investment Ratio is the ratio between capital expenditure (capx) and lagged PP&E 
(ppe), winsorized at the [1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Leverage = Leverage is the ratio (debt in current liabilities (dlc) C long-term debt (dltt))/(debt in 
current liabilities (dlc) C long-term debt (dltt)) + common shares outstanding (csho)_ 
price close at the end of fiscal (prcc_f) 
Compustat 
R&D = R&D Ratio is the ratio R&D expense (xrd)/lagged sales (sale), trimmed at the [1,99] 
quantile. 
Compustat 
SG&A = SG&A Ratio is the ratio selling, general and administrative expense (xsga)/sales (sale). Compustat 
Advertising Expense = Advertising  is the ratio of advertising expenditures (COMPUSTAT item 45) over 
lagged total assets (COMPUSTAT item 6) 
Compustat 
Firm Characteristics 
Number of Employees = No. of Employees is the total number of employees in the firm (emp). Compustat 
 
Cash flow  
= Cash Flow is the ratio (income before extraordinary items (ib) + depreciation and 
amortization (dp))/lagged property, plants, and equipment (ppent), winsorized at the 
[1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Return on Assets = Return on Assets is the ratio income before extraordinary items (ib)/lagged total assets 
(at), trimmed at the [1,99]quantile. 
Compustat 
Sale = Sales are the net sales turnover (sale). Compustat 
Stock Return = Stock Return is the annual total stock return during the fiscal year. Compustat 
Stock Return Volatility  = Stock Return Volatility is the 12-month rolling volatility of monthly stock returns Compustat 
Tangibility  = Tangibility is the ratio (net property, plant and equipment (ppent)/total assets (at) Compustat 
Tobin’s Q = Tobin’s Q is the ratio (total assets (at) . stockholders’ equity (seq) C common shares 
outstanding (csho) _ price close at the end of fiscal (prcc_f))/total assets (at), trimmed 
at the [1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Total Assets  = Total Assets is the total assets of the company (at). Compustat 
Number of Trades = Daily number of trade transactions  CRSP 
Most of the definitions for the financial variables follow the measures used in (Fama & French 2002) and considered standard in the 
literature. Data are available from Compustat and CRSP databases over the period from 2000-2016. The Compustat data refer to the end 
of the fiscal year. The item in parenthesis refers to the corresponding item in the Fundamentals Annual Compustat North America database. 
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APPENDIX B: 
Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Finance Variables and Controls 
Corporate Finance Variables & Controls 
Variable Mean Std Dev P25 P50 P75 No. of Obs. 
Corporate Finance Variables  
Advertising 0.026 0.074 0.001 0.006 0.024 37,471 
Cash Reserve Ratio 0.196 0.233 0.032 0.096 0.275 94,084 
Dividend Payout 0.096 3.798 - - 0.122 90,525 
Interest Coverage 55.723 1,759.590 1.563 5.718 16.743 67,741 
Investment Ratio 0.364 12.103 0.111 0.203 0.355 85,419 
Leverage  0.257 0.258 0.018 0.184 0.424 93,542 
SG&A Ratio 0.996 23.752 0.140 0.260 0.419 76,769 
R & D 0.107 0.276 0.003 0.036 0.121 48,100 
Controls 
Cash Flow  - 4.744 145.737 - 0.018 0.280 0.823 87,634 
Total Asset ($) 12,070.240 95,636.980 120.473 570.300 2,567.220 94,097 
 Log(Total Asset ($)) 6.389 2.282 4.792 6.346 7.851 94,087 
Sale($) 3,500.540 16,049.900 52.740 270.100 1,375.960 93,971 
Ln (Sale($)) 5.665 2.403 4.076 5.664 7.270 91,952 
Return on Asset(RoA) - 0.055 1.895 - 0.034 0.015 0.059 93,959 
Sales growth - 0.392 22.143 - 0.047 0.058 0.164 80,594 
Stock Return Volatility 1.252 3.259 0.435 0.908 1.390 89,476 
Stock Return Annual 0.963 0.570 0.658 0.953 1.179 89,476 
Tangibility 0.226 0.248 0.031 0.124 0.344 91,003 
Tobins Q 26.128 790.302 3.450 8.562 18.311 93,925 
Number of Employees 10.270 44.257 0.180 0.900 5.000 91,483 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for all the corporate finance variables used in the paper. Appendix A defines 
all the variables 
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APPENDIX C: 
Correlation Matrix of Corporate Finance Policies and Controls 
Appendix C reports the correlation between the corporate policy measures adopted for this study and other stock characteristics  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 1                                   
2 -0.028 1                                 
3 0.001 -0.479 1                               
4 -0.029 -0.067 0.108 1                             
5 0.000 0.004 -0.005 -0.012 1                           
6 -0.012 0.011 -0.011 -0.114 0.014 1                         
7 -0.084 0.078 -0.032 -0.184 0.040 0.392 1                       
8 -0.008 0.020 -0.001 0.060 0.004 -0.011 0.015 1                     
9 0.024 -0.366 0.620 0.075 -0.004 -0.022 -0.061 -0.001 1                   
10 -0.034 0.007 -0.027 -0.396 0.006 0.056 0.151 -0.070 -0.056 1                 
11 -0.006 0.096 -0.051 -0.283 0.046 0.410 0.951 0.023 -0.072 0.154 1               
12 -0.005 -0.019 0.005 0.052 -0.002 -0.007 -0.034 -0.012 0.004 -0.020 -0.082 1             
13 -0.001 0.052 -0.002 -0.008 0.005 0.006 0.054 0.015 0.001 -0.053 0.099 -0.210 1           
14 0.001 -0.022 0.005 0.050 -0.002 -0.008 -0.044 -0.012 0.004 -0.020 -0.095 0.950 -0.228 1         
15 0.018 0.016 0.000 0.045 0.005 -0.010 -0.007 0.009 -0.004 -0.049 -0.002 -0.005 0.027 -0.006 1       
16 -0.009 0.051 -0.005 0.039 0.017 0.015 0.094 0.029 -0.014 -0.159 0.105 -0.018 0.079 -0.021 0.746 1     
17 0.033 0.036 -0.052 -0.374 0.009 0.166 0.121 -0.011 -0.094 0.273 0.180 -0.010 0.015 -0.017 -0.004 -0.005 1   
18 0.003 0.025 -0.015 -0.075 0.023 0.179 0.413 -0.005 0.010 -0.033 0.410 -0.010 0.041 -0.011 0.035 0.137 0.054 1 
 
Advertising Cash Flow Cash Holding Cash Reserve Ratio Dividend Payout Number Of Employees Firm Size Interest Coverage Investment Ratio Leverage 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  




Annual Tangibility Tobin’s Q   
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Table 1: Describing Liquidity Measures and CEO Network Measures  
Panels A and B show descriptive statistics for the U.S. liquidity measures. The U.S. sample covers from 2000 through 2016. The liquidity measures examined are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio 
(ILR) and CRSP-Spread consistent with Chung and Zhang (2014). The liquidity measures are calculated for each available stock for each day. We then calculate the daily change in ∆ Amihud Illiquidity 
for all stocks in our sample by taking the difference of the logs of Amihud’s illiquidity measure; we follow Koch, Ruenzi and Starks (2016) and Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008). This is replicated for 
CRSP-Spread.  Panel A shows the mean, standard deviation and median of the liquidity measures, the number of securities used.  Panel B shows the summary statistics of daily changes in liquidity 
measures. Panels C and Panel D show corresponding statistics for control variables. Appendix A defines all the variables. 
 
Panel E presents summary Statistics of CEOs Network Size/Total for full sample data and sub-sample data where we take into consideration industry type. Appendix A defines all the 
variables  
 Mean Std Dev P25 Median P75 Observations 
Panel A :Liquidity Measure, )( ,tiliq   
Amihud-illiquidity  0.307 8.256 0.001 0.003 0.022 12,416,664 
CRSP-Spread 0.006 0.094 0.001 0.006 0.045 14,662,384 
Panel B: Daily Changes in Liquidity Measure, )( ,tiliq  
∆ Amihud- Illiquidity   -0.008 1.461 -0.892 -0.006 0.887 12,410,486 
∆ CRSP- Spread  -0.009 0.900 -0.419 0.0000 0.418 13,645,903 
Panel C: Daily Changes in Liquidity of portfolio of stocks that are connected to stock (i) - (Full Sample), )( ,tjliq  
∆ Amihud- Illiquidity   0.126 0.918 -0.377 0.057 0.565 11,158,603 
∆ CRSP- Spread  0.023 0.459 -0.149 0.016 0.262 12,719080 
Panel D: Daily Changes in Liquidity of portfolio of stocks that are connected to stock (i) (Same Industry), ,( )k tliq  
∆ Amihud- Illiquidity   0.032 1.154 -0.637 0.017 0.714 5,395,249 
∆ CRSP- Spread  0.007 0.688 -0.269 0.000 0.289 6,004,536 
Panel E: Descriptive of Annual Network Size of CEOs 
 
CEOs Network Total  - Full Sample  23.526 35.366 2.000 10.000 29.000 
 
7,453 
CEOs Network Total  -Different Industry  17.242 20.199 2.00 9.000 24.000 6,128 
CEOs Network Total -Same Industry  4.193 5.707 1.000 2.000 5.000 2,851 
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Table 2: Commonality in Liquidity Across Connected Firms [Full Sample] 
For each firm (i) in a year (t), we run the time series regression
, , , ,i t CI j t mkt mkt t i tliq liq liq controls            , where ,i tliq the daily change in the stock is own liquidity, ,j tliq
measures the liquidity of portfolio of stocks that are connected to stock ( )i  ,
,mkt tliq
represents daily changes in market liquidity. 
,mkt tliq
is computed as changes in the value-weighted liquidity of two 
portfolios; a market portfolio containing all stocks and a portfolio comprised of stock connected to stock ( )i .  The regression coefficient 
CI  measures the sensitivity of changes in firm (i’s) liquidity to changes 
in aggregate liquidity of firms connected to the firm (i’s) while  mkt  which measures the sensitivity of changes in firm (i’s) liquidity to changes in aggregate market liquidity. Following, Koch et al. (2016), we 
are interested in the significance of the mean coefficient of liquidity betas to look for evidence of liquidity in commonality. Thus we expect liquidity betas to be 0CI   & 0mkt   and significant.  Our 
sample includes daily data for NYSE/AMEX –listed firms with the beginning of day price greater than $5 from January 2000 to December 2016. 
Independent variables Mean Estimated coefficient 
Amihud Illiquidity 
(t-stat) 
Mean Estimated coefficient 
CRSP-Spread 
(t-stat) 
 (1) (2) 








































Number of regressions  5,136 5,225 
Average Adjusted R-square 0.18 0.10 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Appendix A defines all the variables 




Table 3:   Commonality in Liquidity Across Connected Firms [Same Industry Connections] 
For each firm (i) in a year (t), we run the time series regression
, , , , ,i t CI j t mkt mkt t ind k t i tliq liq liq liq controls               , where ,i tliq the daily change in the stock is own liquidity, 
,j tliq
measures the liquidity of portfolio of stocks that are connected to stock ( )i  ,
,mkt tliq
represents daily changes in market liquidity. 
,mkt tliq
is computed as changes in the value-weighted liquidity of 
two portfolios; a market portfolio containing all stocks and a portfolio comprised of stock connected to stock ( )i .  The regression coefficient 
CI  measures the sensitivity of changes in firm (i’s) liquidity to changes in 
aggregate liquidity of firms connected to the firm (i’s) while  mkt  which measures the sensitivity of changes in firm (i’s) liquidity to changes in aggregate market liquidity. ,k tliq measures the liquidity of the portfolio 
of stocks that are connected to stock ( )i and are in the same industry. Following, Koch et al. (2016), we are interested in the significance of the mean coefficient of liquidity betas to look for evidence of liquidity in 
commonality. Thus we expect liquidity betas   to be 0CI   & and 0ind   significant.  Our sample includes daily data for NYSE/AMEX –listed firms with the beginning of day price greater than $5 for the period 
of January 2000 to December, 2016. 
Independent variable Mean Estimated coefficient (t-stat) Mean Estimated coefficient (t-stat) 
 Amihud Illiquidity CRSP-SPREAD 












































Number of regressions  2,230 2,180 
Average Adjusted R-square 0.095 0.022 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the variables 
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Table 4: Market and Industry Commonality in Liquidity  
Daily changes in an individual stock’s liquidity measure are regressed in time series on daily changes in the liquidity of a portfolio of stock connected to the individual stock 
irrespective of the industry of affiliation and daily changes in the liquidity of a portfolio of stocks connected to the individual stock and belong to the same industry. Cross 
sectional averages of time series slope coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parenthesis. Coefficients for other control variables are not reported. All t-statistics are in 
brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the variables 
 Amihud illiquidity measure CRSP- Spread 
Social Network Liquidity Beta Connections  
Across Industries 




Connections Within Same 
Industry 



























Adjusted R-Square 0.029 0.002 
Observations  24,617 26,536 
 
 
73 | P a g e  
 
Table 5a: Effect of Network Size on Stock Liquidity Commonality (Liquidity Betas) 
Table 5 presents stock own liquidity beta and market liquidity beta sorted by firms network size. Stock own liquidity and market liquidity betas are sorted into 5 Quintiles according to network size of individual 
firms. This table presents descriptive of liquidity betas for firms that are connected irrespective of the industry. We present these results to investigate whether the magnitude of liquidity co-movement as the 
evidence above increases with reference to network size of firms or to the number of firms connected to a specific firm. 



















































































5b Test of Beta Significance between Q1 and Q5 
AMIHUD Observations Mean Std.Dev Test of Means [t-test] 
Q1 1410 0.065 2.087 -3.33*** 
Q5 1283 0.265 0.521  
     
CRSP-SPREAD     
Q1 929 0.004 0.002 -26.96*** 
Q5 1053 0.342 0.012  
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix A defines all the 
variables.  
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Table 6: Liquidity Commonality Measure (BCI) on CEO Total Network Size and controls 
Table 6 reports result from pooled OLS (1-10) specifications  of the following regression: 
, 1 , , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 ,( _ ) ( ) ln( _ ) _CI i t i j t i t i t i tNetwork Total liq ave firm size time effects              
Where 
CI is estimated from equation (1), ( _ )Network Total  and ln( _ )firm size are measured at the end of each year. ( )liq ave is the firms’ 
average daily illiquidity measure measured at the end of each year.  
AMIHUD ILLIQUIDITY MEASURE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






















































Time effects  No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
Firm effects  No No No No No No No Yes No 
Time Clusters  No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters   No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 21,232 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 20,932 21,232 
Adjusted R-square  0.002 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix A defines all the variables.  
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Table 7: Liquidity Commonality Measure (BCI) on CEO Network Size and controls 
Table 7 reports result from pooled OLS (1-10) specifications  of the following regression: 
, 1 , , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 ,( _ ) ( ) ln( _ ) _CI i t i j t i t i t i tNetwork Total liq ave firm size time effects            
 . Where 
CI is estimated from equation (1), ( _ )Network Total  and 
ln( _ )firm size are measured at the end of each year. ( )liq ave is the firms’ average daily illiquidity measure measured at the end of each year. 
CRSP-SPREAD MEASURE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






















































Time effects  No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No 
Firm effects  No No No No No No No Yes No 
Time Clusters  No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Clusters   No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Observations 18,817 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,503 18,817 
Adjusted R-square  0.001 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.020 0.001 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. Appendix A defines all the variables 
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Table 8: Determinants of Corporate Policies Regressions.  
This table shows the results of equation 7 where for each corporate policy, we regress a number of factors that determine the specific corporate policy following 
the literature. We then obtain the residual for each policy to measure policy dissimilarity. Refer to the text for the definition of the models 
 Investment 
Ratio 












 Dividend Over 
Earnings 
Advertising 




































  0.020*** 
(44.82) 




Tangibility   31.121*** 
(6.33) 





























     









     

















































Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-Square 0.026 0.047 0.855 0.139 0.194 0.002  0.001 0.062 
No. of obs.  71,564 37,336 33,816 37,132 37,060 55,412  37,052 16,960 
Notes: All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix A defines all the variables 
 






















Table 9: Liquidity Commonality  and Similarity in Corporate Policy Across Connected Stocks  
Table 9 reports regression estimates for the relation between liquidity commonality and similarity in corporate policy using equation 9.  Refer to the text 
for the definition of the models.  
Dependent Variable 



































































Firm Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,198 4,468 4,422 4,465 4,505 5,210 4,504 4,504 
Adjusted R-square  0.187 0.219 0.219 0.222 0.228 0.195 0.217 0.218 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the variables 






















 Table 10: Liquidity Commonality  and Similarity in Corporate Policy Across Connected Stocks  
Table 10 reports regression estimates for the relation between liquidity commonality and similarity in corporate policy using equation 9.  Refer to the 
text for the definition of the models. 
Dependent Variable 



































































Firm Clusters Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,193 4,467 4,421 4,465 4,504 5,205 4,503 4,503 
Adjusted R-square  0.068 0.076 0.076 0.078 0.081 0.071 0.076 0.076 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the variables 






















Table 11: Liquidity Commonality and Trading Activity Across Connected Firms  
Table 11 reports from pooled OLS (1-6) specifications of the following regression:  
, , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 ,( ) ln( ) Pr _CI i t TRD j t i t i t i t i t i tB Trade liq ave size Vol time effects                  Where CI is estimated from equation (1), ,TRD j tTrade   is 
defined as the portfolio of the number of trades of firms that are connected ( _ )Network Total  and , ln( _ )firm size , 
, 1i tVol   and 
, 1Pri t are measured at the end of each year. ( )liq ave is the firms’ average daily illiquidity measure measured at the end of each year. 
Dependent Variable : Stock Liquidity Beta 
(Amihud Illiquidity)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) 






































































Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No No No 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No 
Time Clusters No No No No Yes No Yes 
Firm Clusters  No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 34,834 34,465 34,465 34,465 34,834 34,834 34,834 
Adjusted R-square  0.032 0.038 0.367 0.373 0.032 0.003 0.003 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the 
variables 





















Table 12: Liquidity Commonality and Trading Activity Across Connected Firms  
Table 12 reports from pooled OLS (1-6) specifications of the following regression:  
, , 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 ,( ) ln( ) Pr _CI i t TRD j t i t i t i t i t i tB Trade liq ave size Vol time effects                  Where CI is estimated from equation (1), ,TRD j tTrade   is 
defined as the portfolio of number of trades of firms that are connected ( _ )Network Total  and , ln( _ )firm size , 
, 1i tVol   and , 1Pri t
are measured at the end of each year. ( )liq ave is the firms’ average daily illiquidity measure measured at the end of each year. 
Dependent Variable : Stock Liquidity Beta 
(CRSP-Spread)  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (4) (5) (6) 






































































Time Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No No No 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No No 
Time Clusters No No No No Yes No Yes 
Firm Clusters  No No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 34,712 34,712 34,712 34,712 34,712 34,712 34,712 
Adjusted R-square  0.007 0.018 0.269 0.276 0.008 0.007 0.008 
All t-statistics are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.   Appendix A defines all the 
variables 
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Table 13: 2 Stage Regressions Using Instrumental Variables 
 1st stage 
Dep= CEO  Total  
Network Size 
2nd Stage 
Dep = Social Network Stock 
 Liquidity Beta (Amihud) 
CEO Total Network Size  - 0.0056*** 
(3.54) 
Industry Network Total 0.8316*** 
(75.11) 
- 








Year Effects  Yes  Yes  
Industry Effects No  Yes 
Observations  20,118 20,118 
Adjusted R- Square 32% 6.7% 
Partial F-Statistics  3.29 (p-value <0.0001) 
Weak Identification Test Cragg-Donald Wald F = 5641.728 
 Stock-Yogo C.V: 10% Max IV 16.38 
 Stock-Yogo C.V: 25% Max IV 5.53 
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Table 14: 2 Stage Regressions Using Instrumental Variables 
 1st stage 
Dep= CEO  Total  
Network Size 
2nd Stage 
Dep = Social Network Stock 
 Liquidity Beta (CRSP-Spread) 
CEO Total Network Size  - 0.0031*** 
(3.94) 
Industry Network Total 0.8092*** 
(65.88) 
- 








Year Effects  Yes  Yes  
Industry Effects No  Yes 
Observations  17,652 17,652 
Adjusted R- Square 30.7% 7.5% 
Partial F-Statistics  3.74 (p-value <0.0001) 
Weak Identification Test Cragg-Donald Wald F = 4339.915 
 Stock-Yogo C.V: 10% Max IV 16.38 
 Stock-Yogo C.V: 25% Max IV 5.53 
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Table 15: Endogeneity: Difference-in-Difference using a CEO’s Death 
Dependent Variable: 






























Adjusted R-Square 0.165 0.331 0.167 0.289 
Observation  680 680 4,456 4,456 
In Panel A we consider firms that actually recorded CEO death within the sample period. 
In Panel B we consider firms that did not recorded CEO death but a CEO in the network of firms connected to 
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Table 16: Endogeneity: Difference-in-Difference using a CEO’s Death 
Dependent Variable: 






























Adjusted R-Square 0.176 0.241 0.128 0.172 
Observation  680 680 4,454 4,545 
In Panel A we consider firms that actually recorded CEO death within the sample period. 
In Panel B we consider firms that did not recorded CEO death but a CEO in the network of firms connected to 




























The impact of social and professional ties among top executives and directors in corporations 
is a central issue in corporate finance. It is well established that information flow among 
connected executives significantly affects corporate policies and governance practices. 
Fracassi (2016) shows that managers are influenced by their social peers in making corporate 
policy decisions. Fracassi (2016) notes that the more connections two companies share, the 
more similar are their capital investments. Investigating the implications of social networks 
among corporate executives has become a growing body of research in finance. These studies 
support the idea that social and professional network interactions that facilitate peer influence, 
motivate connected firms to adopt similar actions leading to commonality in corporate 
behaviour. In the context of stop split, Kaustia and Rantala (2015) find that through peer effects, 
firms are more likely to split their stocks if their peers have recently done the same. Bouwan 
(2011) notes that peer effects and peer influence facilitate corporate governance practices to 
spread from one firm to another leading to convergence in governance practices. Similarly, 
Grennan (2019) shows that dividend policies have peer effects. He finds that payment of 
dividends by firms increases by 16% in response to peer firms’ changes and speeds up the time 
taken to make a dividend change by about 1.5 quarters.  
 
Some recent social network studies in finance reveal that CEO networks significantly influence 
several aspects of corporate decisions and corporate behavior. El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik 
(2015) show that high network centrality can allow CEOs to efficiently gather and control 
private information, which facilitates value-creating acquisitions. Brown, Gao and 
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Stathopoulos (2012) and Engelberg, Gao, and Parson (2013) find that CEOs with large 
networks earn more than those with small networks. Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran 
(2014) present evidence that firms with better-connected CEOs invest more in research and 
development and receive more, higher quality patents. On earnings management, Chiu, Teoh, 
and Tian (2013) find that a firm is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common 
director with a firm that is currently managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings 
when it shares a common director with a non-manipulator. In line with these studies, this essay 
contributes to the literature by examining the influence of peer effects across CEO networks 
on asset growth decisions (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalex, and 
Wolfenzon, 2006; Cronqvist ,Makhija, and Yonker, 2012; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013; 
Jenter and Lewellen, 2015).  
 
Specifically, this essay examines whether social and professional connections among CEOs 
influence asset growth decisions of firms leading to e commonality in asset growth across 
connected firms. Our quest to investigate the above relationship to establish whether CEO 
networks fuels asset growth commonality rest on the fact that, studies such as Cooper , Gulen, 
and Schil (2008) and Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2013) find that asset growth affect stock 
returns. On the contrary, McConnel and Muscarells (1985) find that announcements of capital 
investments affect stock prices favourably. In addition, recent research in empirical corporate 
finance show that social network of firm executives greatly influence corporate decision 
outcome focusing on several corporate outcome such as compensation structure, stock split, 
dividend policies, mergers and acquisition among other. Interestingly, even though the 
corporate finance literature provide evidence on the impact of executives network on firms, the 
literature is yet to consider the link between social network of firm executives and asset growth 
decisions of firms. Since asset growth decisions of firms can be influenced by management, its 
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prudent a study is a carried to ascertain the linkage between asset growth decisions of connected 
CEOs. Gupta, Guha, and Krishnaswami  (2013) define asset growth as an increase in certain 
attributes such as sales, employment and profit of a firm between two times. According to 
Nelson and Winter (1982), asset growth is determined by the combination of firm-specific 
resources, capabilities and routines. Zhou and de Wit (2009) find that asset growth at the firm 
level is driven by individual, organizational and environmental determinants. Focusing on the 
individual determinants of asset growth, prior studies show that asset growth, to a large extent, 
is driven by the decisions and preferences of top management. These studies suggest that 
personality traits, growth motivation, individual competencies and the personal background of 
top management are the most important factors that determine a firm’s asset growth rate 
(Delmar, 1996; Baum , Locke and Smith, 2001; Shane, Locke, and Collins, 2003). Renneboog 
and Zhao (2014) and El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015), in examining the role of CEO 
networks in finance, classify CEOs’ network size as personality traits and soft skills of the 
CEO. This is because social and professional networks of CEOs affect CEOs’ personal 
decisions as well as corporate behaviour. Indeed, top executives draw upon these networks to 
derive valuable information that will be beneficial to their firms (Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 
2005; McDonald, Khanna, and Westphal, 2008). Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) show that 
social networks among firm executives serve as channels for interpersonal and inter-
organizational support, influence, and information flow. Thus, social interactions among firm 
executives can be beneficial for companies because they facilitate information exchange, 
allowing diffusion of ideas, knowledge and private information. In addition, social and 
professional connections can serve as channels whereby top executives obtain business 
opportunities and learn key market information that enhances the quality of their decisions 
(Granovetter, 2005). 
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From the above discussion, we realise that asset growth decisions at the firm level can be 
influenced greatly by top managements, hence, we conjecture in this essay that connected 
CEOs, belonging to the same network, through peer effects are likely to imitate each other’s 
asset growth strategies if the CEO believes that the information obtained from peer CEOs is 
valuable.  We hypothesise that the asset growth of firms that are connected will comove. This 
is because social connections increase a CEO’s access to relevant network information, which 
may encourage asset growth and innovation since, through social networks, a CEO obtains 
non-public information that helps them identify, evaluate, and exploit innovative ideas and 
good projects. Specifically, the study addresses the following research questions: Does the 
asset growth of connected firms covary, and, if so, through which channel(s)? What are the 
implications of commonality in asset growth on shareholders wealth?   
 
The intuition for our hypotheses is as follows: A substantial body of literature examines the 
empirical relationship between asset growth and stock returns. Xing (2007) finds a negative 
relationship between investment and stock returns. Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), using 
total asset variations, confirm the results of Xing (2007). Likewise, Lam and Wei (2011) find 
a negative, significant relationship between stock returns and asset growth in U.S. firms. From 
the above, understanding factors that drive asset growth is important because it affects expected 
returns (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004; Cooper, Gulen, and Schill, 2008). A fundamental 
question is: given the well-known asset growth effect, do connected CEOs imitate asset growth 
strategies of peer CEOs to increase assets? Following, Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012), who find 
that peer performance can influence the adoption of financial innovations and investment 
styles, Davis (1991) and Davis and Greve (1997), who show that connections among firm 
executives lead to the adoption of similar poison pill and golden parachute strategies, and 
Bouwman (2011), who finds a link between board interlocks and the convergence of 
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governance practices, we argue that, through peer performance, CEOs with personal 
connections imitate each other and grow their firm’s asset just like their peers even if the 
addition of more assets is detrimental to shareholders’ value. We argue that connected CEOs 
in a network in their quest to run big empires may want to grow their firms to a level close to 
their network peers since that will subsequently enhance their prospects in the labour market.  
Our proposition stems from the findings of Delmar and Wiklund (2008) who conclude that 
motivated managers can effectively utilise resources and select appropriate strategies to 
improve growth. Thus, connected CEOs, through peer effects, can motivate each other to 
embark on related asset growth strategies.  
 
Accordingly, we argue that CEOs with personal connections through the peer effect may adopt 
similar asset growth strategies around the same time, which, in effect, may lead to similarity in 
asset growth rates among connected firms leading to commonality in asset growth. We evaluate 
the impact of peers on firms’ asset growth decisions and test whether commonality in asset 
growth impacts shareholders’ value.  
 
To test the hypothesis, we rely on biographical information about CEOs of U.S. public 
companies supplied by BoardEx from 2000-2016 to establish connections among firms through 
CEOs’ social networks. Next, we follow Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) and use annual total 
asset variations as a measure of annual asset growth rate. We construct a measure of 
commonality in asset growth among connected firms by adopting an approach similar to that 
of Anton and Polk (2014) and Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2016). To obtain the measure for 
commonality in asset growth across connected firms, we estimate the relationship between a 
firm’s own asset growth rate and the asset growth rate of a portfolio of firms that are connected 
to that firm. We label the regression coefficient of individual firms’ asset growth on the average 
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asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to the individual firm our measure of 
commonality in asset growth among connected firms, as Asset Growth Beta. Following 
Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008), we define Asset Growth Beta as the sensitivity of each firm’s 
asset growth change to the variation in asset growth rate of portfolio of firms connected to the 
firm. 
  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a significant positive relationship between individual 
firm asset growth and the asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to the firm. The results 
suggest that asset growth across connected firms strongly comove. Thus, through personal 
connections among firm executives, connected firms imitate each other in asset additions by 
observing the actions of peers. We next test the empirical relationship between commonality 
in asset growth, Asset Growth Beta and CEO network size. We regress the Asset Growth Beta 
coefficient for each stock on the network size of each firm. Again, as predicted, we find a 
significant positive relationship between asset growth beta and the CEO’s network size. This 
evidence further confirms our earlier assertion that asset growth among connected firms 
comoves.  
 
We further examine the economic benefits of asset growth commonality. We argue that 
connected firms growing their assets similarly may not be economically beneficial to 
shareholders. This is because a CEO may be influenced by peers in the social network to 
embark on asset expansion, even if the expansion is not needed, since the CEO’s personal 
characteristics and preferences impact corporate policies. This, we argue, will not add 
significant economic benefit to the firm. Moreover, misleading and incorrect information may 
spread through the CEO network, resulting in value decreasing strategies and investments as a 
result of peer influence.  We hypothesise that commonality in asset growth across connected 
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firms will negatively affect firm performance. To test this claim, we regress, return on assets 
(RoA) and stock returns on Asset Growth Beta, our measure of commonality in asset growth 
among connected firms for each firm, while controlling for factors that can determine RoA and 
stock returns. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find evidence that asset growth commonality 
significantly reduces shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Next, we evaluate potential channels through which CEO connections facilitate commonality 
in asset growth across connected firms. First, we test whether connected CEOs adopt similar 
M&A decisions by investigating acquisitions of connected CEOs. Evidently, several factors 
determine investment decision similarity across firms. For instance, firms in different 
industries are less likely to invest in similar assets than firms in the same industry. We use 
multiple regressions to test whether the findings obtained could be driven by similarity in 
acquisition decisions across connected firms. In the first regression, using data from SDC, we 
compute the acquisition growth rate for each individual firm and the acquisition growth rate of 
firms connected to that firm. We then regress each individual firm’s acquisition growth rate on 
the average acquisition growth rate of portfolio of firms connected to that firm. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, we find a significant positive relationship between the acquisition growth rate 
of individual firms and the acquisition growth rate of a portfolio of firms connected to that 
firm.  
 
Following Bliss and Rosen (2001), we further investigate whether connected firms grow their 
assets similarly through non-merger and acquisition strategies. We estimate the non-merger 
growth rate for each firm by finding the difference between each firm’s annual total assets and 
the total value of acquisitions. We then regress the non-merger growth rate for each firm on 
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the non-merger asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to that firm. We find evidence 
suggesting connected firms grow their assets similarly through non-mergers and acquisitions.  
 
Secondly, we investigate whether commonality in asset growth across connected firms may be 
attributed to similarity in research and development investment (hereafter, R&D). Following 
Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016), we compute the annual R&D growth rate for each firm and 
the average R&D growth rate of a portfolio of firms connected to that firm. We hypothesise 
that connected CEOs belonging to the same network influence each other to embark on similar 
R&D investments in their quest to grow assets to similar levels and at a similar rate. We find a 
significant positive relationship between each individual firm’s R&D growth rate and the R&D 
growth rate of a portfolio of firms connected to the firm.   
 
Subsequent to our results that show that CEO network size influences asset growth strategies, 
one issue with our results is that a CEO may build stronger networks to maximize the net 
benefits associated with asset growth, at least in the short term. We use a two stage instrumental 
variable (IV) approach to check for endogeniety. We argue that the positive relationship 
between CEO network size and commonality in asset growth is susceptible to reverse causality. 
This is because a firm can grow assets through the firm’s own efforts, resources, and 
capabilities without relying on information obtained by the CEO from peer CEOs in the CEO 
networks. If the above scenario happens, then eventually the chances of the CEOs’ network 
size increasing surges to successfully increase the firms’ assets even though the growth might 
not come from the CEO’s efforts. On the other hand, a firm with less access to quality non-
market information may rely on the information obtained by the CEO from peer CEOs to 
increase assets. We find that the positive effect of CEO network on similarity in asset growth 
among connected firms is robust to the IV approach. Another possible reverse-causality could 
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be that when firms want to change corporate finance policies, they hire people with the 
appropriate skills and social connections to implement the desired strategies, hence we use a 
CEO’s death as an exogeneous shock to a firm’s social and professional connectivity to test 
the direction of causality between a CEO’s social connections and commonality in asset growth 
since, when a CEO dies, his/her social ties with other individuals in the network ceases, 
exogeneously altering the social connections between companies. We find that a CEO’s death 
significantly reduces the extent of asset growth comovement of connected firms.   
 
The study contributes to two distinct literatures. First, we contribute to the strand to literature 
on the determinants of asset growth. Some key early studies on this topic in economics and 
finance (Simon and Bonini,1958; Eatwell,1971; Lucas Jr ,1978; Sawyer, 1985; Evans ,1987 ; 
Audretsch, Klomp, and Santarelli, 2004) focus on the role of firm characteristics such as firm 
size and firm age as determinants of asset growth. Other studies on the topic concentrate on the 
relationship between environment, business strategy and firm growth (McDougall, Robinson, 
and DeNisi, 1992).We extend the literature and consider the effects of network ties among top 
management who direct corporate behaviour to ascertain whether social ties facilitate asset 
growth at the firm level through peer effects. We use personal connections among firm CEOs 
and show that access to network information plays a significant role in explaining the 
determinants of asset growth in U.S. public firms.  
 
Secondly, we contribute to empirical research on the impact of CEO connections on firm value. 
Advances in this research area show that top executive connections affect firm decisions and 
behaviour. Hwang and Kim (2009) find that personal connections between CEOs and directors 
aid higher pay levels, lower turnover profitability and low pay performance sensitivity. Ishii 
and Xuan (2014) find negative effects from relationships between an acquirer and targets, and 
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the audit committee and the firm’s auditor (He, Pittman, and Wu, 2014). Kramarz and Thesmar 
(2013) observe that CEO and board connections lead to a decline in turnover performance 
sensitivity. Our results show that CEO personal connections that facilitate asset growth 
commonality across connected firms can have a positive effect on corporate investment 
decisions. Thus, through personal connections, CEOs are well positioned to make the right 
investment choices because of valuable information that flows across the network. However, 
additional tests to investigate the economic benefits of asset growth commonality suggest that 
co-variation in asset growth across connected firms significantly affects firm performance.  
 
Overall, we find that larger CEO connections are associated with higher asset growth 
commonality across connected firms, which confirms the view that network contacts fuel the 
diffusion of economic information from external sources that enables CEOs to obtain more 
accurate, quality information relating to asset growth. The significant positive relationship 
between commonality in asset growth and CEO network size, suggests that the more 
connections a CEO has, the more is the tendency that the CEO will grow assets more because 
of peer influences from a large number of individuals in the network even if increasing assets 
may not be beneficial to the firm. Our result confirms that commonality in asset growth 
negatively affect firms. Finally, we find evidence that similarity in M&A decisions and R&D 
investment are two channels that drive commonality in asset growth among connected firms.  
 
The study proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes data and sample selection. Section 4 presents empirical findings and Section 
5 documents the conclusion.  
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2. Literature Review  
2.1 CEO Personal Connections  
First, we rely on the comprehensive literature in organisation psychology, economics and 
finance that provides evidence of the potential benefits and costs of being well-connected 
through social and professional network ties. The benefits of having a well-connected top 
executive such as a CEO take several forms. First, CEOs are carriers of a wealth of information 
that relates to industry dynamics, market trends, regulatory changes and key market data, which 
may flow across the CEO network. This implies that a well-connected CEO has better access to 
information that may aid in making decisions that may be beneficial to the firm (Larcker, So, 
and Wang, 2013). Second, when designing contracts, personal connections among firm CEOs 
allow firms to leverage on social relationships to reduce information asymmetry since both 
factors can help in developing the terms of contract agreements between firms (Engelberg, Goa, 
and Parsons, 2013). Third, through CEO connectedness, CEOs can obtain important business 
contacts that can be sources of useful business relationships or sources of other economic 
benefits and resource exchanges. Lastly, personal connections among CEOs can be a channel 
of information diffusion through which value-improving business strategies and innovations 
may spread. Thus through information flow across the network, CEOs can obtain useful 
information such as efficient corporate governance and compensation practices (Hvide and 
Östberg, 2015; Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi, 2016).  
 
In empirical finance literature, numerous studies on the effect of social networks in corporations 
acknowledge the significant impact of personal connections among firm top executives on 
corporate decisions and behaviour, resource allocation in capital markets (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2009), option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009), information transfer in security 
marekts (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008), acquisiton activity (Cai and Sevilir, 2011; El-
97 | P a g e  
 
Khatib, Renneboog and Zhao, 2011; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Fogel and Jandik, 2015), 
compensation practices (Renneboog and Zhao, 2011), board monitoring (Fraccasi and Tate, 
2012), earnings management (Shu, Yeh, and Yang, 2015), IPO outcomes (Cooney, Madureira, 
Singh and Yang, 2015), corporate fraud (Chidambaran, Kedia and Prabhala, 2011; Khanna, Kim 
and Lu, 2015) and innovation (Faleye, Kovacs and Venkateswaran, 2014).  
 
A number of these studies conclude that personal connections among top executives positively 
influence firm behaviour. For example, Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) show that a CEO’s close 
connections with directors and other top management help detect fraud. Thus, a CEO’s 
closeness with top directors and executives may possibly assist the CEO to discover early 
signals of any negative activity. Renneboog and Zhao (2014) examined the impact of corporate 
network ties on takeovers. Their results show that when the respective executives and directors 
of the bidder and target are connected, the propensity for the takeover to be successful increases 
and the duration of the takeover transaction shortens. Likewise, Burt (2004) and McDonald, 
Khanna, and Westphal (2008) provide evidence that CEOs personal connections positions the 
CEO to have alternative points of view that enhance the quality of strategic decisions in 
unfamiliar settings. Schonlau and Singh (2009) find that well-connected CEOs can improve 
their ability to identify and exploit innovation opportunities because of vital information that 
permeates through their networks. 
 
An existing literature strand concludes that personal connections among firm top executives 
adversely affects firm behaviour and performance. This is attributed to misleading information 
that may flow through the network, resulting in individuals within the network adopting 
strategies that can decrease firm value and jeopardize firm behaviour. For example, Armstrong 
and Larcker (2009) and Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby (2009) show that personal connections 
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among firm executives facilitate the spread of option backdating. Fracassi and Tate (2012) 
show that network ties among CEOs and directors destroy corporate value and weaken board 
monitoring. On the effectiveness of boards comprising highly connected directors, Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) find board members are unable to keep a watchful eye on management thus 
negatively affecting corporate activities. Khanna, Kim, and Lu (2015) find that through 
appointment, CEOs develop networks with directors and executives that directly fuel the 
likelihood of fraud in the firm. Similarly, Chidambaran, Kedia and Prabhala (2011) show that 
connections between CEOs and directors significantly increase the probability of fraud; CEOs 
close connections with top executives and directors provide the support required to engage in 
fraudulent activities. A number of studies show that firms with CEOs who are connected to 
board of directors receive higher compensation, demonstrate lower pay-performance 
sensitivity and are unlikely to be fired for under-performance (Hallock, 1997; Hwang and Kim, 
2009; Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). 
 
The arguments and conclusions from the literature on the effects of personal connections 
among firm executives on firm behaviour highlight the ambiguity regarding the net economic 
impact of top executives’ network ties. In this essay, we examine the relationship between CEO 
connectedness and commonality in asset growth and its ripple effect on shareholders.  
 
2.2 Firms Asset Growth Strategies   
Prior evidence suggests that asset growth strategies and choices adopted by firms are not static 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Penrose and Penrose, 2009). Thus, firms 
grow in many different ways, and the growth patterns can vary across firms (Delmar and 
Wiklund, 2008). As a multidimensional construct, firm growth primarily involves expansion 
of organisation size measured by assets and employees; increase in volume of sales and profit 
levels as well as the generation of new economic functions or more product or service lines 
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(Starbuck, 1965; Greiner, 1972; Kimberly, Kimberly and Miles, 1980; Chandler, 1990; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990; Penrose and Penrose, 2009). Although the traditional 
strategy for growth has been either through generic expansion or mergers and acquisitions (Yip, 
1982; Peng and Heath, 1996; Penrose and Penrose, 2009), a strand of literature advances that 
firms have become increasingly interested in relying on trust-based network relationships to 
achieve growth (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Williamson, 1991; Powell, 2003). These 
network-based relationships assume various forms, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
hybrid organisations, partnerships, corporate groups and research consortia (Thorelli, 1986; 
Johanson and Mattsson, 1987; Jarillo, 1988; Borys and Jemison, 1989; Ring and Van de Ven, 
1994; Tallman and Shenkar, 1994; Browning, Beyer, and Shelter, 1995).  
 
Research has classified the drivers of firm growth into three dimensions: individual, 
organisational and environmental (Zhou and de Wit, 2009). Empirical studies attribute the 
following as organizational determinants of firm growth: firm attributes, firm strategies such 
as market orientation, firm specific resources including human capital and financial resources, 
organizational structure and dynamic stability. Prior studies classify firm age and size as 
attributes that influence firm growth. The relationship between firm size/age and firm growth 
has its roots in Gibrat’s law which states that the rate of growth in a firm is independent of its 
initial size (Audretsch, Klopm and Santarelli, 2004). Becchetti and Trovato (2002) find that 
firm growth is affected by firm size and firm age. Other studies show that the growth rate of 
younger firms is higher than firms that existed for many years. The negative effects of firm age 
on firm growth are well established in a long history of literature that examines the relationship 
between firm age and firm growth (Glancey, 1998; Liu, Tsou and Hammitt, 1999; Robson and 
Bennett, 2000; Geroski and Gugler, 2004; Reichstein and Dahl, 2004; Yasuda, 2005). Studies 
on the stylized fact of firm size and firm growth have yielded mixed findings. For example, 
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Yasuda (2005) finds a negative effect whereas Audretsch, Klopm, and Santarelli (2004) record 
a positive effect.  
 
Firm growth is also attributed to how successful companies sell services and products to 
customers thus making market orientation a key determinant of firm growth. This is because 
firms with market orientation are able to track and respond swiftly to customers’ preferences 
which positions the firm to develop market intelligence and coordinate internal processes to 
respond quickly to stakeholders. Prior studies show that market orientation facilitates better 
satisfaction of stakeholders and customers, which eventually aids a firm’s growth (Narver and 
Slater, 1990; Hult, Snow, and Kandemir, 2003). Furthermore, Jaworski and Kohli (1993) find 
that market orientation significantly affects firm performance.  
 
Firm specific resources such as financial and human capital are important determinants of firm 
growth (Wiklund, Patzelt, and Shepherd, 2009). It has been argued that securing financial 
resources significantly promote firm growth (Sexton and Bowman-Upton, 1991; Bamford, 
Dean, and McDougal, 1997). This is because financial resources can be converted to other 
types of resource (Dollinger, 1999). With sufficient funds, firms can carry out R&D to 
experiment with new things which not only improve firm innovation but also position the firm 
to venture into new growth opportunities (Zahra, 1991; Castrogiovanni ,1996). Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, and Woo (1994) show that access to financial resources significantly drives 
firm growth. The financial performance of a firm is a secondary input to financial resources for 
firms; past profit can be reinvested into the firm. By this means, a firm not only relies on 
external funding, but also uses internal funds to finance investments. Human capital resources 
include knowledge, skills and experience. Birley and Westhead (1990) and Chandler (1990) 
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show that the human capital in managers contributes significantly to firm growth. Thus 
personal the characteristics and experience of managers play a determined role in firm growth.  
 
A general finding in the literature is that environmental determinants such as dynamism, 
heterogeneity, munificence, and hostility largely influence firm growth (Dess and Beard, 1984; 
Covin and Slevin, 1991; Pelham and Wilson, 1995). A dynamic environment, which relates to 
market dynamics or technology dynamics, is measured by the level of environmental 
predictability (Houston, 1986). Wiklund, Patzelt, and Shepherd (2009) conclude that changes 
in society, politics, markets and technology offer firms more growth opportunities. Aldrich and 
Wiedenmayer (1993) conclude that munificence represents an environment’s support for firm 
growth. It is argued that a firm in such an environment with better access to required resources 
has higher chances to grow. Baum, Locke and Smith, (2001) find a significant direct effect of 
munificence on firm growth. A hostile environment serves as a threat to firms through intensive 
competition because intensive competition reduces the growth prospects of small firms 
(Houston, 1986). Heterogeneity indicates the complexity of the environment regarding the 
concentration or dispersion of organizations in it. It is argued that small firms that serve niche 
markets can find growth opportunities with relatively more ease in a heterogeneous market 
than in a homogeneous one (Wiklund, Patzelt, and Shepherd, 2009).  
 
Firm growth is hugely determined by individuals at the helm of affairs; their personality traits, 
personal background, competencies and growth motivation significantly influence the growth 
choice and strategies adopted. Baum, Locke and Smith (2001) find that specific competencies 
of managers such as technical and industrial skills affect a firm’s growth significantly. The 
personal background of managers includes age, education, personal experience and gender. 
Studies show that experienced managers have a positive impact on firm performance. Orser, 
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Hogarth-Scott and Riding (2000) find a positive relationship between related industry 
experience and willingness to pursue growth opportunities. Likewise, Delmar and Shane 
(2006) find that experience matters in venture success. It is also observed that the education 
level of managers significantly impacts firm performance in terms of growth (Sexton and 
Bowman-Upton 1991; Storey, 2016). However, the nexus between firm growth and higher 
education remains mixed. Kolvereid (1992) find a positive effect but Welter (2001) notes a 
negative effect.  
 
Recently, a growing amount of literature on the effects of social networks of top executives in 
corporate finance concludes that the personal connections of top executives affects several 
corporate practices such as compensation, corporate innovation, board monitoring, investment 
styles and firm performance (Haunschild, 1993; Hwang and Kim, 2009; Fracassi and Tate, 
2012; Engelberg, Gao, and Parsons, 2013; Larcker, So, and Wang, 2013; Fracassi, 2016). Most 
of these studies attribute their results to peer effects and peer influence from individuals having 
personal connections. We build on this growing body of literature that examines the impacts 
of peer effects on firms’ and managers’ decisions by examining the impact of peer effects and 
group thinking on asset growth decisions among CEOs with personal connections. Larcker, So, 
and Wang (2013) find that social connections can enhance  firm value. We argue that social 
structure can impact on asset growth, which, to some extent, may lead to commonality in asset 
growth among connected firms.  
 
There exists a substantial number of factors that may have a relationship with firm growth. We 
argue the social and professional connections of top executives such as CEOs which facilitates 
the transfer of ideas, knowledge and resources can influence firm growth.  
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2.3 Asset Growth and Firm Performance    
The literature on asset growth and firm performance is relatively new. Existing studies show 
that firm asset and investment growth affects stock returns. Cooper, Gulen, and Schil (2008) 
observe that asset growth rates are strong predictors of stock returns. They conclude that a 
firm’s annual asset growth rates significantly predict stock returns. Cooper, Gulen, and Schil 
(2009) find a strong negative relationship between the growth of total firm assets and 
subsequent stock returns. Fu (2011) finds that firms that shrink their assets or investments 
subsequently earn higher returns than firms that expand their assets or investments. Lipson, 
Mortal, and Schill (2011) show that the asset growth effect is pervasive in stock markets. Lam 
and Wei (2012) testing the prominent rational and behavioural explanations for the negative 
relationships between corporate asset growth or investments and subsequent stock returns find 
that returns on low growth firms with low subsequent growth are not higher than those on high 
growth firms with high subsequent growth. Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2013) find that firms 
with higher asset growth rates subsequently experience lower stock returns. Following this 
literature on asset growth effect on stock returns, we predict that asset growth commonality 
among connected firms will negatively affect firm performance. Our argument rests on the fact 
that a CEO can suffer from group thinking bias because of trust among individuals within a 
network to adopt certain asset growth policies through the peer effect that may not add value 
to the firm.  
 
2.4 Hypothesis Development  
Considerable evidence indicates that social networks facilitate innovation and information 
diffusion (Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2001). Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, and Jaffe (2006) 
show through firm interconnections, a firm’s ability to learn is increased and it is able to adapt 
quickly to new technology and innovation. Rodan and Galunic (2004) examine a manager’s 
104 | P a g e  
 
social networks and find that access to heterogeneous knowledge through social contacts is useful 
in generating and implementing new ideas. Oldham and Cummings (1996) attribute managerial 
innovation to information obtained from the heterogeneous social network of managers. Engelberg, 
Goa, and Parsons (2011), in examining CEOs’ social networks, find that social networks provide 
an informal medium for managers to share each other’s valuable experiences, gather key market 
information, exchange resources and identify business opportunities. From social network theory, 
social network ties provide access to diverse groups so that one can gain superior information and 
resources beyond one’s own group (Burt, 2004). Kaustia and Knüpfer (2012) show that peer 
performance can influence the adoption of similar financial innovations and investment styles. 
Consequently, network members with similar personal characteristics can lead to group 
thinking. 
 
Following these arguments, we argue that access to heterogeneous social networks offers CEOs 
a broader knowledge base, adds information richness, and provides alternative problem-solving 
insights. Hence, diverse social ties are beneficial for managerial decision-making in terms of 
selecting value-enhancing investments. Thus, we argue that through group thinking, CEOs with 
personal connections may grow their firms’ assets leading to asset growth commonality across 
connected firms. Following the literature that shows a significant positive relationship between 
managerial social networks and corporate finance decisions, we hypothesize that:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The asset growth of firms with CEOs having personal connections will 
strongly covary. 
 
To empirically test for the channels through which personal connections among CEOs can 
drive asset growth commonality, we first examine an external channel of asset growth by 
105 | P a g e  
 
focusing on the  M&A of connected firms by studying whether connected CEOs through peer 
influence increase assets through acquisition. We examine M&A because it is considered a 
major type of corporate investment and asset addition. Theoretically, M&A should create 
economic synergies among merging firms and increase the value of the acquirers. Since M&A 
transactions require manager capability in selecting the right strategies, we argue that social 
networks help CEOs make better decisions through information diffusion across the networks. 
Hence, CEOs with personal connections may grow their firm’s assets through acquisitions by 
adopting similar strategies leading to asset growth commonality. We argue that peer 
performance can give rise to CEOs with personal connections imitating each other in asset 
addition. This leads to our second hypothesis; CEOs with personal connections make similar 
M&A decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Similarity in M&A decisions among firms with CEOs with personal 
connection is a channel through which CEO connectedness drives asset growth 
commonality.  
 
In addition to M&A decisions, we also examine the R&D investment performance of connected 
firms which is classified as internal growth opportunity. Our motivation to examine R&D 
investment is inspired by a number of studies. Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014) 
provide evidence that better connected CEOs invest more in R&D and often receive higher 
quality patents. This shows that CEO connections drive investments that lead to corporate 
innovation. Also, Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez (2001) find that benefits arise from knowledge 
sharing among connected firms, which enhances R&D investment. Following, Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003), who find that individual managers affect corporate behaviour and performance 
by focusing on several corporate policies, we argue that CEOs with personal connections 
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through information sharing may adopt similar investments in their quest to grow their firm’s 
assets since they direct corporate behaviour. This leads to our third hypothesis; CEOs with 
personal connections make related R&D investment decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Similarity in R&D decisions among firms with CEOs with personal connection 
is a channel through which CEO connectedness drive asset growth commonality.  
 
We next examine the relationship between commonality in asset growth and firm performance. 
Some studies in corporate finance provide evidence supporting the darker side of social 
networks among firm top executives. For example, Ishii and Xuan (2014) examine the level of 
social connections between managers and boards of directors of acquirer and target firms. The 
results show that social network negatively affects acquirer returns. They attribute the result to 
flawed decision-making and a lack of due-diligence because of familiarity between the two 
connected firms. Asch and Guetzkow (1951) find that members in a group with similar personal 
characteristics and attitudes may lead to group thinking and flawed decisions because of a lack 
of challenging views and ignorance.  
 
Other studies provide strong evidence of an asset growth effect. These studies show that asset 
growth negatively affects stock returns (Cooper, Gulen, and Schil, 2009; Fu, 2011; Lam and 
Wei, 2012; Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu, 2013). The question is, if asset growth affects stock 
returns and firm performance, why do firms grow assets? We argue that CEO connections, 
which create peer effects, may be a reason firms grow assets.  
 
Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Watts (2004) show word-of-mouth communication 
aggregates the information of individual agents and that the structure of the communication 
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determines whether all agents end up making identical choices. In particular, it is argued that 
economic agents do not know all the information and alternative choices when making 
decisions. Hence, agents are more likely to rely on whatever information they can acquire via 
word-of-mouth communication. They may also change preferences and beliefs because of the 
actions of their social peers. In finance, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) display the word-of-
mouth effects between mutual fund managers by showing that trades of mutual funds located 
in the same city are correlated. Fracassi (2016) finds that CEOs who are well connected in the 
corporate elite network make financial decisions that are like those of their social peers. Social 
network theories also examine issues related to the mutual trust and exchange of social support 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Coo, 2001; Powell, 2003). The enhanced trust between socially 
connected individuals leads them to interpret the behaviour of one another favourably, and thus 
assume that each will take actions that are predictable and mutually acceptable (Uzzi, 1996; 
1999).  
 
In line with the arguments above, we argue that trust among CEOs with social and professional 
connections can cause a CEO to accept and rely on whatever information permeates through 
the network to carry out investments or overinvest in a project without due diligence. We 
conjecture that, in situations where the information obtained from the network is flawed, then 
decisions taken by the CEO based on the flawed information to overinvest in a project may 
negatively affect firm performance Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), who find a 
negative relationship between overinvestment and future stock returns, we argue that firms 
with CEOs who follow whatever information is obtained from their peers to increase or 
overinvest in an asset may reduce the wealth of shareholders and firm performance. This is 
because a CEO, using information obtained from his/her social peers, can influence the board 
of directors to accept increasing the firm’s assets or overinvestment in a specific project. 
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Consequently, we infer that commonality in asset growth strategies of connected firms can 
affect wealth of shareholders because, as Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) show, a market normally 
underreacts to negative implications of overinvestment, but because of limits to arbitrage, 
mispricing is not quickly arbitraged away. In another study, McConnel and Muscarells (1985) 
show that firms when firms announce major capital investments, stock prices tend to respond 
favourably. Our fourth hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Asset growth commonality among connected firms can affect the wealth of 
shareholders.  
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
 
We obtain data from three sources. Data on CEO characteristics and personal connections is 
sourced from BoardEx database, which provides biographical information on directors and top 
executives. Our data from BoardEx goes from 2000 to 2016. We obtain accounting data from 
Compustat and M&A transactions data from SDC. Our final sample includes all firms in the 
intersection of these three databases, 8,736 U.S. firms for 13,980 CEOs.  
3.1 Variable Definitions  
 
1. Measures of CEO Network Size 
 
From BoardEx, we measure CEO personal connections by counting the number of individuals 
with whom the CEO shares a common educational, employment, or social history. Two CEOs 
are connected through employment history in a particular year if they were employed at or 
served on the board of the same company before or during that year. Two CEOs are connected 
through education if the two attended the same institution, graduated within one year of each 
other and obtained a same type of degree (Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy, 2010). Two CEOs are 
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connected through social connections if they have established connections through social 
activities such as clubs, charities, sporting or other not-for-profit organisations.  
 
, , , ,_ _ _ _ _ _i t i t i t i tCEO Network Total Network Emp Network Edu Network Other Act           1 
where Network Empi.t sums a CEO’s current and past employment connections, Network Edui,t 
sums a CEO’s education connections, and Network Other Acti,t sums a CEO’s other social 
activity connections. 
 
2. The Measure of Asset Growth 
 
We calculate the annual change in total assets for all stocks in the sample. The sample includes 
ordinary common shares listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ. We obtain annual data from 2000 
to 2016 from Compustat to construct the main variable of interest, the annual firm asset growth 
rate (ASSETGRWTH). Following Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008), we calculate the annual 
firm asset growth using the year-on-year percentage change in total assets. We filter the data 
by removing all firms with zero or negative total assets. The firm asset growth rate for year t  
is estimated as the percentage change in total assets from fiscal year ending in calendar year 
1t   to fiscal year ending in calendar year t , as below: 
 
( ) ( 1)
( 1)










      2 
3. Measures of Corporate Investment  
 
We consider two major forms of corporate investment to investigate the channels through 
which firms increase assets: acquisitions and R&D investments. We define Acquisitions rate 
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as the value of acquisitions scaled by the total book assets at the beginning of the year. For 
acquisitions, we follow Pan, Wang, and Weisbach (2016) to include only completed deals 
covered by the SDC database, either the acquisition of assets or equity interest. For each sample 
firm, we include domestic and international acquisitions with disclosed transaction values 
above $1 million over the period3. Similarly, Investment Rate is defined as the sum of 
acquisition value and capital expenditure scaled by lag of total book assets (Pan, Wang, and 
Weisbach, 2016). We define R&D investment rate following Faleye, Kovacs, and 
Venkateswaran (2014) as the ratio of R&D expenditure to total assets.  
 
3.1 Control Variables  
We control for several firm factors (e.g., firm size, cash flow, return on assets) that can 
potentially affect corporate investments. Appendix A defines all variables. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the described variables. The table shows that firms 
in our sample are large with average sales of $2.6 billion and total assets of $7.1 billion. 
Focusing on the main variable of interest, the average (median) asset growth rate is 8.9% (2.4%) 
and the standard deviation of asset growth is 33%. Table 1 also shows that the average 
Acquisition rate is 1.4% (median 0%), the average R&D investment rate is 10.3%, the average 
non-merger growth rate, i.e., growth not attributed to mergers and acquisitions, is 98.3%. The 
table also reports firm characteristics. It shows that the acquisition ratio, defined as the ratio 
between acquisition expenditure and total assets, averages 3.1% (median 0%), the average Capx 
rate is 3.8% (median 1.8%), the average investment ratio is 5.4%, the average cash ratio 19.4% 
and the average leverage is 25.4% (median 18.2%).  
                                                          
3 We exclude leveraged buyouts, exchange offers, repurchases, spin-offs, minority stake purchases, 
recapitalizations, self-tenders and privatizations.  
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We also report summary statistics of CEO network size in Table 1. The results show that, 
without taking into consideration industry connections, on average, a CEO is connected to 
approximately 24 individual CEOs. Focusing on connections among CEOs belonging to the 
same industry, the results reveal that, on average, a CEO has four connections with other CEOs 
in the same industry. This shows that CEOs in the sample have more connections with CEOs 
working in different industries.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1  
 
In the Appendix, we report the additional summary statistics of our main variable of interest 
on a year by year basis from 2000 – 2016. We find the average annual asset growth rates for 
the period to be monotonic with 2000 and 2004 recording the least and highest average asset 
growth rates, respectively. The yearly average standard deviation of growth is 32.1% over the 
entire period. We group all firms in our sample into 10 deciles. The average annual asset growth 
rate for decile 10 firms is substantially high at 82.7 %, which is similar to the results in Cooper, 
Gulen and Schill (2008). The average annual asset growth rate for decile 1 firms, which are 
low growth firms, is -31.8%. The average annual asset growth rate of decile 6 is 4.2% per year, 
and decile 7 is 8.2%.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
 
4.1 Estimating Commonality in Asset Growth Across Connected Firms 
Our first hypothesis (H1) predicts that asset growth among firms with CEOs having personal 
connections covary strongly with each other, i.e., we hypothesized a positive relationship 
between asset growth comovement and CEOs’ personal connections.  
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To construct a measure of commonality in asset growth across connected firms, we adopt the 
approach of Anton and Polk (2014) and Koch, Ruenzi and Starks (2016). Following this 
approach, we obtain a measure of commonality in asset growth among connected firms by 
estimating the covariance between annual asset growth of an individual firm and the average 
annual asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to the individual firm. The portfolio of 
stocks constructed for each firm is a representative of all stocks connected to an individual 
firm. For instance, if a firm is connected to 10 firms, then the portfolio of stocks will comprise 
of the 10 firms having connections with the individual firm. The coefficient obtained is a 
measure of asset growth comovement across connected firms. To begin, we estimate 
regressions of changes in annual asset growth, for each individual firm, which we denote as 
,i tAssetGrowth  on changes in the annual asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to the 
individual firm denoted as ,j tAssetGrowth . We follow the literature and include a number of 
control variables that can influence firm level asset growth in estimating our baseline regression 
model presented in equation 3 (Fracassi, 2016; Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, 2016). In Appendix 
B, we report the summary statistics of the value-weighted portfolio average of annual asset 
growth rate of the portfolio of firms connected to each individual firm, ,j tAssetGrowth .We 
find ,j tAssetGrowth  to be monotonic.  
 
We use equation 3 to test the first hypothesis. We conduct additional tests for robustness by 
adding a new variable, ,k tAssetGrowthInd  to cater for the industry influence as shown in 
equation 4 in testing my first hypothesis since industry factors can influence the asset growth 
decisions of firms. The new variable, ,k tAssetGrowthInd  is defined as the average asset growth 
rate of a portfolio of firms that are connected to the firm belonging to the same industry. 
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, 0 , , ,i t AG j t i t i tAssetGrowth AssetGrowth X                 3 
 
 
, 0 , , , ,i t AG j t AGI k t i t i tAssetGrowth AssetGrowth AssetGrowthInd X           
                                                                                                                      4 
 
If there is asset growth commonality across connected firms, then the annual asset growth of 
the individual firm and the average annual asset growth of a portfolio of firms connected to the 
individual firm will have a statistically significant positive relationship. Following the primary 
hypothesis, significance of asset growth betas will be evidence of asset growth covariation 
across connected firms (Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks, 2016). Hence, we anticipate the coefficients 
of asset growth betas 0AG   in equation 3 and 0AGI   in equation 4 to be positive and 
statistically significant. Obtaining statistically significant asset growth betas signifies that 
personal connections among CEOs, which facilitate firm connectedness, leads to the 
convergence of asset growth across connected firms.  
 
Table 2 reports the regression results of equation 34. We find that Asset Growth Beta, AG , 
which measures asset growth commonality across connected firms, is statistically significant 
at 1% level. We define the coefficient, asset growth beta, as the sensitivity of the individual 
firm asset growth to the variation in asset growth of firms connected to the firm (Kamara, Lou 
and Sadka, 2008). Table 2 results show that Asset Growth Beta, AG , without any control 
variables is 0.204 at 1% level of significance (see column 1). This value provides strong 
evidence of asset growth covariation across connected firms.  
                                                          
4 For all regression results reported in this study, we include the constant term in the estimations but don’t report 
the constant in the tables.  
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This results shows that not only firm level factors such as financial performance influence asset 
growth decisions, but the personal network of firms’ top executives greatly influence asset 
growth. We attribute this phenomenon to CEO peer effects driven by CEO personal 
connections. We make this conclusion because one key objective of CEOs is to maximise their 
career outcomes in which their ability to grow a firm’s assets and expand their corporations 
plays a key role. Hence, we argue that a CEO, in a network consisting of colleague CEOs who 
may have added assets in the current or previous year at their firm, is more likely to be 
influenced to follow the same trend by also increasing assets because of the strong effect of 
group thinking among individuals in a group with personal connections. Also, the quality of 
information flowing through a network can influence CEOs in the network to increase asset, 
relatedly. For instance, if private information flows through the network about potential 
projects, CEOs with access to such information may take advantage of it, which, we argue, 
may cause them to adopt similar actions in asset growth policies.  We conclude that a CEO is 
more likely to increase assets if his peers have recently done so leading to asset growth 
comovement across connected firms. Thus, CEO connectedness can influence the adoption of 
related asset growth styles across connected firms. This conclusion confirms the findings of 
some earlier studies that examined the influence of peer effects across social networks and 
provided evidence that peers in a network imitate each other’s actions (Kaustia and Rantala, 
2015; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012).  
 
In column 2, we include several control variables without including fixed effects. Again, we 
find asset growth beta, AG , is positive and highly significant at 1% level though its size is 
smaller (0.087) than that obtained in the absence of controls (0.204). In column 3, we include 
time fixed effects, which include the effect of any time-invariant firm level characteristics that 
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may affect asset growth commonality. We find that although the coefficient estimate AG  is 
somewhat reduced (to 0.024), it is still positive and highly significant at the 1% level. This 
shows the earlier results are not driven by time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity. From 
columns 4 - 7, we find AG  to be positive and highly significant at 1%, which provides further 
evidence supporting earlier findings. For instance, in column 7 where we control for time fixed 
effects, firm fixed effects, industry fixed effects and several firm level characteristics, we still 
find AG to be positively significant at 1% level. These results confirm that CEO connectedness 
facilitates asset growth commonality across connected firms.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
Table 3 reports the regression output of equation 4 where we add a new variable to cater for 
industry effects.  We estimate this regression because industry level factors also have a 
tendency to affect asset growth. We argue that though the peer effect directly influences the 
decisions of individuals, industry events may not permit CEOs to grow assets even if their 
peers have done so recently. From Table 3, we find both AG  (0.175) and AGI  (0.101) to be 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level  in the absence of control variables, which 
supports earlier findings. We include several controls and fixed effects from columns 2 - 7 and 
get results similar to those in Table 2. These results confirm that the personal connections of a 
CEO are a strong determinant of asset growth among connected firms irrespective of the 
dictates of the industry. 
INSERT TABLE 3 
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4.2 CEO Network Size and Commonality in Asset Growth  
In section 4.1, we show that commonality in asset growth is prevalent among connected firms. 
For this section, we investigate the association between Asset Growth Beta, which is a measure 
of commonality in asset growth across connected firms, and CEO network size. We conjecture 
that, if connected firms grow assets similarly, then there must be a significant positive 
relationship between a firm’s Asset Growth Beta and the firm’s network size. This is because 
the magnitude of Asset Growth Beta depends on the total connections of the firm. Following 
the above argument, we examine whether firms with a large network have a larger Asset 
Growth Beta, AG  than firms with a small network. As a test, we divide the sample into five 
quintiles on the basis of total CEO connections and estimate the cross-sectional means of asset 
growth beta for each quintile. We use CEO network size since it’s regarded as a proxy for the 
relative importance of connections in the social network literature (Fracassi, 2016). 
 
In Table 4, the mean asset growth beta decreased from 12.5% in the first quintile to 10.2% in 
the second quintile. However, it increased to 29.3% in quintile 3, 66.2% in quintile 4 before 
declining marginally to 62.6% in quintile 5. Comparing the averages of asset growth beta for 
the five groups, I observe that commonality in asset growth increases with network size even 
though the pattern is not monotonic. Comparing quintiles 1 and 5, the average Asset Growth 
Beta for quintile 5 is 80% (0.501) more than the average mean Asset Growth Beta for quintile 
1 (0.125). Univariate analysis suggests that a larger network is associated with a larger Asset 
Growth Beta.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
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Next, we estimate regressions of commonality in asset growth on total CEO network size to 
test the hypothesis that the magnitude of commonality in asset growth increases with size of 
CEO connections using equation 5 below. The dependent variable in equation 5 is the measure 
of commonality in asset growth across connected firms, Asset Growth Beta AG  obtained for 
each firm using equation 3.Obtaining a positive and statistically significant coefficient value 
for CEO network size, the variable of interest in equation 5, implies that CEO network size is 
a determinant of commonality in asset growth. In the regression, we include industry-fixed 
effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm level to account for cross sectional 
dependence. The specification is: 
 
, 1 , , ,ln( ) ln( _ _ )AGi t i t i t i tCEO Network Total X          5 
 
The results of this regression model are summarized in Table 5. In Column 1, Table 5, the 
coefficient of CEO total network size is 0.091, which is statistically significant at 1% level. 
This indicates that a CEO’s network size influences asset growth decisions taken by the CEO. 
Given that the sample mean of CEO network size is 23.526 and CEO network size increases 
commonality in asset growth among connected firms by 0.091, we find the economic impact 
of 0.39% (0.091/23.526) is significant. In column 2, we include control variables and obtain 
similar results as recorded in column 1. Again, we find the coefficient of the CEO’s network 
size to be statistically significant at 1% level with it increasing to 0.146. From columns 3 - 5, 
we find the main variable of interest, the CEO network, to be statistically significant at 1% in 
all specifications. Following the results presented in Table 5, we conclude that CEOs with a 
large network are likely to increase assets if their peers have recently done so. According to 
Décaire, Gilje, and Taillard (2019), firms learn by observing investment decisions of other 
firms. Hence, we attribute our findings to the CEO peers’ influence.  
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INSERT TABLE 5 
 
We estimate additional regressions to support earlier findings that there is a positive significant 
relationship between Asset Growth Beta and CEO network size as reported in Table 5. First, 
we estimate the relationship between annual asset growth rate and annual CEO network size 
for each firm using the specification model in equation 65. From equation 6, we define 
,j tAnnaulAssetGrowth  as the annual average asset growth rate of a portfolio of firms 
connected to the individual firm per year and define 
,_ _ _ i tAnnaul CEO Network Total  as the 
annual CEO network size as a measure of the individual firm’s annual network size. We 
estimate these variables for each firm for each year. We predict a significant positive 
relationship between the two key variables of interest in equation 6. We construct the dependent 
variable in equation 6, 
,j tAnnaulAssetGrowth , by creating a portfolio of firms connected to 
each individual firm in a particular year based on the network size of the individual firm for 
that year then we estimate the average asset growth rate.  
 
, 1 , , ,ln( ) ln( _ _ _ )j t i t i t i tAnnaulAssetGrowth Annaul CEO Network Total X               6 
 
We further investigate the significant positive association between CEO network and 
commonality in asset growth using equation 7. In this regression, we calculate the overall 
average annual asset growth rate of a portfolio of firms connected to the firm for 2000-2016 
                                                          
5 The results are . Consistent with the hypothesis and earlier results, we find that the coefficient of annual CEO network size is 0.010, which 
is statistically significant at 1% level. In column 2, we include controls in the model and obtain similar results. In columns 3 - 5, we add year 
effects, firm effects and industry effects to cater for any unobserved heterogeneity and correlations. Again, we find a statistically significant 
coefficient of annual CEO network size at 1% level, even though the magnitude is reduced for regressions in columns 3 - 5. This additional 
test confirms that asset growth decisions by CEOs are influenced by their peers.  
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and label it ,j tTotalAssetGrowth . Succinctly, we obtain the dependent variable in equation 7 
by finding the overall average of annual asset growth rate for each firm. We then regress each 
firm’s ,j tTotalAssetGrowth  on total the CEO network size for the period to examine whether 
we obtain similar results to those from equations 5 and 6: 
 
, 1 , , ,ln( _ _ ) ln( _ _ )j t i t i t i tTotal Asset Growth CEO Network Total X             7 
 
As predicted, we find from columns 1 – 5, Table 7, that the coefficient of CEO network size to 
be statistically significant at 1% level for all models. From the regressions, we find that the 
more connections CEOs share with each other, the more that the CEOs may adopt similar asset 
growth strategies.  
 
In summary, asset growth increases with the size of the CEO’s personal network suggesting 
that social and professional interactions among CEOs affects firms’ asset growth strategies.   
 
INSERT TABLE 7 
 
There are multiple reasons why CEO networks influence the asset growth strategies of 
connected CEOs leading to commonality in asset growth among connected firms. A CEO has 
access to internal information through the firm’s internal information system and information 
from personal outside contacts. Prior literature shows social and professional ties as an efficient 
conduit for information transfer in many business settings (Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu, 2007; 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008, 2010; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgendberg, 2012). One 
mechanism through which CEO networks impact on asset growth is that the social and 
professional ties among CEOs can help improve the quality of CEOs’ asset growth strategies 
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by providing information regarding future industry or macro level trends. When a CEO decides 
to increase assets, we argue that his/her network contacts will be more useful than the firm’s 
internal information. To illustrate this intuition, suppose three CEOs in a network want to 
increase assets in the coming year. CEO A has a high reputation and ranking whereas CEOs B 
and C are upcoming CEOs hoping to maximise their career outcomes through empire building. 
Let’s say CEO A, who is highly respected, releases information relating to new investment 
opportunities, CEOs B and C, who are socially connected to CEO A, may accept the 
information for implementation in their firms because of the expectation that it will produce 
better outcomes following the background and experience of CEO A. This information may be 
classified as quality information by CEOs B and C.   
 
We argue that CEO networks impact on asset growth choices of CEOs since they reduce the 
search costs associated with finding the right investment opportunities. Podolny (1994) argues 
that managerial decisions are often based on personal experience because of cognitive 
constraints and information search costs. That is, because of the cost of searching for the right 
investment, CEOs may first choose from within a subset of potential partners with whom they 
are familiar. For example, from the earlier example of three CEOs, CEOs B and C may easily 
rely on the information obtained from CEO A because of the huge costs associated with finding 
the right investment, which leads to all CEOs adopting similar asset growth strategies creating 
asset growth commonality among them. Similarly, let’s assume CEO A announces to the 
members of the group about a potential investment opportunity in his firm, then CEOs B and 
C, following Podolny’s (1994) argument, may first consider the investment opportunity offered 
by CEO A since CEO A is within their network and it will reduce their search costs for 
investment opportunities. Additionally, following Cai and Sevilir (2012), we argue that CEOs 
B and C will consider the investment opportunity offered by CEO A because prior studies show 
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that in an investment transactions, social ties among CEOs increases each firm’s knowledge 
and understanding of the other firm’s operation, which leads to better transactions because of 
enhanced knowledge and information advantage.  
 
Our findings agree with some key earlier studies. For example, theory and research in both 
social psychology and sociology show that people who share social ties tend to hold similar 
points of view on relevant issues, which leads to similarity in actions (Lazerfeld and Merton, 
1954; Byrne, 1971). These studies show that frequent interactions among individuals with 
social ties results in their opinions becoming even more similar (Hackman, 1983; Marsden and 
Friedkin, 1993; Rogers and Kincaid, 1981; Tichy, 1981). Other studies suggest that managers 
with a similar functional background with personal connections are often associated with 
similarity in points of view and often develop similar mental models and diagnose strategic 
issues in similar ways (Beyer, Chattapadhyay, George, Glick, Ogilvie and Pugliese, 1997; 
Dearborn and Simon, 1958; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). Thus, in general, people with 
social ties tend to offer similar points of view.  
 
We argue that our findings can be attributed to bonds that exist among CEOs having personal 
connections; McDonald and Westphal (2003) show that managers prefer to interact with 
individuals who are similar to themselves or with whom they share strong social bonds. Thus, 
a CEO with a social bond with other CEOs through social and professional interactions can 
mimic their asset growth decisions as explained earlier because of similar points of view 
leading to commonality in asset growth among these CEOs. We conclude that CEOs in a 
network with similar beliefs and aspirations are more likely to grow assets similarly. 
Additionally, we conjecture that social and professional ties among CEOs make them potential 
information sources for a firm’s asset growth decisions. Thus, to a large extent, CEOs exploit 
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information relating to asset growth that permeates through the network making CEO network 
size a potential determinant of firm asset growth strategies and the ability to identify new 
investment opportunities.    
 
4.3 Potential Channels for facilitating Commonality in Asset Growth among connected 
firms. 
 
In this section, we explore the underlying channels that lead to the positive correlation between 
CEOs personal connections and commonality in asset growth. We consider two potential 
channels: M&A decisions and R&D investment decisions. We discuss and evaluate each in 
turn.  
 
4.3.1 Commonality in Asset Growth and Similarity in M&A Decisions  
We test the hypothesis that similarity in M&A decisions by connected firms is a channel 
through which CEO connectedness drives asset growth commonality. Findings in the finance 
literature propose a number of corporate polices, such as the allocation of capital through M&A 
activities and the design of compensation schemes by a firm, are influenced significantly by 
the discretionary power of executives (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Frank and Goyal, 2007; 
Graham, Li and Qiu, 2012). In addition, a large finance literature body shows that executives’ 
personal characteristics such as risk aversion, optimism and ability, influence corporate 
outcomes (Malmeidier and Tate, 2008; Graham, Campbell and Puri, 2012; Kaplan, Klebanov 
and Sorensen, 2012). However, firm executives are extremely networked social agents. Even 
though executives tend to be guided by their own inherent preferences and beliefs when taking 
corporate decisions, they are also likely to be influenced by their peers (Kaustia and Rantala 
2015). Renneboog and Zhao (2013) and Cai and Sevilir (2011) reveal that M&A transactions 
are affected by director networks. Shue (2013), in examining the relationship between 
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executive peer networks and managerial decisions, concludes that firm acquisiton outcomes 
are significantly more similar among executives who were students in the same MBA section. 
 
In line with the above, we argue that a firm’s asset growth outcomes, faciliated by the adoption 
of inoganic growth strategies such as M&A and takovers, can be affected by the social and 
professional connections of executives since it is well established that social ties among 
executives significantly affect several aspects of corporate behaviour. This is because valuable 
information on a dizzying number of new opportunities and investment projects can flow 
through executive networks on which a CEO through peer influence may act to the mean group 
behaviour, follow group leaders, or adopt the group norm to increase assets. In such a situation, 
we argue that, regardless of how peer influence occurs, section-based interactions will lead 
connected CEOs to increase assets like everyone in the group is doing because CEOs have 
discretionary power when it comes to allociation of capital for investment and can convince 
the board of directors to adopt projects being adopted by colleague CEOs. Following that 
argument, we predict that such behavior will lead to commonality in asset growth among CEOs 
with personal connections. We use the regression model, equation 8, to test the conjecture.  
 
To test this hypothesis, we compute the annual acquisition rate of each individual firm as the 
dependent variable in equation 8. The annual acquisition rate, ,_ i tAcquisition Rate , in equation 
8 is defined as the value of acquisitions during the year scaled by the total assets at the 
beginning of the year. We then calculate the annual average acquisition rate of a portfolio of 
firms connected to specific the firm and label that 
,_ _ i tNetwork Acquisition Rate . We then 
estimate regressions of the individual firm acquisition rate on the average acquisition rate of 
the portfolio of firms connected to the firm as indicated in equation 8.  
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, 0 1 , 2 , ,ln( _ ) ln( _ _ )i t i t i t i tAcquisition Rate Network Acquisition Rate Controls                       8 
 
The results in Table 8 are consistent with our hypothesis. In column 1, in the absence of 
controls, we find the coefficient of _ _Network Acquisition Rate is 14.8% and statistically 
significant at 1% level. In column 2, we include control variables that are likely to influence 
acquisitions and again we obtain significant results similar to those in column 1. We also 
include year fixed effects, firm fixed effects and industry fixed effects to control for common 
fluctuations in M&A activities across connected firms over time and industry differences in 
the level of M&A activities. We get significant results in columns 3 - 6 with the magnitude of 
coefficient being statistically significant at 1% level. Overall, the evidence indicates that CEOs 
with personal networks grow assets similarly in M&A decisions as observed by Shue (2013).  
 
INSERT TABLE 8 
 
We conduct further tests using a different approach to check whether the conclusions from 
Table 8 results change. First, we use equation 9 below to obtain the residual (or excess) of 
acquisition policy rate for each firm by finding the absolute difference between each firm’s 
annual acquisition rate and the average annual acquisition rate of firms connected to the 
individual firm as reported from equation 9.The outcome variable, which we denote as 
,_ _ _ i tFirm Own Acquisition Growth , in equation 9 is proxy for the difference in the 
acquisition policy decisions between the individual firm and the firms connected to the that 
firm. We define the output obtained from equation 9 as acquisition policy decisions that can be 
attributed to the effort of the individual firm excluding influence from firms connected to that 
firm. The smaller the variable, then the more the individual firm is influenced by firms 
connected to it when it comes to acquisition policy decisions and vice versa. 
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, , , ,_ _ _ ( _ _ _ )i t i t i t i tFirm Own Acquisition Growth abs Acquisition Rate Network Acquisition Rate              9 
In the second step, we regress ,_ _ _ i tFirm Own Acquisition Growth  obtained from equation 9 
for each individual firm on ,_ _ i tNetwork Acquisition Rate , which is the average acquisition 
rate of the portfolio of firms connected to the firm to test whether the acquisition policy 
attributed to the individual firm  relates to the average acquisition rates of the portfolio of firms 
connected to the firm using equation 10. From equation 10, a significant negative relationship 
between the two main variables shows that the individual firm is able to make its own 
acquisitions without peer influence from firms connected to it. However, following El-Khatib, 
Fogel, and Jandik (2015) and Fracassi (2016), we expect a significant positive relationship 
between the two main variables in equation 10 because of the strong effect of group influence 
and peers. We argue that a CEO in all situations observes the activities and actions of his/her 
peers and makes decisions, hence, in all instances, a CEO’s decisions will have some 
component that can be attributed to influence from personal connections.  
 
, 0 1 , ,
2 , ,
ln( _ _ _ ) ln( _ _ )i t i t i t
i t i t






          10 
 
The results from equation 10 are summarized in Table 9. As predicted, we find the coefficient 
of _ _Network Acquisition Rate  is 0.972, which is statistically significant at 1%  level in the 
absence of controls. In models 2-6, Table 9, we include several control variables and control 
for time, industry and firm effects. Again, we find the coefficient of acquisition rates of firms 
connected to the individual firm to be positive and statistically significant at 1% level in all 
specifications. This explains the earlier conclusion that the asset growth of firms that are 
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connected comoves. The results from Tables 8 and 9 point to the fact that the acquisition policy 
of firms in all situations is influenced by the acquisition policies connected firms. 
 
INSERT TABLE 9 
 
Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014) find that CEO connections help CEOs to be more 
innovative. Hence, we argue that CEOs in a network may obtain information relating to new 
opportunities and investments that may not relate to M&A decisions, but they can also lead to 
increased asset growth. We conjecture that CEO connections can facilitate asset growth 
commonality from sources other than M&A decisions. Following Bliss and Rosen (2001), we 
calculate non-merger growth for each firm and test whether non-merger growth among 
connected firms is similar. We test whether asset growth commonality among connected firms 
may also be fuelled by non-merger growth strategies. We use equation 11 below to test the 
claim by estimating the regression of annual non-merger growth of each individual firm, which 
we denote as 
,_ _ _ i tNon Merger Growth Rate , on the average of annual non-merger growth 
of a portfolio of firms connected to the firm, ,_ _ _ _ j tNetwork Non Merger Growth Rate . 
 
, 0 1 ,
2 , ,
ln( _ _ _ ) ln( _ _ _ _ )i t j t
i t i t






            11 
 
We estimate equation 11 above and present results in Table 10. We find the regression 
coefficient of ,_ _ _ _ j tNetwork Non Merger Growth Rate  is statistically significant at 1%  
level for all specifications reported in columns 1- 5, Table 10, which suggests that the non-
merger growth rate of connected firms is related confirming the strong effect of executives’ 
networks in corporate outcomes  
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INSERT TABLE 10 
 
To further substantiate the findings obtained regarding non-merger growth among connected 
firms reported in Table 10, we conduct additional tests as using equations 12 and 13 below. 
Like the earlier analysis, we obtain the absolute difference between the non-merger growth of 
each firm, ,_ _ _ i tNon Merger Growth Rate , and non-merger growth of firms connected to the 
the firm, ,_ _ _ _ j tNetwork Non Merger Growth Rate , using equation 12. We then regress the 
outcome from equation 12, which we define as non-merger growth policies attributed to the 
individual firm without influence from firms connected to it on the average non-merger growth 
rate of firms connected to the firm, ,_ _ _ _ j tNetwork Non Merger Growth Rate , as shown in 
equation 13.  
 
The results in Table 11 are consistent with our prediction in all specifications. This result 
confirms that social ties among CEOs enhances innovativeness since aside from growing assets 




_ _ _ _ ( _ _ _
_ _ _ _ )
i t i t i t
j t
Firm Own Non Merger Growth abs Non Merger Growth Rate
Network Non Merger Growth Rate
  
       12 
 
 
, 0 1 ,
2 , ,
ln( _ _ _ _ _ ) ln( _ _ _ )i t j t
i t i t






         13 
INSERT TABLE 11 
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4.3.2 Commonality in Asset Growth and Similarity in R&D Investment Rates  
Faleye, Kovacs and Venkateswaran (2014) show that social and professional interactions 
among firms’ top executives enable better connected CEOs to invest more in R&D and often 
receive higher quality patents. Malmendier and Tate (2008) and Shue (2013) indicate that 
executives can meaningfully affect firm policies. Based on those findings, we argue that a CEO 
can influence R&D investment decisions at the firm level by relying on information relating to 
R&D investments obtained from peer CEOs. In effect, if other CEOs in the network react to 
the same information to invest in the same R&D projects, then asset growth commonality is 
likely to prevail among the connected firms.   
 
Hypothesis 3 states that the similarity in R&D decisions among firms with CEOs with personal 
connections is a channel through which CEO connectedness drives asset growth commonality. 
To do this, we test whether the R&D policies of connected firms are similar using a pair model.  
 
, 1 , ,_& i t o pi t i tPolicy a a XR D                   14 
First, we account for as much of a firm’s R&D policy as possible by regressing the R&D policy 
for each firm, ,_& i tPolicyR D , specific control variables, ,pi tX , that determine R&D policy as 
shown in equation 14. As described, first, we estimate the regressions of the individual firm’s 
R&D policy, ,_& i tPolicyR D , on a number of control variables, ,pi tX , that mostly determine 
R&D policy decisions. The residual, ,i t , in equation 14 denotes residual (or excess) of R&D 
policy of the individual firm at time ( )t . We present results from equation 14 in Table 12. We 
find the significance of the regression coefficients of the main control variables to be consistent 
with prior studies. 
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INSERT TABLE 12 
 
, , , ,( ).i j t i t i jPolicyDissimilarity abs          15 
Next, we estimate the dissimilarity in R&D policies across connected firms using the residual 
from equation (14), which represents the excess, or idiosyncratic, component of the policy for 
the individual firm at time t  relative to the expected policy according to the standard model. 
We define R&D policy dissimilarity across connected firms using equation 15 as the absolute 
value of the difference in the residuals of the individual firm R&D policy, 
,i t , and the average 
of the residuals of R&D of the portfolio of firms, 
,i j , that are connected to the firm, ,i t . The 
results from equation 15 measure the difference in R&D policy decisions among firms that 
have connections with each other. Following Fracassi (2016), the smaller the variable, the more 
similar the R&D policies of connected firms and vice versa.  
 
., 1 , , ,
ln( ) ln( )
i tAGi t i j t controls i t
                          16                                                                                                     
 
In the third and final step, we regress Asset Growth Beta from equation 3 on R&D policy 
dissimilarity from equation 15 using equation 16. Using equation 16, we test whether similarity 
in R & D policy decisions among connected firms facilitates asset growth commonality. The 
definition of R&D policy dissimilarity, which is the key independent variable of interest in 
equation 16, indicates that R&D policy investment decisions of firms that are connected will 
not be similar if coefficient 1  increases positively. Thus, R&D policy decisions of connected 
firms will deviate from each other. The above proposition in equation 15 implies that there will 
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be no similarity in R&D investment among connected firms to facilitate commonality in asset 
growth as predicted. In effect, we expect a negative coefficient 1  for equation (16). This 
implies that, as R&D investment policy dissimilarity becomes more negative, then R&D 
investment decisions among connected firms become more similar leading to commonality in 
asset growth. The results from equation 16 are in Table 13 with strong evidence supporting my 
hypothesis. In column 1, Table 13, the coefficient of R&D investment dissimilarity is -0.108, 
which is statistically significant at 1% in the absence of controls. This result implies that 
holding all other factors constant a unit decrease in dissimilarity in R& D policy increases 
commonality in asset growth. We obtain similar results in columns 2 - 5 where we add control 
variables and cluster the standard error at the firm level. These findings confirm earlier studies 
that CEO connections facilitate similarity in corporate finance policies and investment 
strategies (Kaustia and Rantala 2015; Fracassi 2016). We show that CEO peer networks 
meaningfully affect the asset growth decisions of connected firms making them similar through 
the adoption of similar R&D investment.  
 
INSERT TABLE 13 
 
To provide further evidence supporting our findings related to similarity in R&D policy 
decisions and asset growth commonality among connected firms, we estimate additional 
regressions to test hypothesis 3.  
 
, , , ,_ _ & _ ( & _ _ & _ )i t i t i t j tFirm Own R D Growth abs R D Rate Network R D Rate                     17 
 
First, we obtain the absolute difference between R&D policy rates of the individual firm at 
time t ,
,& _ i tR D Rate  and average the R&D policy rates of the portfolio of firms connected to 
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that firm at time t ,
,_ & _ j tNetwork R D Rate
 using equation 17. We define the residual 
outcome from equation 17, ,_ _ & _ i tFirm Own R D Growth , as R&D policy decisions that can 
be attributed to the individual firm exclusive of influence from firms connected to the firm. 
The smaller the variable, the more the individual firm is influenced by peer firms in R&D 
policy decisions and vice versa. 
 
, 0 1 ,
2 , ,
ln( _ _ & _ ) ln( _ & _ )i t i t
i t i t






   18                                                                                                                                   
 
We next test for the relationship between R&D policy decisions attributed to the individual 
firm without influence from peers and the R&D policy decisions of firms connected to the firm. 
We regress the outcome of equation 17 on the average R&D policy of portfolio of firms 
connected to the individual firm, ,_ & _ i tNetwork R D Rate  as shown in equation 18. A positive 
significant result for the coefficient ,_ & _ i tNetwork R D Rate  implies that, when it comes to 
R&D investment decisions, a CEO will, at all costs rely on decisions of peer CEOs to arrive at 
a decision. We report results from equation 18 in Table 14 with strong evidence supporting the 
earlier conclusion that connected firms observe the R&D decisions of peers. In column 1, we 
find the coefficient of 1  in equation 18 to be 0.551, statistically significant at 1% level. This 
indicates the strong influence of social ties among firm executives in corporations since we 
find evidence of a positive, statistically significant relationship between an individual firm’s 
own efforts in R&D investment decisions and the R&D decisions of firms connected to the 
firm. We conduct additional test using investment rate.6  
                                                          
6 Additional Analysis on Potential Channels using investment rates. Following, Pan, Wang, and Weisbach, (2016) 
we test for additional channels using investment rate defined as the sum of value of acquisition and capital 
expenditure lagged by total assets. Similar to the above analysis, we estimate investment rate for each firm for the 
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INSERT TABLE 14 
 
4.4 Commonality in Asset Growth and Firm Performance  
Following the comprehensive evidence indicating that asset growth rates of firms with 
connections covary, we test its economic benefit by investigating the relationship between asset 
growth commonality and firm performance. Shue (2013), in examining the relationship 
between executive peer networks and several corporate policies, reveals that peer influence can 
operate in ways that do not contribute to firm productivity. We test hypothesis 4 which state 
that: commonality in asset growth affect firms negatively 
 
In this essay, we base our analysis of firm performance on both accounting performance and 
stock market performance. To test the claim, we focus on year-to-year changes in a firm’s 
return on asset (RoA) and annual stock returns as a measure of firm performance (Titman, Wei, 
and Xie, 2004; Cooper, Gulen, and Schil, 2009; Larcker, So and Wang ,2013).  
 
., 1 , ,
( ) ln( )
i ti t AGi t controls i t
ROA                 19 
Next, we regress Asset Growth Beta, 
, ,AG i t  for each firm obtained from equation 3, our 
measure of commonality in asset growth among connected firms, on 
,i tROA  return on assets as 
shown in equation 19. 
                                                          
period under review and run regressions to ascertain whether investment rate across connected firms is a channel 
that drives asset growth commonality across connected firms. We argue that investment rate across connected 
firms will be similar as a result of information propagation across the network through different nodes. We obtain 
similar findings recorded earlier using acquisition rates and R&D investment rates and reports results in the 
Appendix C 
 
133 | P a g e  
 
The results from equation 19 are summarized in Table 15. We find the regression coefficient 
of Asset Growth Beta is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. This results shows 
that asset growth commonality affects shareholders negatively. One possible explanation for 
this outcome can be attributed to strong peer influence and trust that comes from the personal 
connections of CEOs as well as group thinking (Asch and Guetzkow, 1951). For example, Uzzi 
(1996, 1999) finds that enhanced trust that exists among individuals with social connections 
most often leads individuals with personal connections to take actions that are mutually 
acceptable and predictable, which leads to group thinking. Additionally, we argue access to 
same information flowing through the firm executives network is likely to influence   connected 
individuals to think similarly leading to group thinking since individuals may depend on 
whatever information is obtained through the network to take strategic decisions at the firm 
level. As a result, we conclude that group thinking, which is a potential driver of asset growth 
commonality among connected firms, has no economic benefits for firms.  
 
INSERT TABLE 15 
 
   
., 1 , ,
( _ _ Re ) ln( )
i ti t AGi t controls i t
Annual Stock turns              20 
We further test using annual stock returns as shown in equation 20 and obtain similar results. 
The negative, statistically significant results obtained for the relationship between asset growth 
commonality and firm performance confirms earlier studies that examine the dark side of 
network ties among top management on firm (eg., Ishii and Xuan 2014).  
INSERT TABLE 16 
 
The results from Tables 15 and 16 are important, since they raise further questions whether 
CEO networks add value to a firm. We find that commonality in asset growth among CEO’s 
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with personal connections does not seem to have any beneficial impact on a firm’s 
performance, which challenges the significance of CEOs’ social and professional networks to 
firms (Larcker, So and Wang, 2013; Renneboog and Zhao, 2013). Clearly, imitation of asset 
growth strategies among peer CEOs having personal connections does not improve firm 
performance. One possible explanation is that CEO connections influence CEOs to pursue 
additional unprofitable projects. This result supports the managerial power approach observed 
by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker (2002). We argue that through managerial power and influence 
a CEO may grow a firm’s assets even if not necessarily leading to no value addition to the firm.  
 
Is the commonality in asset growth economically significant? Recent papers have debated on 
the negative correlation between asset growth and subsequent returns and conclude that the 
asset growth effect is not economically material, as it exist only among small cap stocks. We 
add to the literature by providing evidence that asset growth commonality is pervasive across 
connected firms through firm executives social network ties. The implications of our findings 
on the link between commonality in asset growth and firm performance is that, social network 
of CEOs is at least powerful in explaining asset growth effects and that the asset growth effect 
is economically material from our results because the effect exist for both large and small cap 
stocks in our sample.  
 
4.5 Controlling for Endogeneity and Concerns  
The main question that we consider in the essay is whether personal connections among CEOs 
lead to commonality in asset growth across connected firms. We argue that firms with CEOs 
having personal connections are more likely to adopt similar asset growth strategies leading to 
asset growth commonality among connected firms. Our hypothesis was tested in a regression 
framework in which we provide evidence of asset growth commonality among connected 
firms.  
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Interestingly, although prior literature shows the impact of peer effects among firm executives 
in corporations (Leary and Robert, 2014; Grennan, 2019), clear identification of the factors that 
fuel the causal relationship remains a challenge (Manski, 1993). This is because peer effects 
among CEOs with personal connections cannot be observed directly and this raises concerns 
about omitted variables since they are distinct from industry and location factors. These 
endogeneity issues call into question the proper interpretation of the OLS regression results in 
Table 5. We address endogeneity issues in this essay using instrumental variables and a 
difference in difference approach.  
 
4.5.1 Instrumental Variable Regression  
We have shown that CEO personal connections are determinants of a firm’s asset growth 
strategies. The knowledge that CEOs obtain valuable information from their peers through 
social interactions that enhances the quality of decisions they take and investments 
opportunities that they make could prompt CEOs to build stronger networks to maximise the 
benefits relating to asset growth strategies. Also, a CEO hired by a firm to improve the quality 
of asset growth may lead to an increased network of the CEO should the CEO succeed in 
increasing the firm’s profitability and growth. However, the CEO’s network size is influenced 
by several factors, only some of which are influenced by the CEO’s choices. Burt (1992) and 
Granovetter (1995) note that the strength and structure of a CEO’s overall connectedness 
represents his or her social capital and outside employment opportunities. Hence, firms are 
compelled to consider a CEO’s network size before appointing them; what remains uncertain 
is whether this is a first-order effect. The probability that CEOs’ personal connections enhances 
the choice of CEO creates a potential endogeneity and bias from correlated omitted variables 
since CEO’s network size changes over time. To address potential endogeneity concerns 
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arising from unobservable heterogeneity, we estimate instrumental variables by two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) regressions to check the effects of endogeneity on the results.  
 
Following, Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014), we chose the industry average CEO 
network size as the instrumental variable since it relates positively to the underlying 
explanatory variable, the CEO total network size, but is unrelated to the residuals in the second 
stage equation, Asset Growth Beta. We adopt this instrument because firms follow industry 
practices and norms of which interlocking practices among CEOs with personal connections 
would pave way for individuals to build networks within their industry. The basic requirement 
for the validity of the selected instrument is that it must have no effect on the dependent variable 
other than through the effect on the suspected endogenous independent variable.  
 
The structural equation estimated in earlier analysis to test the influence of CEO networks on 
commonality in asset growth is: 
 
, 1 , , ,ln( ) ln( _ _ )AGi t i t controls i t i tCEO Network Total X                  21 
The dependent variable is Asset Growth Beta, AG , the measure of commonality in asset 
growth.  
 
In the first stage of the two-stage instrumental regressions adopted to address the endogeneity 
issue, we fit CEO network size total unto the instrumental variable Industry Average CEO 
Network Size as in equation 22 and then use the fitted value of this variable in the second-stage-
regression. The first-stage-regression is: 
 




ln( _ _ _ ) ln( )    i t i t
controls i t i t







In the second stage regression, we replace CEO Network Size Total with its fitted value from 
equation 22 and thus estimate equation 23: 
 
, 1 , , ,ln( ) ( _ _ _ _ )AGi t i t controls i t i tInstrumented CEO Network Size Total X          23 
 
Table 17 reports the estimates of the IV-2SLS. The results from the first stage regressions 
indicate that the selected instrument that is the coefficient of Industry Network Size is positive 
and statistically significant at 1%. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic suggests that Industry 
Average CEO Network Size is unlikely to be a weak instrument. The first stage regression thus 
indicates that Industry Average CEO Network Size is a strong predictor of network size among 
connected firms. Table 17 also reports the estimates of the second stage regression using 
equation 23. The results show that the coefficient of the instrumented CEO Network Size is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% like the earlier findings in Table 5. The results 
provide additional evidence that CEO network size has a positive impact on asset growth. 
INSERT TABLE 17 
4.5.2 Difference-In-Difference  
When firms want to change their corporate strategies and policies, they often appoint 
individuals (CEOs) with specific skills and appropriate social and professional connections to 
carry out such strategic changes (Fracassi, 2016). When that individual dies, his/her social ties 
with other individuals in the network end. We argue that this will lead to a breakdown of 
information flow between the firm that recorded the death of a CEO and firms that are 
connected to the firm that recorded CEO’s death. Hence, we further test for potential 
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endogeneity issues using the death of a CEO as an exogenous shock to network size to test the 
direction of causality between CEO personal connections and commonality in asset growth. 
We examine whether the death of a CEO of a company affects the extent of asset growth 
similarity among connected firms. We obtain information on CEO death from BoardEx for the 
period of January 2000 to December 2016. In all we record 680 CEO deaths.  
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
, , ,
( _ ) (( _ ) ) (( _ ) *
( _ _ _ ) )
AGi t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
Death Dummy Network Total Death Dummy
CEO Network Size Total controls
    
 




Using equation 24 above, we estimate the difference in difference regressions. Table 18 shows 
the difference in difference approach when we restrict the sample to all firms that actually 
recorded CEO death in columns 1 – 2 with firms that recorded no CEO death in columns 3-4. 
We then compare our measure of commonality in asset growth between firms that recorded a 
CEO death and those that did not record a CEO death. In all specifications, we investigate 
whether the death a CEO in the network weakens the extent of commonality in asset growth 
for firms that actually recorded a CEO death and for firms that did not record CEO death. The 
variable of interest is the interaction between Death Dummy and CEO Network Size. For the 
Death Dummy, a dummy variable of one is created if a CEO died within the group of connected 
firms irrespective of whether the individual firm recorded CEO death. We argue that the death 
of a CEO within the group weakens the strength of asset growth covariation among connected 
firms.   
 
The estimates from equation 24 are reported in Table 18. For both Panels A and B, Table 18, 
the results show that the coefficient of Death Dummy is negative and statistically significant 
for all regression specifications with the exception of column 3, Panel B. This result suggests 
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that the death of a CEO within the group of CEOs with personal connections affects the 
magnitude of asset growth comovement across connected firms irrespective of whether a firm 
recorded the CEO death since there will be a break in information flow. Thus, asset growth 
opportunities that came from the CEO who died will cease slowing the magnitude of asset 
growth commonality. Following the coefficient estimate of Death Dummy in both Panel A and 
Panel B, we find that the coefficient of Death Dummy is negative and significant at 1% level 
for firms in Panel A for models 1 and 2. This result confirms that the extent and magnitude of 
commonality in asset growth is reduced by the death of a CEO. In Panel B, the coefficient of 
Death Dummy is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, which does not agree with 
our prediction. However, when we include control variables, we find the Death Dummy 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 1% confirming our claim that the death of 
a CEO breaks contacts and, as a result, reduces the extent of commonality in asset growth 
across connected firms. Furthermore, we find the interaction coefficient between Death 
Dummy and CEO Network Size is positive and statistically significant in all specifications. This 
indicates that the death of a CEO within a network of CEOs reduces the magnitude of 
commonality in asset growth among connected firms. Overall, the results of the difference in 
difference regressions suggest that a break in the flow of information in social and professional 
connections has a causal effect on changes in commonality in asset growth rates.  In the 
difference in difference approach reported above, we argue that the death of a CEO will alter 
the extent of connectivity between two firms, its noteworthy to mention that, our findings could 
be driven by characteristics of an incoming CEO. This is a because an incoming CEO with 
strong network ties will definitely influence the information environment of the firm and stock 
liquidity.   
INSERT TABLE 18 
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5. Conclusion  
This study examines the relationship between CEO networks and asset growth for several 
reasons. First, the CEO is regarded as the principal change agent and, as a result, sets the tone 
for both quality asset growth rate strategies, decisions and policies. Additionally, a CEO faces 
several personal consequences should the adopted asset growth strategies fail to yield the 
expected outcomes. For instance, a CEO could be fired for failure to increase firm growth or 
become open to public ridicule for failure to add value for shareholders. We focus on the 
personal connections that exist among firm CEOs because prior evidence suggests individuals 
can access non-public information from their social and professional connections which enables 
them to identify and evaluate innovative projects that eventually reduce the risk of failure. Prior 
studies show that social and professional networks lead to group thinking as a result of peer 
influence and performance, hence, we hypothesize in this study that asset growth rates of firms 
that are connected through CEO connectedness will comove. We test this hypothesis on a 
sample of 13,980 CEOs in 8,736 firms during 2000-2016.  
 
This essay provides evidence that the asset growth rate of firms that are connected through 
CEOs personal connections strongly comove. Tests suggest that asset growth commonality 
increases with the size of a CEO’s personal connections. This finding suggests that better 
connected CEOs receive more information that drives the increase in asset growth rate with the 
pool of firms connected to the individual firm leading to greater asset growth covariation. This 
raises an important question of whether asset growth covariation among connected firms is 
value enhancing. Using return on assets (RoA) and annual stock returns as a measure of 
performance, we find in both cases that comovement in asset growth rates among connected 
firms affects shareholders negatively. Thus, commonality in asset growth reduces the wealth of 
shareholders. We believe that peer influence, trust and lack of due diligence among CEOs with 
141 | P a g e  
 
connections can lead to wasteful overinvestment or asset growth that might not bring any 
benefit. Another possible explanation is that a CEO is more likely to increase his/her assets if 
his/her peers in the network have recently done so.We conclude that asset growth commonality 
reduces shareholders’ wealth. 
 
Next, we test for the channels through which personal connections among CEO drive asset 
growth commonality. First, we find that similarity in M&A decisions among connected firms 
positively drives asset growth commonality. Secondly, we find that similarity in R&D 
investment rate decisions is a channel through which CEOs’ personal connections fuel asset 
growth commonality. We address potential endogeneity problems and find that the death of a 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Key Variable Name   Definition  Source 
CEO Connection Measures  
Network Education  = Sum of the CEO’s educational ties. An educational tie occurs if the CEO went to the same university 
at the same time with another CEO 
BoardEx 
Network Employment = Sum of the CEO's employment ties. An employment tie occurs if the CEO currently or historically 
overlapped with another CEO 
BoardEx 
Network Other Social 
Activity  
= Sum of the CEO’s other activity ties. Another activity tie occurs if the CEO participated in a same 
organization (e.g., charity or recreational club) at the same time as another CEO. 
BoardEx 
CEO Network Total = (Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social Activity) for 
connected CEO irrespective of Industry  
BoardEx 
CEO Network Total (Same 
Industry) 
= (Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social Activity) for CEOs 
who are connected and in same industry.  
BoardEx 
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CEO Network Total 
(Different Industry) 
= (Sum of Network Employment, Network Education, and Network Other Social Activity) for CEOs 
who are connected but in different industry.  
BoardEx 
Corporate Investment Variables   
Asset Growth Rate  = Total asset in the fiscal year – total assets last fiscal year/total asset in last fiscal year Compustat 
Acquisition Rate = Value of acquisitions/lagged total assets. Acquisitions include completed deals covered in SDC with 
the deal form of “Acquisitions of Assets” “Acquisitions of certain Assets” “Acq. Maj. Int.” “Acq. 
Part. Int.” “Acq. Rem. Int” “Acquisition” or “Merger” (as the acquirer”. 
SDC&  
Compustat 
Non-Merger Rate =  (Value of acquisitions-Total Asset)/lagged total assets SDC & 
Compustat 
Investment Rate = (Value of Acquisitions + Capital Expenditure/lagged total assets) SDC& 
Compustat  
R&D Rate = R&D Rate is the ratio R&D expense (xrd)/lagged sales (sale), trimmed at the [1,99] quantile. Compustat 
Firm Performance Measures   
ROA = Return on Assets is the ratio income before extraordinary items (ib)/lagged total assets (at), trimmed 
at the [1,99]quantile. 
Compustat 
Tobin’s Q = Tobin’s Q is the ratio (total assets (at) . stockholders’ equity (seq) C common shares outstanding 
(csho) _ price close at the end of fiscal (prcc_f))/total assets (at), trimmed at the [1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Firm Characteristics 
Acquisition Ratio = Acquisition Ratio is the ration between the acquisition expenditure (aqc) and the total sales(sale) Compustat 
Capital Expenditure Rate = Capital Expenditure/lagged total book assets, with missing or negative Capx set to zero Compustat 
 
Cash flow  
= Cash Flow is the ratio (income before extraordinary items (ib) + depreciation and amortization 
(dp))/lagged property, plants, and equipment (ppent), winsorized at the [1,99] quantile. 
Compustat 
Cash Ratio = Cash and short term investment divided by total assets Compustat 
Cash Changes  = Cash and short-term investments in the fiscal year – Cash and short-term investments last fiscal year/ 
Cash and short-term investments in last fiscal year 
Compustat 
Employment Growth  = Total employment in  fiscal year – Total employment in last fiscal year/ Total employment in last 
fiscal year 
Compustat 
EP  EP is earnings to price ratio [EPS/Price) Compustat 
Internal Finance (∆RE) = Retained Earnings in fiscal year – retained earnings in last fiscal year/total asset in last fiscal year Compustat  
Investment Rate =   
Leverage = Leverage is the ratio (debt in current liabilities (dlc) C long-term debt (dltt))/(debt in current liabilities 
(dlc) C long-term debt (dltt)) + common shares outstanding (csho)_ price close at the end of fiscal 
(prcc_f) 
Compustat 
M/B = Market value of equity (closing price at the fiscal year end times shares outstanding) divided by book 
value of equity 
Compustat  
Number of CEOs = No. of CEO is the total number of CEOs employed in the firm BoardEx 
Number of Employees = No. of Employees is the total number of employees in the firm (emp). Compustat 
Sale  = Sales is the net sales turnover (sale). Compustat 
Stock Return = Stock Return is the annual total stock return during the fiscal year. Compustat 
Size = Logarithm of the total book asset  Compustat  
Tangibility  = Tangibility is the ratio (net property, plant and equipment (ppent)/total assets (at) Compustat 





APPENDIX B:  
ADDITIONAL SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES 
 
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ANNUAL ASSET GROWTH RATE FOR EACH FIRM (FULL SAMPLE) 
YEAR MEAN STD. DEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N 
2000 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5543 
2001 0.051 0.369 -0.582 -0.105 0.007 0.127 2.050 5141 
2002 0.040 0.321 -0.582 -0.093 0.014 0.123 1.452 4883 
2003 0.120 0.342 -0.490 -0.020 0.060 0.176 1.938 4729 
2004 0.164 0.374 -0.470 0.000 0.078 0.210 2.050 4762 
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2005 0.136 0.346 -0.478 -0.009 0.063 0.183 1.830 4735 
2006 0.149 0.353 -0.475 0.000 0.071 0.201 2.050 4659 
2007 0.138 0.379 -0.498 -0.010 0.058 0.183 2.050 4542 
2008 0.019 0.312 -0.582 -0.113 0.002 0.102 1.428 4283 
2009 0.031 0.283 -0.555 -0.079 0.005 0.087 1.351 4058 
2010 0.103 0.320 -0.457 -0.025 0.038 0.142 2.034 3929 
2011 0.104 0.318 -0.456 -0.021 0.043 0.148 1.811 3860 
2012 0.094 0.317 -0.522 -0.025 0.039 0.129 1.757 3830 
2013 0.108 0.334 -0.459 -0.020 0.034 0.137 2.034 3901 
2014 0.124 0.362 -0.499 -0.016 0.039 0.149 2.050 4059 
2015 0.087 0.372 -0.582 -0.052 0.017 0.124 2.050 4041 
2016 0.062 0.310 -0.582 -0.049 0.024 0.115 1.578 3918 

















SUMMARY STATISTICS OF ANNUAL ASSET GROWTH RATE FOR EACH FIRM IN DECILES 
(FULL SAMPLE) 
DECILES MEAN STD. DEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N 
1 -0.318 0.132 -0.582 -0.404 -0.279 -0.207 -0.161 7488 
2 -0.098 0.030 -0.157 -0.122 -0.094 -0.072 -0.055 7487 
3 -0.029 0.014 -0.054 -0.040 -0.028 -0.017 -0.007 7487 
4 0.000 0.001 -0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 10065 
5 0.012 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.024 4910 
6 0.042 0.011 0.025 0.033 0.042 0.051 0.060 7487 
7 0.081 0.013 0.061 0.070 0.081 0.093 0.104 7488 
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8 0.136 0.020 0.105 0.119 0.135 0.153 0.174 7487 
9 0.241 0.046 0.176 0.201 0.234 0.276 0.336 7487 
10 0.827 0.527 0.343 0.436 0.604 1.022 2.050 7487 























SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VALUE- WEIGHTED PORTFOLIO AVERAGE ANNUAL ASSET 
GROWTH RATE [FULL SAMPLE] 
YEAR MEAN STD. DEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N 
2000 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 5543 
2001 0.042 0.130 -0.239 0.000 0.000 0.079 0.446 5141 
2002 0.030 0.118 -0.263 0.000 0.000 0.062 0.399 4883 
2003 0.074 0.097 -0.082 0.000 0.055 0.125 0.407 4729 
2004 0.187 0.127 0.000 0.104 0.170 0.312 0.555 4762 
2005 0.151 0.112 -0.030 0.070 0.136 0.271 0.451 4735 
2006 0.147 0.105 -0.030 0.082 0.150 0.199 0.496 4659 
2007 0.105 0.104 -0.084 0.049 0.098 0.132 0.491 4542 
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2008 -0.080 0.135 -0.289 -0.167 -0.045 0.001 0.220 4283 
2009 -0.059 0.128 -0.255 -0.137 -0.022 0.015 0.275 4058 
2010 0.065 0.122 -0.163 0.000 0.036 0.111 0.456 3929 
2011 0.059 0.116 -0.136 0.000 0.030 0.098 0.450 3860 
2012 0.053 0.123 -0.154 0.000 0.014 0.080 0.537 3830 
2013 0.057 0.115 -0.170 0.000 0.016 0.092 0.521 3901 
2014 0.062 0.146 -0.161 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.590 4059 
2015 0.029 0.128 -0.207 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.501 4041 
2016 0.025 0.104 -0.199 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.411 3918 



















SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VALUE- WEIGHTED PORTFOLIO AVERAGE ANNUAL ASSET 
GROWTH RATE IN DECILES [FULL SAMPLE] 
DECILES MEAN STD. DEV P1 P25 P50 P75 P99 N 
1 -0.144 0.098 -0.404 -0.255 -0.106 -0.062 -0.035 7,488.00 
2 -0.002 0.007 -0.031 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 27,117.00 
5 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.014 0.018 2,832.00 
6 0.038 0.011 0.018 0.029 0.039 0.048 0.057 7,487.00 
7 0.076 0.011 0.058 0.067 0.076 0.086 0.095 7,488.00 
8 0.113 0.012 0.096 0.101 0.112 0.124 0.136 7,487.00 
9 0.169 0.021 0.137 0.151 0.167 0.188 0.201 7,487.00 
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10 0.322 0.166 0.203 0.239 0.271 0.320 1.048 7,487.00 

























APPENDIX C:  
ADDITIONAL CHANNELS DRIVING SIMILARITY IN ASSET GROWTH USING 
INVESTMENT RATE 
 
Similarity in Investment Rate across connected firms  
We regress similarity in investment rate of stock (i) on average investment rate of firms connected to stock i 
Dependent  Variable:   Annual Investment Rate of stock (i) 
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No of Observations 74,873 67,393 67,393 53,194 53,194 53,194 
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Firm Fixed Effects No  No No  No  No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.002 0.044 0.053 0.062 0.072 0.017 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  











APPENDIX C (Continued):  
 
Similarity in Investment Rate across connected firms leading the similarity in asset growth rate  
We regress investment rate residual of stock (i) on average investment rate of firms connected to stock (i) to 
further test whether connected firms grow asset related. The dependent variable is the absolute difference 
between investment rate of stock (i) and average investment rate of portfolio of firms connected for stock (i). 
We refer to the difference as stock (i) own investment rate without the influence of firms connected to firm (i) 
Dependent  Variable:   Residual Annual Investment Rate of stock (i) 
















161 | P a g e  
 
 





















































































































No of Observations 74,873 67,393 67,393 53,194 53,194 53,194 
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Firm Fixed Effects No  Yes No  No  No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.047 0.096 0.053 0.128 0.131 0.111 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  











Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables and Controls 
Corporate Finance Variables & Controls 
Variable Mean Std. Dev P25 P50 P75 Obs. 
Key Variable of Interest  
Annual Asset Growth Rate 0.089 0.332 -0.028 0.024 0.135 74,873 
Corporate Investment Variables 
Acquisition Rate 0.014 0.067 0.000 0.000 0.000 74,873 
Non-Merger Growth Rate 0.983 1.653 0.875 1.018 1.121 74,873 
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R&D Rate 0.103 0.721 -0.171 -0.010 0.168 22,427 
Investment Rate 0.061 0.276 0.001 0.019 0.056 74,873 
Acquisition Ratio 0.031 0.112 0.000 0.000 0.005 74,873 
Firm Performance Measure 
ROA  0.030 0.235 0.015 0.077 0.142 72,122 
Firm Characteristics  
CapX rate 0.038 0.061 0.001 0.018 0.046 74,873 
Cash Ratio 0.194 0.234 0.029 0.091 0.274 74,866 
EP -0.123 0.591 -0.049 0.035 0.065 74,708 
Investment Ratio 0.539 1.948 0.067 0.171 0.356 74,873 
Leverage 0.254 0.254 0.017 0.182 0.421 74,493 
M/B 2.730 4.493 1.085 1.794 3.162 74,771 
No of CEOs per firm 1.875 1.054 1.000 2.000 2.000 8,736 
No of Employees 8.554 42.579 0.179 0.826 4.290 74,377 
Sale($billion) 2,662.70 12,592.38 53.55 253.45 1,166.97 74,772 
Stock Return (Annual) -0.014 0.532 -0.199 0.000 0.236 74,873 
Tangibility  0.210 0.237 0.029 0.113 0.310 72,106 
Total Assets ($billion) 7,178.439 60,034.290 120.208 537.728 2,176.265 74,873 
CEO Network Size 
CEO Network Total  23.526 35.366 2.000 10.000 29.000 
 
7,453 
CEO Network Total (Same Industry) 4.193 5.707 1.000 2.000 5.000 2,851 
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for all the corporate finance variables used in the paper. Appendix A 















Table 2: Commonality in Asset Growth across connected firms [Full Sample]                                                                                              Independent Variable:   Annual Asset Growth 
From (1)-(7): For each firm (i) in year (t), we run the time series regression 
, 0 , , ,i t AG j t i t i tAssetGrowth AssetGrowth X         , where AssetG
is defined as the percentage change in total asset from the fiscal year ending in calendar year 2t  to fiscal year ending in calendar 1t  , AssetG Connected measures the percentage change in 
total asset from the fiscal year ending in calendar year 2t  to fiscal year ending in calendar 1t   of firms that are connected to firm (i) while X represent control variables that influence total assets. The 
regression coefficient 
1 thus asset growth betas measures the asset growth rate in firm (i’s) to asset growth rate of firms connected to firm (i’s). Thus we investigate whether firms in same network grow asset 
similarly.  Thus we expect asset growth betas   to be 
1 0    and significant.  Our sample includes annual data for NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX –listed firms for the period of January 2000 to December, 2016.     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 





















































































































































Year effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm effects No No No No No Yes  Yes  
Industry Effects  No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R-Square 0.007 0.258 0.262 0.279 0.284 0.257 0.292 
Observations 74,873 67,975 67,975 53,440 53,440 67,975 53,440 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix A defines all the variables  
 
164 | P a g e  
 
Table 3: Commonality in Asset Growth across connected firms in same industry [Sub Sample]                                                        Independent Variable:   Annual Asset Growth 
For (1)-(7): For each firm (i) in year (t), we run the time series regression 
, 0 , , 3 , ,i t AG j t AGS k t i t i tAssetGrowth AssetGrowth AssetGrowth X            , where AssetG
is defined as the percentage change in total asset from the fiscal year ending in calendar year 2t  to fiscal year ending in calendar 1t  , AssetG Connected SameInd  measures the percentage 
change in total asset from the fiscal year ending in calendar year 2t  to fiscal year ending in calendar 1t   of firms that are connected to firm (i)  an in same industry while 
X represent control variables that influence total assets. The regression coefficient 
1 thus asset growth betas measures the asset growth rate in firm (i’s) to asset growth rate of firms connected to firm (i’s) but 
in same industry. Thus we investigate whether firms in same network grow asset similarly.  Thus we expect asset growth betas   to be 
1 0    and significant.  Our sample includes annual data for 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX –listed firms for the period of January 2000 to December, 2016. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 

















Commonality in Asset Growth 




















































































































































Year effects No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm effects No No No No No Yes  Yes  
Industry Effects  No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
Adjusted R-Square 0.009 0.261 0.263 0.280 0.280 0.268 0.282 
Observations 74,873 67,975 67,975 53,440 53,440 67,975 53,440 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix A defines all the variables  
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Table 4: Effect of Network Size on Asset Grwoth Commonality (Asset Growth Beta) [Full Sample] 
Table 4 presents Asset Growth Beta sorted by firms network size.This table presents descriptive of Asset Growth Betas for firms 
that are connected irrespective of the industry. We present this results to investigate whether the magnitude of Asset Growth co-
movement as evidence above increases with reference to network size of firms or to the number of firms connected to a specific 
firm. 
 




0.125 0.000 1.014 -2.940 0.000 0.321 2.614          1,534  
 
Network Size 
Quintile 2 0.102 0.028 21.567 -10.258 -0.135 0.421 5.290          1,280  
 
Network Size 
Quintile 3 0.293 0.077 10.785 -10.406 -0.197 0.606 6.316          1,297  
 
Network Size 
 Quintile 4 0.662 0.203 12.568 -7.868 -0.201 0.794 11.722          1,380  
 
Network Size 
Quintile 5 0.626 0.361 6.449 -6.696 -0.119 1.090 15.444          1,347  























Table 5: Association between Commonality in Asset Growth  and CEO Network Size [Full Sample] 
 
Dependent Variable: Asset Growth Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) 
 









































































































No of Observations 6,838 6,261 6,261 6,261 6,261 
Firm Cluster No No No Yes  Yes 
Industry Effects No No  Yes No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.015 0.078 0.097 0.079 0.158 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
Appendix A defines all the variables  
 


















Table 6: Association between Commonality in Asset Growth  and CEO Network Size [Full Sample] 
Dependent Variable:  Total Value- Weighted Portfolio Average Asset Growth Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 



































































































No of Observations 6,327 5,983 5,983 5,984 5,984 
Firm Cluster No No No No Yes 
Industry Effects No No  Yes Yes Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.001 0.084 0.210 0.086 0.210 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
Appendix A defines all the variables  
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Table 7: Similarity in Acquisition Growth Rate across connected firms 
We regress annual acquisition growth rate of stock (i) on average acquisition rate of firms connected to stock (i) 
to test whether acquisition rate across connected firms is related.  
Dependent  Variable:   Annual Acquisition Rate of stock (i)  



































































































































No of Observations 74,873 68,510 68,510 53,901 53,901  
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  Yes   
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes    
Firm Fixed Effects No  Yes No  No  No  
Adjusted R-Square 0.003 0.120 0.132 0.150 0.160  
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table8 : Similarity in Acquisition Growth Rate across connected firms 
We regress acquisition growth rate residual of stock (i) on average acquisition rate of firms connected to stock 
(i) to further test whether connected firms grow asset related. The dependent variable is the absolute difference 
between acquisition rate of stock (i) and average acquisition rate of portfolio of firms connected for stock (i). We 
refer to the difference as stock (i) own acquisitions without the influence of firms connected to firm (i) 
Dependent  Variable:   Residual Annual Acquisition Rate of stock (i) 





















































































































































No of Observations 74,873 68,510 68,510 53,901 53,901 53,901 
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Firm Fixed Effects No  No No  No  No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.120 0.214 0.1223 0.237 0.244 0.235 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 9: Similarity in Non-Merger Asset Growth Rate across connected firms  
We regress non-merger asset growth rate of stock (i) on average non-merger asset growth rate of firms connected 
to stock (i) to test whether asset growth commonality across connected firms is linked to other sources aside 
acquisitions.  
Dependent  Variable:   Annual Non-Merger Asset Growth rate of stock (i) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Portfolio Average Annual 




















































































































































No of Observations 74,873 69,904 69,904 54,591 69,904  
Year Fixed Effects No No Yes No No  
Industry Fixed Effects No No No Yes No  
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.002 0.264 0.682 0.688 0.311  
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 10: Similarity in Non-Merger Asset Growth Rate across connected firms  
We regress non-acquisition growth rate residual of stock (i) on average non-acquisition rate of firms connected to 
stock (i) to further test whether connected firms grow asset related. The dependent variable is the absolute difference 
between non-acquisition rate of stock (i) and average non-acquisition rate of portfolio of firms connected for stock 
(i). We refer to the difference as stock (i) own non-acquisitions without the influence of firms connected to firm (i) 
Dependent  Variable:   Residual Annual Non-Merger Asset Growth rate of stock (i) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Portfolio Average Annual 









































       








































































































No of Observations 74,873 69,904 69,904 54,591 69,904  
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  No   
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  No    
Firm Fixed Effects No  No  No  No  Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.863 0.861 0.682 0.953 0.943  
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 11: Determinants of R&D Investment  Rate Regressions  
This table shows results where we regress a number of factors that determine the R&D investment decisions 
following the literature. We then obtain the residual for the R&D policy to measure R&D dissimilarity.   
Dependent  Variable:   Annual Acquisition Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
















































































































No of Observations 22,026 18,743 22,026 18,743 18,743  
Year Fixed Effects No  No Yes  Yes  Yes   
Industry Fixed Effects No  Yes No  Yes   Yes    
Firm Fixed Effects No  No  No  No Yes   
Adjusted R-Square 0.040 0.044 0.046 0.050 0.074  
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
















173 | P a g e  
 
 
Table 12: Similarity in R&D Growth Rate and Commonality in Asset Growth.  
Dependent  Variable:   Asset Growth Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 


















































































No of Observations 3,912 3,772 3,772 3,772  3,772 
Industry Fixed Effects No No Yes No  Yes 
Firm Clusters  No No No Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R-Square 0.004 0.092 0.122 0.094  0.213 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 13: Similarity in R & D Growth Rate across connected firms  
We regress R & D rate residual of stock (i) on average R & D rate of firms connected to stock (i) to further test 
whether connected firms grow asset related. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between R & D rate 
of stock (i) and average R & D rate of portfolio of firms connected for stock (i). We refer to the difference as stock 
(i) own R & D investments without the influence of firms connected to firm (i).  
Dependent  Variable:   Residual  R & D Growth Rate of stock (i) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio Average Annual 






































































































































































No of Observations 22,427 22,026 22,026 22,026 22,026 18,743 
Year Fixed Effects No  No    Yes  No  Yes  Yes  
Industry Fixed Effects No  No  No  Yes  Yes   Yes   
Firm Fixed Effects No  Yes  No  No  No Yes  
Adjusted R-Square 0.054 0.161 0.161 0.197 0.197 0.271 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 14: Commonality in Asset Growth and Firm Performance   
We regress Asset Growth Beta of stock (i) on firm performance of stock (i) measured here by 
RoA to investigate whether asset growth commonality affects firm performance.  
Dependent  Variable: Return on Asset (ROA)  [Full Sample] 
 (1) (2) (3) 

















































No of Observations 3,727 3,630 3,630 
Industry Fixed Effects No  Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster  No  No  Yes 
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Table 15: Commonality in Asset Growth and Firm Performance   
We regress Asset Growth Beta of stock (i) on firm performance of stock (i) measured  by Stock 
Returns to investigate whether asset growth commonality affects firm performance.  
Dependent  Variable: Annual Stock Returns   [Full Sample] 
 (1) (2) (3) 










































No of Observations 3,803 3,632 3,632 
Industry Fixed Effects No  Yes Yes 
Firm Cluster  No  No  Yes 
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Table 16: 2 Stage Regressions Using Instrumental Variables 
 1st stage 
Dep= CEO  Total Network Size 
2nd Stage 
Dep =Asset Growth Beta 
CEO Total Network Size  - 0.252*** 
(0.000) 































Observations  5,915 5,915 
Adjusted R- Square 4.8% 18.7% 
Partial F-Statistics  44.52 (p-value <0.0001) 
Weak Identification Test Cragg-Donald Wald F = 553.664 
 Stock-Yogo C.V : 10% Max IV 16.38 
 Stock-Yogo C.V : 25% Max IV 5.53 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  Appendix 
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Table 17 :Endogeneity: Difference-in-Difference using CEOs’ Death 
Dependent Variable 
Asset Growth Beta 
Panel A Panel B 
 1 2 3 4 
















































Observations 715 715 5,247 5,247 
Adjusted R- Square 0.006 0.032 0.041 0.137 
All p-values are in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
Appendix A defines all the variables 
In Panel A we consider firms that actually recorded CEO death within the sample period. 
In Panel B we consider firms that did not recorded CEO death but a CEO in the network of firms connected 





















1. Summary of Findings 
Social networks have attracted much attention from researchers in finance in recent years. 
Numerous studies examine the impact of social connections on firm outcomes. However, it 
remains an open question the extent to which CEO networks affect firms. In this thesis, we 
explore the effects of CEO networks on corporations by focusing on two important dimensions 
that have been largely ignored in published studies. Specifically, this study examines the role 
of social and professional interactions among firm executives in corporations focusing on the 
link between CEO connectedness and commonality in liquidity and the association between 
CEO peer effects and asset growth across connected firms. In the first part, we investigate 
whether commonality in stock liquidity can be driven by CEO connectedness. We hypothesize 
that stock liquidity of connected firms will comove because of convergence in corporate 
activities among connected firms. In the second part, we argue that through peer effects, 
connected CEOs are likely to adopt similar asset growth strategies leading to commonality in 
asset growth.  
 
Although a number of studies provide evidence of liquidity commonality among stocks, most 
of these studies primarily focus on market-level determinants leading to the conclusion that 
liquidity commonality is driven by supply-side and demand-side sources. In the first part, we 
focus on firm level determinants by focusing on CEO networks that create connectedness 
among firms as a potential source of liquidity commonality. In the light of the above argument, 
we analyse, for the first time in the literature, whether CEO networks that facilitate similarity 
in corporate behaviour drive commonality in liquidity. Using stocks listed on NYSE and 
AMEX for 2000-2016, we examine whether the stock liquidity of connected firms covary. We 
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find strong evidence that suggests that stock liquidity of connected firms covary. We also show 
that the magnitude of liquidity covariation among connected stocks increases with network 
size. This suggests that the larger the network of a firm, the larger the liquidity covariation.  
 
We further investigate the potential channels through which CEOs network ties drive liquidity 
commonality across connected stocks. We find evidence that indicates that similarity in 
corporate decisions across connected firms drives liquidity commonality. We also find that 
there are similarities in the trading activities of connected firms that drive commonality in 
liquidity.  We address concerns for endogeneity and find that the death of a CEO in a firm 
reduces the extent and magnitude of liquidity covariation.  
 
In essay two, we investigate the relationship between CEO networks and asset growth 
decisions. The extant literature on determinants of asset growth suggests that firm age and size 
are key factors that determine asset growth rates. However, following the significant influence 
of CEO networks on corporations, we investigate for the first time in empirical corporate 
finance literature, the linkages between asset growth rates of firms with CEOs having personal 
connections. We conjecture that through peer effects, CEOs with personal connections will 
grow assets similarly leading to commonality in asset growth among connected firms. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that the asset growth rates of firms that are connected through 
CEO connectedness will comove. We test this hypothesis on a sample of 13,980 CEOs in 8,736 
firms listed on NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ over 2000-2016. We find that the asset growth rates 
of firms that are connected through CEOs personal connection comove strongly. We next test 
whether commonality in asset growth among connected firms is beneficial to shareholders. We 
provide evidence that indicates that commonality in asset growth reduces the wealth of 
shareholders.  
181 | P a g e  
 
 
In the light of these results, we analyse whether similarity in M&A decisions and R&D 
investment rates among connected firms positively drives asset growth commonality. We 
provide evidence that suggests that CEOs with personal connections mimic the asset growth 
strategies of their peers through social learning leading to commonality in asset growth among 
firms with CEOs having personal connections. We address potential endogeneity problems and 
find that the death of a CEO significantly affects the magnitude of commonality in asset growth 
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